THE AMERICAN EUTOPIA

by

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The ideal land is small
Its people very few,
Where tools abound
Ten times or yet
A hundred-fold
Beyond their use;
Where people die
And die again
But never emigrate;
Have boats and carts
Which no one rides.
Weapons have they
And armor too,
But none displayed.
The folk returns
To use again
The knotted cords.
Their meat is sweet;
Their clothes adorned,
Their homes at peace,
Their customs charm.

And neighbor lands
Are juxtaposed
So each may hear
The barking dogs,
The crowing cocks
Across the way;
Where folks grow old
And folks will die
And never once
Exchange a call.

--Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching; R. B. Blakney, trans.

APOLOGIA

One of the earliest themes of the ecology movement to be exploited by the popular press has been that of "overpopulation". Many books and articles have flowed from the pens of population pundits since the Sixties. Some have been best sellers. Despite this flurry of rhetoric very little has been written advancing expanded future freedoms. It would seem that the role of a modern Paul Revere is most comfortable. If one is against pronatalism and the demographic consequences of too many people doing too much to our one Earth, that would seem enough to many. Even the "radical" Z. P. G. movement postulates as its norm two children as an average we should strive for, implying that a couple should have some children to be normal. However, most of life's processes remain hidden to such perspectives. Exciting options remain closed to most of us, simply because we have grown too complacent to seek them out. I seek to correct some of this myopia.

Quite often theory and practice advance simultaneously, neither really leading the other. So it was that the Z. P. G. movement flowered in the early Seventies--at the same time our national fertility rate plummeted toward eventual zero growth levels.

Yet we are still beset with problems of pollution, energy, "stagflation," alienation, etc. ad nauseum. Despite the great successes of the Z. P. G. movement we should ask ourselves how deeply implanted is this new ideology in our national consciousness. The table below was printed in the 12/31/74 issue of H. E. W.'s Monthly Vital Statistics Report. Clearly shown is the sharp drop in American fertility rates, beginning at the end of 1970. Equally clearly shown is the bottoming-out and slight upward movement of that drop just three years later.



Even after the drop in fertility to 15.7 births per 1,000 population in October, 1974--the excess of births over deaths for that month alone was 119,000 persons. To some people this amount is not a great deal when put into a national or a worldwide perspective. Nevertheless, in a world already beset by a critical shortage of affordable food of good

quality this addition could hardly add to the welfare of our species. If (as will be detailed later) each American will consume in his or her lifetime twenty-five to fifty times as much as the average Indian in India, then the real increase in population in America in October, 1974 alone was from 2,975,000 to 5,950,000 Indian equivalents! This is we recall after the decline in birth rates. [Worldwide population growth is 200,000 each day, or 73 million a year. More than 45 million are born in countries not currently self-sufficient in food.]

There has recently been a rash of so-called disaster movies. They feature ships, tall buildings, even cities subjected to violent and dramatic destruction. And these movies have been very successful at the box office. Why? One key is their identifiable human drama; the viewer can project himself into the events. How well does the real world's chronic food and freedom dilemma stand against such melodrama in the consciousness of the average American voter? Sadly, if it were not for television news the average American would neither know of nor care about the mass starvation imperiling his Third World brothers and sisters. Just say grace over that overcooked turkey, and God will bless you....

It has not been my intention in writing this book to echo and catalogue all the excellent exposés of

our world's crisis. Rather, I have sought out systemic origins of man's dual nature: saint and cannibal. I will not overload the reader with mystical quasi-Freudian theory. The dynamics of love and alienation can be seen in phenomenological terms. Process refers to events where there is no voluntary or intentional agent; praxis involves willful agents. In areas where human activity displays demonical process it is our duty to analyze its constituent forces, and deliver process to the guidance of ethical praxis. After all, is not choice of destiny the only thing which separates historical man from other animals?

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This book began as a magazine article setting forth the idea of negative population growth, population shrinkage for America over the next century. It was thought that a simple reduction in the total level of population would have far-reaching systemic effects. As I researched and thought deeper it soon became apparent that nobody could honestly and fully deal briefly with all of the relevant factors at work in a mere magazine article. Even now, in a much more elaborate form, the subject is treated in a thematic, abbreviated form.

Our inquiry will focus on population and government. My point of value reference is the individual. Philosophically, I am as opposed to gigantism of the "Left" as I am to that of the "Right." Only

the welfare of the individual counts: the state and its society are merely matrices for interaction. Just because society antecedes and tutors the individual, it does not thereby follow that an individual's worth is a social derivative. For an individual to be individual there must occur a dialectical struggle between the given (society) and its new arrival. Just as the evolution of body form has followed an ancient dialectic, so too the evolution of culture and ethics has followed the dialectic of novelty confronting the established. But social matrices have a systemic life of their own: two chapters on methodology follow an introductory chapter to better tool us for dealing with the seemingly abstract "thingness" of social order.

I have consulted many sources of varied content and perspective. If Source X is praised for Observation Y--it does not necessarily follow that I agree with everything Source X says. Conversely, if a source is criticized over one or more points it does not necessarily follow that I disagree with all that is not brought into my discussion herein. Therefore, it would only be fair for most of my readers to disagree with me at one or more points along the way to our mutual exploration of people and their governments. A large part of this book deals with the future: My vision of what the future could and should bring may be honestly disputed from several angles.

A note on reference style:

(1) Footnotes are numbered for each page of this text.

(2) Each bibliographical note is given in these footnotes in abbreviated form by author and date of publication for the first printing of the edition I consulted.

(3) Complete references are found in the Selected Bibliography of Sources Cited at the end of the text, arranged alphabetically by author. If an earlier date is also supplied it is of the last copyright date. Subtitles are supplied when they help clarify meanings of titles.

CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

Historians for a thousand years will be fascinated by the two phenomena of mass slaughter and rapid population growth in the twentieth century. Nowhere is the pathos more acute than in the history of the United States of America in the last decades.

This country is far from leading the numbers game either in slaughter or in population growth rates. The pathos lies in the sordid reality of the world's oldest constitutional democracy rampaging in Vietnam, sucking up a disproportionate share of the earth's non-renewable resources and, most ominously, being the only government to ever A-bomb--twice--another people. The rabies theory may work with Hitler's Germany; but what theory fits America?

This book will attempt to demonstrate some of the causal links between population growth and anomie, between technological sophistication and bewitchment of the citizenry, between information overload and numbness toward the fates of other peoples, and so forth. Our purpose is to help find ways Americans can <u>restructure</u> their government to bring back both a sense of and the reality of a society more sensitive to what the "little man" needs to become a philosopher.

This philosophical goal seems absurd to the realpolitiker. After all, hasn't history upheld Hobbes more than Locke and Jefferson? Despite this, new technologies and other structural changes, such as population shrinkage, can now open up avenues to a eutopic nation which our founding fathers could only dream of. We need not search for any "utopia," which means "no place"; rather, our future can become a "eutopia," which literally means a "good place." The gap between vision and potential future reality is not all that great. All that is needed is a new awareness of how systems work, of how we the people can relate honestly to each other, rather than manipulate each other.

There are now more professional thinkers practicing their craft in this world than ever before. It is a truism that there are more scientists alive now than the total number of scientists in all of civilization's past. Yet....what has science done to us? Science has put atomic matches into the child man's hands.

The history of the twentieth century reads like a murder mystery where the murder act and the murderer are known: The real mystery is the motive. To find the motive we cannot expect to find a simple linear cause-and-effect relationship. There are no

influential but simplistic $E=mc^2$ formulae to be found in the study of social man. The social philosopher cannot condense social reality into a crystal stereotype. The only permanent thing is change; but change does have its logic.

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Our innocence, our psychic hymen, was burst on that fateful August 6, 1945 when the mushroom cloud evaporated 100,000 civilians in Hiroshima. It is not my purpose to discuss in detail here what happened before and after that day.[1] Rather it is my purpose to show in this chapter how a breakdown in democratic and humanitarian spirit can occur despite a superstructure of democracy. Later we will search for things that can be done to quell the beast in man--for his own survival.

There is in history one notable example of a great democracy committing atrocities such as we have at Hiroshima and Mylai. That sorrowful episode belongs to the Athenians during the later phases of the Peloponnesian War. The victims were the islanders of Melos. These people were neutral and wished no

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[1]For a full discussion see Smith, 1965, pp. 157-179; Grodzins and Rabinowitch, eds., 1963, pp. 11-43; and Lifton, 1971.

harm to Athens. Thucydides, the first great historian, tells us how the Melians asked only to be free; while the Athenians demanded they become a tributary ally. When the Melians refused this offer the Athenians ". . . put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves . . . ."[1] Subsequently, Athens was herself defeated by Sparta, even though she was richer and generally stronger.

Up to now the fate of Athens has not been the fate of America. Did Hiroshima teach us anything about man's inhumanity to man? Orville Schell reports in The New Republic how killing Vietnamese was called "squirrel hunting." One captain, when asked how he knew the person he had just shot was a Viet Cong, replied, "Son, I know he's a VC by the nine bullet holes in his chest."[2]

If man is biologically a killer ape there might be some slim justification for his killing on a face-to-face level, as was done at Mylai. But there is also man's cerebral cortex, supposedly the seat of ethics and rationality. It is the cerebral cortex which relates to technology. Or does it?

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[1]Thucydides, 1951, p. 337.

[2]Schell, 1970, p. 19; see also Edward M. Opton, Jr., "It Never Happened and Besides They Deserved it," in Sanford et al., 1972, pp. 49-70.

The following episode casts doubt on even science and technology as a protective barrier between man and his capacity for self-destruction.

The CBS 60 Minutes program of April 23, 1972 ran a segment where correspondent Morley Safer interviewed crew members of a B-52 which routinely released thirty tons of bombs over unseen areas of Southeast Asia.[1] Because of the super sophistication of these planes pilots and crew relate only to the plane's computers. Yet they believe they are in control.

Despite the vast carnage these war machines caused, the pilot of this plane cooly said, ". . . it's hard to get personally involved." Safer queries an officer: "It strikes me as though you're almost the extensions of the computer. . . ." The officer denies this heatedly. Safer asks the radar officer what tells them when they are on target. Answer: "We have the computer. . . ." The pilot summarizes the attitude of his crew: "We're professionals. We do our job. That's what it amounts to."

Safer ends our trip into fantasy land with a sobering thought:

> Perhaps the reason those professionals can remain so cool and detached is that few of them have ever witnessed a B-52 strike on the ground. Those seconds of explosion can seem a lifetime.

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[1] CBS, 1972.

> On the ground, the earth shudders violently and divides. And afterwards: an even more frightening silence.[1]

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Some people may object to this resurrection of alienated atrocities as instant ancient history. All Lady Macbeth needed was an enzyme detergent to wash the blood from her hands. All America needs is "time" to fade memories and heal the wounds. This narcotization of consciousness is a useful psychological defense. Americans, alas, are good at this: After the Eichman trial and its detailing of the Nazi atrocities fully forty-seven per cent of the American public either had no opinion or felt the Jews were to blame for the genocide that befell them.[2]

Before this century disease was the great killer. Man-made death in its direct and indirect forms now rules. The scale of carnage has changed; the quantitative increment has assumed a new grisly quality. Megadeath is the new word reflecting the new horror. The nuclear shadow casts its darkness into every person's future, mocking values, love. Gil Elliot says that the scale and shape of man-made death is the central moral and material fact facing our civilization.[3] He points out that the 100,000,000

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[1] Ibid., p. 11.
[2] Glock, et al., 1970, p. 136.
[3] Elliot, 1972, p. 6.

already killed in our century can only be compared to an entire nation massacred.

Elliot sees the identity of machine and man as a mechanthropoid creation.[1] The psychiatrist R. D. Laing contemplates this carnage and suggests:

> Either our inter-human behavior is unintelligible, in that we are simply the passive vehicles of inhuman processes . . ., or our own behavior towards each other is a function of our own experience and our own intentions, however alienated we are from them.[2]

Note clearly the association of experience and intentions; for intentions are largely a function of experience.

Another viewpoint is reflected in the thoughts of Anthony Storr who claims that the need for weapons is rooted in man's biological vulnerability.[3] Since man has no inhibitions against acquiring weapons, man has no built-in safeguards against using any of his weapons, especially if the target is impersonal and can be abstracted by the potential aggressor.

Storr comes closer to the truth as I see it when he notes: "One feature of modern existence which tends to convert aggression into hate is the

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[1] Ibid., p. 47.
[2] Laing, 1968, p. 28.
[3] Storr, 1970, pp. 125-128.

size and complexity of civilized institutions."[1] He notes that being a cog in a machine robs one of personal pride, producing collective man, rather than healthy individuals.

Erich Fromm blames freedom itself for setting the individual loose from the bonds of pre-individualistic society. This is an anarchic, anomic conception of freedom which Fromm is referring to. Isolated, the individual seeks to escape from his anxious freedom. There are two avenues of escape from this tension: either into new dependencies, or into "the full realization of positive freedom which is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man."[2] He thus weds Hobbes and Locke, through psychology.

The task then of modifying social systems which generate anomie and cognitive dissonance is to craft a social matrix which controls violence but allows cooperative competition to continue. The systems designer must attempt to consider all dynamic elements of all relevant systems. Martin Kuenzlen warns us that formal system changes do not necessarily bring about substantial change in the character of a system. Subtle rules, controls and hierarchical influences can persist below outward forms.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 129.
[2] Fromm, 1968, p. viii.
[3] Kuenzlen, 1972, p. 91.

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Consider the lowly cockroach: His morality is simple and elegantly functional--"eat or be eaten." This is just a variant of the "might makes right" ethos. Cockroaches serve each other by erotic union and vast multiplication of their numbers whenever possible. Their great Malthusian growth potential has kept them viable as a species for many times longer than man has existed; they will be here long after the last man has breathed his last breath.

The cockroach does not hesitate to eat his lame brother. Humans prefer a more subtle form of cannibalism: malnutrition and starvation, indifference to loneliness, and pollution of the physical and spiritual environment. In contrast, the stupid roach does not have enough sophistication to hate his food-antagonist. It seems that man alone is blessed with an ideology of hatred--rooted in fear and ignorance of the humanity of his brothers.[1]

Humans dwell in a society, just as do cockroaches. The chief characteristic of any society is its set of rules of conduct for the members of the social body. In-group morality is designed to protect the integrity of the group. Out-groups are outside

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[1]See Allport, 1958, for a discussion of ideological fears, as well as for an analysis of in-groups and out-groups.

the moral restraints of the in-group. Therefore war is always quite legal, even if immoral. Relationships within a complex society do not always follow in-group norms: Tension is generated when cooperation is pushed aside by competition, when exploitation is labeled "Progress"; in short, when "might makes right" becomes the operational morality of an entire culture.

We cannot condemn the lowly cockroach for his genetic nature. It has served his species well. The individual cockroach is nothing but an energy cell to the rest of cockroach society. In sharp contrast is the human emphasis on each individual finding value in the social matrix. This is a clear example of the abstract form of social order remaining similar among species, while at the same time the contents of these societies differ to such a large degree that the very quality of human society <u>can be</u> fundamentally different from that of roach society.

The major reason for cockroach morality usually differing from the ideals and practices of human society is in the <u>different birth rates</u> of the two species. Whenever the individual is swamped by a sea of similar bodies--his personal value is minimized by his society. He can be replaced; he is redundant. Whenever the birth rate is low enough for the individual's unique birth to mean something to his cohorts--his potential social value is maximized.

Technology and language have largely freed humans from the bounds of instinctive behavior. But man has also become desensitized to his ecological relationship with nature. Faustian culture ignores the Yin and the Yang at its peril. Our one-dimensional concern with accumulating power has largely left us blind to the simple fact that there is always power in every dynamic structure, and that distribution, not accumulation, is the norm among life forms. Dynamic equilibrium has each power, each right, balanced by another; each is protected so that the social organism itself can change from within as well as from without. An open, homeostatic system initiates a relationship with its environment, as well as responding to that environment.

In this Age of the Atom we can at last see what frail specks we are, clinging to the skin of our spaceship Earth. Humanity's only lasting solution to the peril of chaotic disequilibrium is to extend the embrace of in-group morality to all people, to all of the biosphere where possible. This accomplishment will take more than lots of "good will"; it will take a more sophisticated appreciation of how cultures are put together, and of how the individual can be given maximum freedom, without minimizing the necessary social bonds.

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It is a central tenet of this book that the worst way to try to morally improve a man is to structure his life so that his actions are supposed to be programmed for his own good. If Man is reduced to robot status all of his actions are meaningless in a moral sense. Freedom is best defined as options. Can a society which by its very growth processes increasingly narrows the range of meaningful options be considered a good and free society?

There are many areas where growth in scale brings with it more interdependence and its handmaiden, discipline. Social discipline exists in inverse relationship to individual power, and in direct relationship to size. In a large society many forces which affect the individual are beyond his personal control. In a smaller, modern community the social power has less potential; the individual has a better opportunity to escape the fate of "mass man."[1]

The philosopher, Sebastian de Grazia, cites bigness itself as one of today's great problems.[2] He points out that the Greeks tried to solve growth

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[1]Good discussions are J. W. Dyckman, "Some Conditions of Civic Order in an Urbanized World," in Hoffman, ed., 1968, pp. 300-315; A. S. Miller, "Some Observations on the Political Economy of Population Growth," in Shimm, and Everett, eds., 1961, pp. 238-253; and Stockwell, 1970, pp. 199-205.

[2]Grazia, 1964, p. 394.

problems by building new cities for their people; the Romans built roads, bridges and deified their emperor to hold their empire together. Modern society has tried to glue together its culture with the broadcast media--a poor substitute for community. He concludes we have literally built on air.

Another perspective is S.P.R. Charter's.[1] Charter warns us to avoid the panacea of merely encouraging fewer births. Our numbers are already so large that birth control alone cannot generate awareness of the value of life. If technology alone contained the answers then the form of government would not really matter, since all solutions would be extra-governmental. However, the relationship of man to his society is critical, for the man-machine world becomes increasingly statistical, increasingly standardized; and individual man becomes expendable. Charter adds:

> In the context of population-pressures such expendability is frightening. Even those in power are expendable as individuals since power now is essentially technological and its controllers essentially Man-Machine beings who, by the time they reach positions of control, possess more similarity one to another than individuality in terms of purpose and response.[2]

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[1]Charter, 1968, pp. 40-52.

[2]Ibid., p. 42.

Over half of those now living should be alive in the twenty-first century. Yet our conventional wisdom is mostly of the nineteenth century. C. W. Griffin, Jr., postulates that our nineteenth-century tradition of destroying our natural environment without a thought for the future has helped anesthetize us to war atrocities.[1] Our frontier culture survives today in the shallow shell of selfish individualism. Even altruism seeks a tax deduction.

We are suffering a national energy crisis; but such crises don't appear without preparation. We are likewise suffering a pollution problem: rates of cancer, heart and lung diseases are soaring for congested areas--offering eloquent testimony of the body's revulsion against these assaults--even while the mind chooses to ignore. The quality of life itself suffers in the surfeit of self-destructing consumer goods. Most important: happiness itself has not increased along with the increase in quantity of material comforts. More and more we Americans enjoy neither life, liberty, nor the pursuit of happiness.

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[1]Griffin, 1970, p. 59.

CHAPTER II:

SYSTEMS AND SOCIETY

Reality is the same for everyone. Perception of reality is not. If directed action is dependent on perception, and if reality is sufficiently plastic to respond to various chosen actions, it follows that perceptions can be the key to our potential freedoms. This chapter is dedicated to exploring in a fresh way dynamisms which largely predetermine how we live our social lives. If it can be shown that there are significant gaps in necessary perception within conventional wisdom--we will have found a major key to the frustrations which beset our era. Even major reforms are wasted when they are carried out inside a sterile framework.

I believe much progress can be made by a reexamination of two analytical tools: systems theory, and the quantity-quality dialectic. We will first examine what a system is in the abstract, and then see how social groups on all functional levels, from cells to macrosocieties, operate within the logos of systems. In the next chapter we will explore the fascinating frontier of the quantity-quality dialectic.

The first clear impression one has of a system as a whole is a gestalt, a mental picture with

its unique form. The gestalt is composed of figure and background, just as all matter and all space exist in necessary apposition.[1] One cannot view a whole in its linear aspects, for it has none, as a whole. Linearity is one-dimensional; planes are two-dimensional; space is three-dimensional; space and time, which is the living reality, is four-dimensional.

Books are structured along one-dimensional lines. The components of books may relate to other dimensions, but books and indeed nearly all written messages follow the basic linear dimension. A one-dimensional medium is thus hard put to accurately deal with a four-dimensional reality. Poets approach this space and time reality, but falter. McLuhanesque photomontages approach, but falter.

Therefore, we are stuck with an inadequate medium to reflect protean reality. The tyranny of one word following another word, of one paragraph, of one chapter following another--all conspire to segment the presentation of reality, and thus distort it. Presentation is a chief ingredient of subsequent perception. If I choose to defy convention and babble on as if I were madly mixing thoughts, many readers would become alienated from my style, and thus my message.

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[1] Köhler, 1947, pp. 102-122; and Perls, et al., 1951, pp. 25-29.

So it is that this book is unable to reflect the reality of its subject. Isomorphism must yield to tradition. A clear example of this dilemma is the following presentation of systems theory and its companion, the quantity-quality dialectic. In fact, they are one, but will be treated differently via their different manifestations. The rest of this book too labors under false divisions. The eloquence of social reality is not that of micro-physical reality: Society's oriental tapestry is not chemistry's crystalline structure.

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There are many words and concepts which a systems theorist uses to describe the behavior of systems. The average person casually uses some of them, often in a contradictory way. This confusion is not surprising, since most of our perceptions are historical and linear, or psychological and private.

A few systems words are coming into modern currency. The "in" word among business students is synergy, meaning the increased energy produced from the interaction of two or more energy sources. This is an energy formulation of the Gestaltist's cliché: The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. More than this happens: The whole is also dialectically

different from its parts. This example illustrates how a mere word (synergy) can be the door which opens up a new perception, one which allows us to probe deeper into the mystery of social existence.

There are other words and concepts worth mentioning: entropy and negentropy; feedback and feedforward; open systems and closed systems; field theory; elasticity; dynamic conservatism; steady states; overshoot; false start; equifinality; cybernetics; boundaries, internal environments and external environments; hierarchies; and so forth. All of these concepts apply to simple as well as to complex systems. What goes on inside a family can be put into the same type of framework as what goes on at the United Nations.

The purpose of our systems inquiry will be achieved if and when we find those nodal points where social dynamisms can be modified to allow for maximal personal individuation, as well for social progress.

A system is more than just a cluster of phenomena which happen to be going on at some place at some time. A system is a group of interacting elements which form a whole via mutual interactions. A system has functions which usually exist by virtue

of structural design requirements.[1] Changes in either functional or structural requirements will necessitate corresponding adjustments in either structure or function. There must be a communication among the elements of a system; this linkage is accomplished via feedback mechanism. Simple stimulus-response is functionally similar to advanced cogitation, systemically.

Each feedback network consists of three essential components: receptor, control apparatus, and effector. The receptor receives a message/stimulus and passes it on to the control apparatus. It in turn communicates its message to the effector; the system then initiates its response to the original stimulus which the receptor received.[2]

The "original" stimulus comes either from within the system or from outside the system. Our analysis cannot start anywhere, for all systems are interrelated in space and time: It is best to talk of the state and behavior of a given field of systems at a given time.[3] It is more important not to think of all possible systems influencing an event/message, but rather of the significant elements of that event's field. What is significant now at this time may

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[1] Parsegian, 1973, pp. 21-33.

[2] Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 43.

[3] Cf. Lewin, 1964, p. 45.

be irrelevant under later conditions. Nevertheless, despite existential changes, the principles of change are constant within systems theory.

The general phenomenon of regulation can be seen in terms of communication. Channels of communication have their limits. The Law of Requisite Variety states: A regulator's capacity as regulator cannot exceed its capacity as a channel of communication.[1] If another channel is not available to carry surplus message elements--noise appears in a message. We will see later how noise applies to social activity in excess.

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Our discussuon of noise leads us to a very significant concept: entropy. Entropy is a mathematical measure of the disorganization of a system. The opposite of entropy is called negentropy; this is a system's order.[2] Entropy is an idea which started out in discussions of transfer of heat from a warm body to a cooler body. It was noted that the transfer went always in one direction, from warmer to cooler bodies in a closed thermodynamic system. Open systems, where outside temperatures were interfering, did not follow the law of entropy, or progressive movement of a closed system to chaos.

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[1] W. R. Ashby, "Self-regulation and Requisite Variety," in Emery, 1969, p. 115.

[2] See Whitrow, 1967; Henninger, 1967, p. 89; Bertalanffy, 1968, pp. 39-41, 159; Parsegian, 1973, pp. 49-51, 198-201; White, 1959, pp. 34-35; and Monod, 1971, pp. 59-60, 197-199.

Systems are of two types when viewed thermodynamically: closed and open. In a fully closed system, a system isolated from interacting with the rest of the universe, the total quantity of energy is constant. It is only the quality of that energy which changes. An open system interacts with other systems, so that the total quantity of energy can vary. All of the Universe, we hypothesize, follows the Law of Conservation of Energy and Matter. Totality is thus a "closed system." [Does Totality therefore follow the Law of Entropy? This question is beyond human knowledge.]

Organization of energy is a measure of its qualities. A system which has more energy available for work than it has energy in a chaotic state is said to be relatively negentropic. Because all"states" within chaos are the same, and because we can describe the state of a system in terms of probability distributions, we note that entropy is higher for states having a higher probability of occurrence.[1] Thus we can converse about statistical equilibriums of molecules in a closed system, when we cannot study them in terms of Newton's laws.[2] In thermodynamic equilibrium there are no microphenomena. Only where negentropy exists can discrete energy sub-systems be found. Life is that negentropy in a universe of chaos and death.

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[1] Parsegian, 1973, p. 50.

[2] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

The model of a closed system is for our purposes just that. Closed systems in nature are rare and transitory. Perhaps only the just discovered stellar "black holes" could qualify as macrophenomena worthy of permanent inclusion in this category. Even here we must note that the "black hole" is not closed in both directions; its great gravity pulls other matter toward its center, even light. Thus the "black hole" qualifies because it relates unidirectionally; whereas an open system relates reciprocally with its surrounding system environment.

Only an open system contains the possibility of a return to order from relative chaos. The degree of order can be defined in terms of information. Monod observes, "the order of a system . . . is equal to the quantity of information required for the description of that system."[1] Further, a communication either between a system's components or among whole systems requires energy. Information is an energy function. Transmission of energy-information units is not totally efficient; thus a certain dissipation of the information through noise occurs.[2] An open system imports energy from outside to offset the noise, or energy loss, involved in the feedback process, which underlies the life process.

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[1]Monod, 1971, p. 198.
[2]Ibid., p. 199.

In order to avoid the disturbances of noise generation the open system must either ignore certain messages (as the human ear ignores many sound frequencies), or integrate messages into its logic. We could cite numerous examples of the second option, but the best approach at this point is to explain how a system seeks a dynamic, but steady, state.

A steady state, or vital balance, is a perpetually unstable restabilizing.[1] A simple servomechanism, such as a furnace thermostat, has a built-in patterned response to certain changes in its external environment. More sophisticated servomechanisms feature a more varied repertoire of potential responses. Functionally, the difference between conscious life and machines is one of degree--allowing anthropocentric commentators to speciously claim a difference in quality between human and machine thought processes. The twenty-first century will see a sharpening of the debate over essential differences when machine thought becomes as subtle as human thought has been.

Adjustment processes exist with social units as well as with individual organisms. A system need not be enclosed within a skin to be a system.

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[1] Menninger, 1967, p. 114.

The functional requirement is communication among relating elements. That communication can be analyzed in terms of the cybernetic control principles of negative and positive feedback. The thermostat opposes departure from the pre-set norm through negative feedback. Positive feedback accentuates changes in variables, sending them away from the old norm. The so-called population laws of Malthus are an example of negative feedback (curbs on population growth) which can follow positive feedback (brief periods of bursts in growth). Ecologists warn us of "threshold effects" of pollution increases. But feedback is neither in itself "good" or "bad"; it is the context which tells all.

Life processes are open systems designed to both sustain the organism and let it grow to maturity. Activity implies entropy, but activity can also draw to itself outside negentropy. The sun supplies our planet with its ultimate negentropic energy, even while that very energy is a measure of the sun's own entropy. Plants use chlorophyll to transform sunlight into carbohydrates; long dead plants fuel our furnaces. Leslie White sums up this ladder of negentropy: "The maintenance of life is a continuous balancing of positive entropy with negative entropy. The evolution of life is the ascendance of negative entropy."[1]

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[1] White, 1959, p. 35.

The ascendance of negative entropy is facilitated in higher organisms by the principle of equifinality.[1] A given state can be reached from different initial conditions and in different ways. Hierarchy and function are interrelated. Primary regulations are primitive and designed to maintain a steady state. Secondary regulations of more sophistication are evolutionarily more recent and function under the principle of progressive mechanization. Linked to increased ability to meet novelty on successful terms is that resultant which we humans hold dear to our concept of Self: progressive individualization.

Human minds are the equifinal coordinator operating via memory mechanisms. Humans use memory to present options and to put the existential problem into comparative value perspectives. Unlike the simplest servomechanisms which can respond in a limited way, the human's potential freedom is relatively vast because of the options which the mind presents to its body. In humans the internal environment assumes great significance, sometimes more so than the external environment. This is true both for the individual person and for societies.[2]

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[1] Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 40.

[2] Cf. G. Sommerhoff, "The Abstract Characteristics of Living Systems," in Emery, 1969, pp. 197-198. [He suggests that the whole apparent antithesis between freedom of will and causal determinism melts away when seen as a reflection of our freedom of choice options.]

CHAPTER III:

QUANTITY AND QUALITY

If there were no qualitative changes involved with quantitative changes in society, the specious saying--"the more things change the more they are the same"--would be verified. Nature's cycles involve the poetry of the eternal return, as well as emergence of the new. Man has broken the rhythm of nature's return cycles. Therein lies man's special light, and darkness. The brainy ape has set himself apart, and against, flux. He has found individuality and power never before harnessed by mere creatures. Man's linear march to the unknown that is his linear future is a heady experience. Yet always there is the persistent reminder from the laws of nature that human flesh cannot totally forsake its origins.

Albert Camus observed: "A billion ions and one ion differ not only in quantity but also in quality. It is easy to find an analogy in human experience."[1] Camus stands in sharp contrast to B. F. Skinner when he tells additionally: "Being aware of one's freedom, and to the maximum, is living, and to the maximum."[2]

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[1] Camus, 1955, p. 47.

[2] Ibid., p. 46.

Even Skinner is forced to retreat somewhat from his reductionist position by claiming at the end of his opus: "[Man] is indeed controlled by his environment, but we must remember that it is an environment largely of his own making. The evolution of a culture is a gigantic exercise in self-control."[1] But what is self-control if not options, freedom? To deny the self is to deny self-control; to assert the self is to assert the unique potential of each person.

This freedom has two aspects: the actual and the potential. The actual is always equal to or less than the potential. Skinner's confusion is in examining actual unfreedom and declaring freedom to be beyond man's potential. The sordid state of the world's societies would seem to verify his thesis, if all we did was look at past history. My concern however is with upgrading the potential for freedom to the level of maximized potentiality.

Gregory Bateson[2] suggests the cybernetic nature of slef and the world is hardly perceptible to consciousness. Man is in the habit of changing his environment rather than himself, a dangerous habit in a unique age of accelerating rates of technological change. Bateson describes the existence of these

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[1] Ibid., p. 215.

[2] Bateson, 1972, pp. 446-453.

new self-maximizing entities which legally are "persons"--such as trusts, companies, unions--but which operate for their own interests. They are not even aggregates of persons, but rather aggregates of parts of persons. this is fertile soil for a reified consciousness, leading to frustrations and alienation for the average individual who instinctively knows that the power in his life is not his own.

Technological society has gifted us with a dazzling array of new devices, making it appear that our age could be freed through reason applied to consumer satisfaction. Each new invention has been a triumph of mechanical intelligence. But the totality of these innovations has transformed society. Michael Harrington tells us that the parts have become more ingenious, while the whole became more irrational.[1]

If freedom is composed of options, then the exercise of those options is dependent on consciousness of them and on a suitable framework in which to carry them out. This is true both for the individual and for the social group. It is easy to see structure, and easy to see cycles (such as those in nature). But it is more difficult to see the quantity-quality dialectic as such, if only because modern man is unaccustomed to viewing this aspect of reality. Such a blind spot can

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[1]Harrington, 1966, p. 29.

be dangerous both for action and for freedom.

The world's population creeps higher every day, forcing changes in life styles just to cope with the new numbers and their demands. The habit of seeing only segments of the future horizon leads to not looking deeply into the samller maelstrom of beginnings where clues for unity may lie.[1] Faustian man prefers the "pound of cure" to the "ounce of prevention." Such flagrant disregard of the quantity-quality dynamisms can only lead to greater grief.

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Part of the blame for the weak public consciousness of the quantity-quality dialectic must belong to the guardians of its philosophy, the Marxists. We shall see below how the history of this concept has helped distort its application to the problems of the world in the second half of the twentieth century.

It is my contention that the Marxian tradition of treating quantity-quality has forced it into the magical and self-serving framework of a necessary advancement of societies from imperfect to generally perfect. This viewpoint can only gloss over certain realities of systems--such as their

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[1]Chermayeff and Alexander, 1965, p. 33.

it is meant that men do not have fixed natures; rather their choices bring their natural potentials into being.[1]

Hegel was struck with the fantasy of finding out the nature of the Absolute by a sheer exercise of logic. Later, Marx and Engels would be themselves stuck with the fantasy of finding absolute laws of social evolution by means of Hegel's method (such as it was), purged of his theological leanings. Marx succinctly summed up Hegel's perspective a year before he became the first Marxist::

> ". . .Quality superseded equals Quantity, Quantity superseded equals Measure, Measure superseded equals Essence, Essence superseded equals Appearance, Appearance superseded equals Actuality, Actuality superseded equals the Concept, the Concept superseded equals Objectivity, Objectivity superseded equals the Absolute Idea, the Absolute Idea superseded equals Nature, Nature superseded equals Subjective Mind, Subjective Mind superseded equals Ethical Objective Mind, Ethical Mind superseded equals Art, Art superseded equals Religion, Religion superseded equals Absolute Knowledge."[2]

Later, Marx as Marxist thought he had cleverly exorcised the mystical shell in Hegel's thought to discover the rational kernel within.[3] The focus of Marx

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[1]MacIntyre, 1967, p. 149.

[2]Marx, 1964, p. 186.

[3]Venable, 1966, p. 37. See Wilson, 1953, pp. 189-198, for a critique of Marx's dialectic as religious myth disencumbered of divine personality.

and Engels was on man's activities, on man's own concrete productive practices. Marx's Sixth Thesis on Fuerbach asserts the human essence is the ensemble of the social relations.

Engels wrote more philosophically on the subject of dialectics. Both men were very serious revolutionaries and did not write philosophy just to pass the time: philosophy was to be used as another weapon to justify their conception of the march of history. Hegel's dialectic proved to be the ideal framework, because it contained the security of absolute predictability. Central to all dialectics is the quantity-quality problem. Engels wrote two books which dealt extensively with this question, Anti-Dühring[1] and Dialectics of Nature.[2]

The world view of Engels rests solidly on the nineteenth century faith in progress as energized by science and its agent, technology. But first the nasty class villains must be overthrown. In his haste to show the inevitability of eventual progress, even if there were occasional setbacks, Engels commits a classic error. Closely related to the quantity-quality question is the assumed power of another dialectical formulation--the "negation of the negation." Engels puts this principle into a neat mathematical form thus:

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[1] Engels, 1970.

[2] Engels, 1940.

> "Let us take any algebraical magnitude whatever: for example, a. If this is negated, we get -a (minus a). If we negate that negation, by multiplying [sic] -a by -a, we get $+a^2$, i.e., the original positive magnitude, but at a higher degree, raised to its second power."[1]

All of these mental gymnastics may impress--until we remember that -a negated (in, literally, the negation of a negation) is just +a, not $+a^2$. Only a multiplication gives $+a^2$; negation cannot be multiplication.

Despite Engels, history does not necessarily progress in the face of negations. In the formulation above we found a return to the original element, as in a natural cycle. Engels attempts to link the very fall of Rome, of Constantinople, etc., and the appearance of higher societies with this phenomenon.[2] Pure reductionism! How would Engels describe the fall of civilization itself following a thermonuclear war between ideological enemies? This type of negation would be annihilation, the ultimate negation for our species. Quantity-quality annihilates Engels' conception of negation of the negation as an evolutionary-revolutionary imperative. The reason: quantity-quality works in both directions, not just in an evolutionary ascent. Action can destroy without regeneration; in addition to action destroying to make way for a new and improved social order.

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[1] Engels, 1970, p. 150.
[2] Engels, 1940, p. 218.

Engels' denial of the quantity-quality dialectic its creative human dimensions distorts his presentation of what freedom of the will can be. He sees natural necessity assuming its form through historical, social development. Necessity and freedom are locked together, crowding out the individual as moral actor. Options for rational action are reduced by necessity to one pattern. Engels concludes: ". . . the freer a man's judgment is in relation to a definite question, with so much the greater necessity is the content of this judgment determined."[1] However, doesn't this formulation bear a striking similarity to Skinner's reductionism?

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[1]Engels, 1970, p. 125.

CHAPTER IV:

THE ANIMAL IN MAN AND NATURE

There are over three and a half billion humans alive on this planet today; their numbers should double by the end of this century. No other species has had such an impact on the ecology of this planet. Surely if numbers alone were all that should be taken into account, our place would be far down on the species list--below the microscopic organisms, the insects, even the birds. What is critical is the way humans interact with each other and affect their planet. The story is as complex as we could imagine; but it is also simple in its dynamics. The metaphor "Spaceship Earth" illustrates the closed nature of our land, air and water systems. Modern man is no longer able to sail with Columbus. Today's journeys of exploration are to lands such as the Moon[1] which are even more hostile to life than the South Pole is, itself devoid of most life.

Any relatively closed world of organisms in which life is maintained and mutated is called an eco-system. This word is taken from the Greek word for

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[1] If the spaceman is liberated from earth gravity and slow earth speeds, he is also forced to pay the penalty of being constricted to a small cabin and to an even more constricting space suit environment when he journeys outside his space-borne "fish bowl" environment. One gain in freedom is bought with the sacrifice of other freedoms.

household, oikos. The feedback relationships in a fish aquarium are functionally the same as those in the worldwide ecosystem. In these systemic relationships a difference in size does not necessitate a difference in quality always; for here we are concerned with one unifying thread: the mutual interrelationship of life forms inside one nutrient bath. And that nutrient bath which covers the earth's surface is more or less two-dimensional when viewed from an extraterrestrial perspective. Most of the earth is hot rock; only the surface skin supports life. Think of a wet beach ball, and you will have seen how significant the oceans are to an indifferent earth. Think of Moby Dick, and you will have seen how significant human flesh is to an indifferent ocean.

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The myriad expressions of physical life (species; ad hoc groupings of various species; self-conscious individuals)--all must establish an etiquette so that potentially destructive competition for food and territory is minimized. The price of ameliorated conflict is born by weaker members of a species; they are eliminated in a Darwinian selection so that Natural Selection can favor those individuals most capable of reproducing themselves, and thereby their species. Only man is fixed with the idea of the worth

of the individual as an absolute good. Man's belief systems thus are sometimes at conflict with the greater pattern of competition and cooperation among life systems. This ethical vanity is attainable only because human social organization can be highly negentropic, producing surpluses so that our brains can be fed along with our stomachs.

Natural selection does not equal evolution. Darwin himself did not use the word in his Origin of Species until the fifth edition of this landmark study.[1] Evolution as a popular idea implies movement from a lower to a higher, even if it does not clearly detail this thesis. In the context of the Industrial Revolution, when man's scientific exploits were seemingly overpowering nature, this metaphysical idea became quite fashionable as seen by the popular cliché "survival of the fittest." The phrase, "progressive selection," was also popular; but that same selection could likewise yield "stabilizing selection" or 'centripetal selection."[2]

The great thesis of mutual aid was put forward by Petr Kropotkin during the 1890's and

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[1]Hardin, ed., 1969, p. 133. See pp. 133-176 for various arguments, mostly nineteenth-century.

[2]Ibid., p. 134.

summed in his book, Mutual Aid[1], in 1902. Kropotkin did not consider mutual aid and natural selection to be opposites. Rather he objected to that world view of a T. H. Huxley who would express his views in a "Struggle for Existence Manifesto." Kropotkin's documentation of mutual aid among animals, primitive societies, medievel Europeans and modern societies still stands as the best corrective to a simplistically aggressive view of man's nature.

Ashley Montagu clarifies the distinction between competition and cooperation among humans thus[2]:

> Because of our confusion between co-operative competition and competitive competition, and because of our failure to recognize and give co-operative competition a name, we have mostly attributed to competitive competition what properly belongs to co-operative competition. In addition to co-operative competition there is such a thing as competitive co-operation in which one vies with others to achieve for the benefit of all the advantages one seeks together.

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The question of space is central to any analysis of behavior. Space has two social dimensions: the objective, measurable dimension; and the perceived, conceptual space. To illustrate the effects of perceived crowding, consider the lemmings: Popular thought has

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[1] Kropotkin, 1902.

[2] Montagu, 1964, p. 294.

it that the lemmings run to the sea and try to swim across because they have multiplied so much they cannot find enough food to feed their swollen numbers. Quite the contrary is true. Sally Carrighar[1] in 1953 arrived two days after a migration of lemmings at Barrow, Alaska, and walked back in the direction over which they had passed. Their food plants were of normal size. In a follow-up experiment she confined some lemmings to cages: They frolicked and cuddled up together--up to a psychologically critical number. The addition of even one too many led to irritability and angry fighting. Removal of the surplus lemming(s) restored friendship and play.

In a famous series of experiments John B. Calhoun[2] showed what happens to a population of rats allowed to increase in a confined space. Skeptics have attacked his findings on the grounds that what applies to rats need not apply to humans. However, their chief error is in emphasizing dissimilarities between species, while underemphasizing the many functional psychological similarities between rat society and human society. Calhoun noticed the development of a behavioral sink with overcrowding which led to unusual behavior patterns, much like

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[1]Carrighar, 1971, pp. 167-170.

[2]Calhoun, 1962.

what stressful human society is prone to: extreme promiscuity of females not claimed by dominant males, dominant males, prober males who would challenge the dominant males covertly, and increased infant mortality in the behavioral sink. Another type of male emerged who appeared to be the healthiest and most attractive member of the community; but this type was completely passive and desexed in practice.

Systems theory trains us to look for functional equivalencies when the eye sees only differences in appearances. From this perspective we should not be surprised to find primates reacting to high density just as do rodents and humans, even though primates are superficially far removed from rodents and just below people on the ladder of evolution. A population of Microtus monkeys, starting from a breeding pair, will cease to grow after a certain density is reached.[1] While numbers born remain stable, numbers weaned diminishes rapidly to the point where population stabilizes. This infant mortality phenomenon occurs in human societies too under certain conditions and will be dealt with later on in this book.

Attempts have been made to show that the behavioral sink will not develop in human society.

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[1]Chance and Jolly, 1970, p. 149.

Jonathan Freedman[1] placed groups of four to nine persons in crowded and uncrowded rooms for four hours; reasonably comfortable chairs were provided. The results of two tests of task performance and interpersonal behavior showed no effects of density on task performance, and only minor increases in male competitiveness. However, Freedman himself points out the relative briefness of his experimental time span when compared to real life.[2] Furthermore, all subjects knew that this was just an experiment (unlike Calhoun's rats). In short, the subtleties of human consciousness interfered with Freedman's experiment so as to seriously weaken his findings.

Is it possible to say anything concrete about human space consciousness, if laboratory experiments generally lead us nowhere? I think so, because laboratory experiments with humans are famous for their high internal validity and infamous for their low external validity. Our data should come predominantly from macro-observations, through which we can deduct the psychology of people in groups. In short, social psychology needs the methods of sociology, not the methods of laboratory tests for its best data.

Unlike man, animals maintain fairly constant population levels with fluctuations around a mean,

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[1] J. Freedman, 1971.

[2] Ibid., p. 61.

other things being equal. V. C. Wynne-Edwards[1] studied animal populations in the wild and found forms of social behavior that result in avoiding overexploitation of food resources. He surveyed territorial behavior of birds, hierarchy struggles between male black bucks in India, and other homeostatic, automatic control mechanisms among animals. In contrast to animal equilibrium man has temporarily escaped the limitations of space and food production. But man too is an animal in nature.

Ours is the only species that has been able to avoid psychological overcrowding by the device of increased conceptual space, so that the sum of available physical and conceptual space accommodates increased group size.[2] Nevertheless this process does not mean that social man has infinite plasticity in his efforts to minimize psychological dissonance in response to changes in his objective conditions. One of the basic reasons for this eventual barrier to adaptation is found in two basic responses of animals to their environment. The two types are (1) the specialists and (2) the opportunists. Specialists, as Desmond Morris[3]

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[1] Wynne-Edwards, 1964.

[2] J. B. Calhoun, "Population," in Allison, ed., 1970, p. 124.

[3] D. Morris, 1971a, pp. 148-149.

notes, such as eagles can thrive in a small cage; but opportunists (such as dogs, racoons, monkeys and apes) have evolved no single, specialized survival device. They are always exploring their environment seeking any small advantage. These species react strongly to confinement. And man? He is the supreme opportunist.

Man's activity is predominantly aggressive. Aggression denotes, literally, "movement toward." The aggressive part of human nature is more than a safeguard against predators; it is also the basis of intellectual achievement, of independence and pride.[1] A central aspect of aggression in society is the right to participate in an active, engaged sense--rather than in a passive, receptive sense. Thus it is more than density which seems to be the precondition for social pathology: Extended and severe peripheralization tends to push men to revolt and violence, even if that violence is turned inward against the self.[2]

A study which suggests an interrelationship between density and socioeconomic status was carried out in the seventy-five Community Areas in Chicago.[3] Tuberculosis rates, infant mortality and other indicators of pathology were found to correlate positively with gross population density. Another study in

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[1]Storr, 1970, p. xi.

[2]Tiger and Fox, 1972, p. 225.

[3]Winsborough, 1965.

Honolulu[1] found a close association between population per net residential acre and morbidity, mortality, and social breakdown rates. Peripheralization plus density yields social pathology.

Cognitive behavioralism (the thesis that a person responds to his milieu as he apperceives it) accounts for different responses to the same political entity.[2] Selective perception determines values, moods, attitudes and other decisions about reality. Conversely, selective perception is dialectically dependent on these conditioning factors. Rapid growth and/or rapid change in a community can itself affect social organization, leading to individual anomie. First-generation immigrant communities which have a closely knit family life in their adopted city have less pathology than do second-generation communities which are more torn between two cultures.[3]

Each person thinks in terms of "tactile" space (separating himself from objects) and of "visual" space (separating objects from each other).[4] This is a manifestation of the boundary phenomenon, a characteristic of all integral systems. For there

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[1]Schmitt, 1966.

[2]H. Sprout and M. Sprout, 1965, p. 118.

[3]Taylor, 1970, p. 226.

[4]Hall, 1969, p. 60.

to be a self there must be an other. Ancient Greek philosophers and philosophers of the Orient have long given equal weight to the void and to matter: each defines the other's boundaries.

An excellent example of how a person manages his space is in his use of clothing. Humans are alone in their strong use of clothes to define the social self. The closest comparison is specialized plumage of birds. One outfit can tell another person to approach sexually; another can indicate social superiority or deference; another can indicate a person's moods through color. The list of variations is vast. Berger and Luckmann supply, for example, the case of a minor shift in one's subjective definition of reality sufficing for him to go to his office without a tie, while a more drastic shift in his definition of reality might prompt him to appear nude at his workplace.[1]

Robert Sommer's investigation of personal space describes the shape of personal space. It is not necessarily spherical in shape, nor does it extend an equal amount in all directions. What one person could define as an olfactory insult, another may define as pleasant; individuals themselves change in their subjective preferences over time. Sommer adds the

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[1]P. Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 148.

following potent observation: ". . . an important consideration in defining a spatial invasion is whether the parties involved perceive one another as persons."[1] Black Americans used to be non-persons to white Americans; some of the current revival in racism can be seen in terms of the white majority feeling its territory has been "invaded" by an out-group element--an element that was there all along!

Perhaps the B-52 bomber crews would have given more thought to the Vietnamese people they were killing if they had thought more of them as people. Since these mechanized warriors did not consider the women and children below human, they did not feel they were invading the others' territory. This is another clear example of man's ability to reify (literally, "make a thing of") his fellow man, and woman.

A cross-cultural study Edward Hall conducted shows how a national culture can surround the individual and influence his personal preferences.[2] The German word Lebensraum ("living space") was used by Hitler to energize his imperialistic dreams. Such a crude ploy would have fallen flat on other ears. The American

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[1] Sommer, 1969, p. 37.

[2] Hall, 1969, pp. 131-164.

tradition of "Manifest Destiny" was likewise a balm for greedy consciences which did not care to trouble themselves with the fact of genocide of the first Americans.

The Germans and the Americans are private people. In contrast, there is no Japanese word for privacy.[1] But the Japanese do have the concept of privacy, tied in with their concept of ma, "interval." Another spatial experience is that of the Arabs[2], where people apparently take on rights to space as they move about. Arabs think not in terms of privacy, and avoid partitions because they do not want to be left alone; they don't mind crowds, but do mind crowding walls.

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The peculiar qualities of any culture are the resultants of much unique history, usually taking form over many centuries. The modern world has introduced a novel element into the world cultural picture: technologically accelerated, global change. In response to new technologies, viable cultures exhibit a type of resistance called "dynamic conservatism."[3] The temporary success of this effort becomes understandable when the fact of an individual's dependency

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[1]Ibid., p. 152.
[2]Ibid., pp. 154-164.
[3]Schon, 1971, pp. 32, 51-60.

on his social fabric is clearly seen.

The animal in man is a forgiving spirit. This can be a weakness, for short run adjustment to conditions that are undesirable in the long run (such as increasing levels of air pollution) serves to prepare the way for reified society. Thus it is that increases in population density may spark increases in related problems. The worst effects will not come at first, but will appear later in individuals and in their society.[1]

The United States has a very reasonable overall population density. Only one Latin American nation, Equador with twenty-one people per square kilometer, comes close to our figure. Yet most informed people regard Latin America as overpopulated and the United States as not yet overpopulated, except for a few areas.[2] Nevertheless, an increasing number of Americans with their Germanic sense of private space feel crowded and robbed of access to wide open spaces. This feeling parallels the rapid development and use of communications and travel.

If the Latin Americans are overcrowded because, in part, they are not mobile enough to generate capital for affluence, we are becoming overcrowded because our

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[1] Dubos, 1968, pp. 153-154.

[2] Nobile and Deedy, eds., 1972, pp. 22-23.

high energy culture causes people to bump into each other more often. E. J. Mishan[1] compares the annihilation of distance with the annihilation of variety. Differences in cultures are being extinguished by a new technological cosmopolitanism. Time is itself annihilated by the forward-looking spirit. This leveling of differences is novel in its intensity and extensiveness. If, despite increases in consumer brand-name choices, physical variety through physical freedom is restricted--does not this point to a restriction in overall opportunity for individuation and unique identity?

Man's previous animal heritage was a dominant factor in shaping human interrelationships. Now man's technological child has grown up into man's master. The simple addition of screens to windows and doors has profoundly altered the demographic pattern in much of the Third World, for example. The transistor radio in backward villages is an avatar of a technological future which does not automatically respect different cultural traditions. Technological fixes were not part of the social universe before modern science. Civilizations formed their world views from experiences alien to modern linear consciousness. Still, these world views are critical to an understanding of how tradition-oriented peoples respond to the exhortations of birth control advocates.

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[1]Mishan, 1969, pp. 119-122.

Let us now trace the formation of social structures, the early history of population growth, the debates over Malthus and other thinkers; and carry the story into the twentieth century. Toward the end of this Part I, we will consider in depth the idea of negative population growth, an idea whose time has come. Population shrinkage will be seen as a vehicle by means of which societies can return to a more human-scale existence at a lower level of absolute population, maintaining their levels through zero population growth (population stability) over the long run. Our discussion of N. P. G. is the first extensive treatment of this idea, even though it has been tentatively advocated by several other thinkers.

CHAPTER V:

POPULATION BEFORE MALTHUS

The apparent gap between man and monkeys is great. After all, we have science, culture, history and so forth--while the apes are stuck in nature's rhythms. The qualitative synergy which humans generate is quite impressive. But our species chauvinism should falter upon considering that just two more binary fissions of the brain cells would advance the chimpanzee's brain to human size; while the growth process from zygote to adult chimpanzee brain requires hundreds of mitotic generations.[1]

Among modern humans the range of adult brain size is from about 750 c.c. to over 2,000 c.c. Adult australopithecines, the "ape man" of Raymond Dart and Dr. Leakey, had brains ranging in size up to 750 c.c.[2] Even though we acknowledge their tool-making prowess, no modern man could psychologically identify with such a protohuman. A major reason for this psychological alienation lies in different life styles, styles determined by group experiences in distinctive social environments--by culture.

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[1] Earl W. Count, in Montagu, ed., 1968, p. 71.

[2] See Kenneth P. Oakley, "A Definition of Man," in Montagu, ed., 1962, pp. 3-12.

Human culture has been a product of symboling[1], wherein man domesticated himself, and then proceeded to domesticate animals and food plants. Harnessed energy provided the tool to transcend previous economic and social limits. Primitive culture produced only about one-twentieth of one horsepower per capita in self-reproducing societies.[2] Because of the low level of negentropy in such a society it could be overwhelmed by disease epidemics, invasions or other entropic catastrophies. Destruction of the first societies was possible, with remnants either joining a more viable group, or perishing.

If the first humans had continued as hunters and food gatherers they would have spread over the earth, but their total numbers would have leveled off at about the ten-million level. Their groupings during this era in fact numbered around fifty thousand scattered family, band and tribal units.[3] Early human demography paralleled the demography of other animal societies.

Life profoundly changed with the Agricultural

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[1]See Strauss, ed., 1964, for G. H. Mead's analysis of interactional relationships between self and society; which in humans evolved through the universe of discourse, leading to conscious direction, away from the unconscious direction of lower life forms.

[2]White, 1959, p. 367.

[3]Harrison Brown, "The Growth and Distribution of Human Population," in H. Brown and Hutchins, eds., 1972, pp. 4-5.

Revolution. With surpluses stored away periods of drought could be weathered. With security comes predictability, a precondition for more sophisticated levels of social interaction. The greater size and density of a settled tribe over a hunting band of just thirty to one hundred members made possible a more stable life. A chiefdom is a still denser society than a tribe, being distinguished from tribes by centers which coordinate economic, social and religious life.[1]

There is still much uncertainty over what made hunters turn into farmers and city dwellers. An interesting cotemporal event was the shift in climate after about 6,000 B.C. from moderate rainfall to arid in the area of the Afrasian steppe-desert belt. This one elemental event may have pushed hunting peoples off their territory and into the riverine lands.[2] The resulting clash of armies and cultures could have been that catalyst for intensified fortifications, bureaucratic governments and other trappings of a more "advanced" era.

Another viewpoint on the origin of city culture is held by Jane Jacobs.[3] She suggests the origin of her model town, New Obsidian, came from trade

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[1]Service, 1962, pp. 111, 143.
[2]East, 1965, p. 131.
[3]Jacobs, 1970, pp. 18-31.

in obsidian and the resultant barter economy accompanying specialized economic life. She even goes so far as to suggest that the cultivation of plants and animals was first only city work.

If we do not know how the negentropic process of increased social power started, we do know what it meant for man to live in a city for the first time. If tribal man knew his fellow tribesman, the super tribe that was the new city surrounded strangers meeting each other on a daily basis.[1] This process of alienation was the same for the early Mesopotamian as it is for the twentieth century African tribesman who journeys to the city. Roles soon replace personality as the currency of social encounter. Roles mean hierarchy of prestige and power--always with some people pushed to the bottom of the life line who otherwise might not have stayed at the bottom of a more intimate community.

How large were these early cities? The largest cities of the time were Greater Ur at some 250,000 in 2,200 B.C., and Babylon with 200,000 in 500 B.C.[2] Other great cities were considerably smaller. In contrast, the modern world supports many

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[1] D. Morris, 1971a, p. 21.

[2] Darlington, 1971, p. 89.

cities of several millions. Fabled Babylon could be nestled in New York City's smallest borough, Staten Island.

The first western city to top the million mark was Rome, reaching over 1,200,000 during the second century A.D. But the third century A.D. brought wars, plagues and other factors which turned Rome into a semi ghost town by the early medieval era. The third century Christian writer, Tertullian, observed of Rome:

> What most frequently meets our view is our teeming population; our numbers are burdensome to the world . . . . In very deed, pestilence, and famine, and wars, and earthquakes have to be regarded as a remedy for nations, as a means of pruning the luxuriance of the human race.[1]

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The entire period from 600,000 B.C. to 6,000 B.C., a period of 594,000 years, saw a total of just twelve billion estimated births.[2] It is likely that this number of people will be alive <u>at one time</u> in the next century--a catastrophe to be experienced by many people now living. Until modern times population growth rates were low, and those growth rates operated on a much lower population base than today's rates.

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[1] Quoted in H. Brown, 1956, p. 30.

[2] Nobile and Deedy, eds., 1972, p. 2; see too Philip M. Hauser, "The Population of the World: Recent Trends and Prospects," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, pp. 15-29.

If 200 to 300 million people were alive in 1 A.D., there were only 500 million people alive in 1650. It took until 1850 for the earth to reach just one billion. The next billion cohorts arrived in only eighty years. Forty-five years later, in 1975, another doubling --to four billion people--will have occurred.[1]

If Paleolithic and subsequent societies were small it does not necessarily follow that earlier man's fecundity was lower than more modern man. A more accurate statement, supported by indirect evidence, would be that earlier man had both high birth rates and high death rates, with the long-term edge going to the birth rates.[2]

Two definitions are in order at this point: Fecundity is the maximum biological potential for reproduction; fertility is the actual reproductive performance. To illustrate, women are capable of bearing children between the ages of fifteen and forty-five, on the average. This means women could bear fifteen to twenty children, more if there were any multiple births. But no known society has had

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[1] Ibid., p. 1.

[2] Cipolla, 1965, p. 75.

fertility levels anywhere near the biological potential. The reasons for this are tied in more with psychology and sociology than with biology. The pill and other modern contraceptive measures are irrelevant for an explanation of the gap between historical fertility and fecundity. More relevant are diseases, wars, and especially cultural customs environmentally modified.

There are many chicken-egg controversies. One of which is the origin of the hymen. Margaret Mead[1] suggests the hymen is a specific evolutionary adjustment which decreases young females' erotic awareness of themselves, allowing for the prolongation of the learning period. This question illustrates just one of the many questions of this order which could be asked about the body and its dialectical relationship with society.

Many traditional cultural customs led to reduced fertility. An example of which is the Cheyenne Indian vow made by a good husband of strong character to abstain from intercourse with the mother of his first son for a period of seven to fourteen years.[2] The rationale for this unusual behavior was their belief that this concentrated diffuse spiritual

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[1] Mead, 1968, p. 29.

[2] Hoebel, 1968, pp. 167-168.

powers on the growing boy, helping him become a worthy man. The Cheyenne concern for religious abstinence and spirit cultivation has not been shared by most other cultures. The devout Hindu marries for three purposes: dharma (religious duty), rati (pleasure), and for praja (offspring). Patrilineal societies require sons to carry the family name, since women change their names when they marry and leave their family.[1] In short, religious customs have either pushed upward or retarded fertility, depending on each culture.

Since male:female birth ratios are roughly 1:1, the odds against a male being first born are 2:1. Because traditional societies have had high infant mortality rates the prudent patrilineal, patrifocal society would encourage the birth of two sons at least. But the odds against two sons being born in the first two births are 4:1! Any cultural norm which severely depresses the number of births threatens patrilineal ideology. High birth rates were socially functional as long as there were high death rates; but (as will be detailed later) are increasingly dysfunctional in the context of a population boom fueled by lowered infant mortality rates.

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[1] See Stephens, 1963; Goode, 1970; and Goode, 1964; also see D. Mace and V. Mace, 1960, for discussions of husband-wife dynamics from a cross-cultural perspective.

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Early forms of birth control were just as effective as each society needed them to be. This may be surprising to some who marvel at the 98+% efficiency of the pill and look at the high failure ratex for the rhythm method, coitus interruptus, primitive condoms and other contraceptives. Customs in less advanced societies are essentially designed with ecology in mind. Birth is controlled to produce not a maximum increase, but an optimum density. As Darlington[1] notes, we can compare population control in animals and men. The preservation of a stabilized population with density adjusted to available resources not only avoids war, famine, and pestilence; it also preserves the whole habitat.

The available supply of food is the ultimate check on population growth, but it is not usually the proximate agent in stable environments. Hierarchy, if only of prestige, serves to identify surplus individuals when periods of stress are experienced by a marginal group.[2] Because the key elements of a society over the short run are the healthy adults, all others may be considered peripheral and surplus when conditions become critical.

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[1]Darlington, 1971, p. 60.

[2]Wrigley, 1969, pp. 40-41.

A modern tragedy was recorded by anthropologist Colin Turnbull[1] who studied the Ik, a tribe living in East African mountains when he encountered them. They had been driven from their traditional hunting grounds by the creation of a game reserve. Because they had been hunters, and because they were forced onto barren soil without adequate technology--their whole society collapsed into the lowest common denominator: survival of the fittest individuals. Surplus emotions--love, kindness, concern for one's own children--vanished with the game herds.

Fortunately the ordinary society is not so desperate. Viable societies control their numbers in their group's best interests, for selection favors groups which are healthy from adequate diets. Margaret Mead has sharply observed[2]: "Our humanity depends upon our relative infertility, upon the long period of human gestation and dependency possible only where there are few children, who can be reared long and lovingly." It is one of the most savage ironies of our species that preservation has been bought with the very blood of infants: Infanticide and its cousin, abortion, have long been at the front of man's battle against his own numbers. The price of failure to regulate simple number increases has long been known

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[1] Turnbull, 1972.

[2] Mead, 1968, p. 238.

by society: a qualitative degeneration into cockroach morality.

In the days before man knew how to effectively prevent conception, crude abortions and infanticide solved the messy question of who is marginal and surplus. David Bakan's definitive study is based on the hypothesis "that child abuse is an evolutionary mechanism associated with population-resource balance."[1] Marginal societies have also in the past approved of invalidicide, senilicide and suicide whenever unproductive members threatened the integrity of the total group.[2]

Infanticide was practiced in civilized as well as in traditional societies. Greece and Rome allowed this practice to continue, the father being allowed to proclaim whether or not he would keep his child on the fifth day.[3] There are many references to the killing of infants in the Bible.[4] Removal of excess babies has been regularly reported in Eskimo, Polynesian, Egyptian, Chinese, Scandinavian, African, American Indian, and Australian aborigine cultures--to name a few.[5]

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[1]Bakan, 1972; Rheingold, 1967, presents a profound psychological discussion of the taboo of maternal destructiveness.

[2]Hoebel, 1968, pp. 74-79.

[3]H. Brown, 1956, pp. 29-30.

[4]Bakan, 1972, pp. 26-29.

[5]Ibid., p. 30.

We should not imagine that this practice is a dark vestige of ancient history: as late as 1873 female infanticide was permitted in China; a father could kill without baptism a newborn in Sweden until 1734, in Norway until 1854, and in Denmark until 1857.[1]

Most often it was the female child who was killed and the male child raised.[2] Raising more males would offset higher death rates for older males, and killing girl babies is a more effective way to limit fertility than killing boys. Patrilineal societies were concerned with carrying the name through males, because patrilineal societies have believed the male transmits the "soul," while the female is just the vessel in which the new person grows. In contrast, the lesser number of matrilineal societies have believed that the "soul," is transmitted by the mother.

Modern Americans should find the above discussion bizarre; their bi-lateral descent ideology emphasizes the conjugal bond, and deemphasizes "soul" lineage, even if the tradition of patrilineality is carried on with the wife and her children taking the husband's name. William Goode[3] describes the

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[1]Ibid., pp. 30, 33.

[2]See Clark, 1967, pp. 44-49, for selected statistics on female infant survival rates.

[3]Goode, 1970, p.19.

intrusion of the ideology of the modern conjugal family into non-Western cultures: This ideology is destructive of older traditions, of older sexist values. It asserts the equality of individuals--as against lineage, class, caste and sex barriers. It is too early to measure the impact of this new value system worldwide, but we can safely point to this process as one major element in the building of a future, worldwide eutopia.

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Another massive reality modern Americans are strange to is famine and epidemic diseases. In our insularity we choose to ignore that China alone between 108 B.C. and A.D. 1911 suffered 1,828 famines; there were 201 recorded famines in the British Islands between A.D. 10 and 1846.[1] A combination of bad harvests and famine reduced drastically the population of fourteenth-century England. The Black Death fiercely struck England in 1348, in 1361 and 1369; before this, many people had starved to death during 1315-1317 when harvests failed. The subsequent problem of overpopulation relative to productive capacity was thereby thrust

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[1]Bates, 1962, pp. 143-144.

at least four generations into the future.[1]

Victims of the bubonic plague could not have cared less about the next century's population pressures. At least twenty to twenty-five per cent of the people of Europe were killed in just two years, 1348 to 1350.[2] This disaster was far greater than either of the two world wars in Europe this century. Plague still stalked Europe into the eighteenth century. Even as late as 1973 Naples, Italy suffered a cholera outbreak caused by polluted waters and infested shellfish. Other diseases, especially smallpox and influenza, took countless lives in Europe until recent times.

History records many instances of coincidence which, through causal chains, have altered the course of future events. The history of demography records that the only flea species which carries the plague, Xenopsylla cheopis, is itself picky about its rat host. It loves to bite black rats and will bite humans; but it hates to bite Norway grey rats. In the eighteenth century, perhaps as a response to a colder shift in climate, the grey rat moved southward and swiftly

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[1]Bridbury, 1962, pp. 23-24.
[2]Stockwell, 1970, p. 28.

eliminated the smaller competitor black rat. Thus the door was opened wider for a reduction in death rates--and the consequent rise in Europe's population.[1]

Warfare during the seventeenth century reached levels of horror exceeded only by the twentieth century. The infamous Thirty Years War was fueled by religious fanaticism and led to the breakdown of social order, of religious order, of trade ties, in addition to the usual dislocations a war economy forces on civilians. Though military losses were great, civilian losses followed the twentieth-century pattern: they exceeded military deaths, considerably. The German Empire had numbered twenty-one millions in 1618, but shrank to thirteen millions by 1648.[2]

One of the fall-out effects of such a drastic reduction in population was the reduction in potential manpower under a ruler's command. In medieval times many legal and religious restrictions were placed on people wanting to marry. Large numbers of men and women remained childless in monasteries. However, following the discovery of America and a new way to India, trade expanded. Countries deficient in relative manpower feared they would be bypassed in the race for wealth and power. Rulers began more and more to

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[1]Clark, 1967, p. 51.

[2]Wedgwood, 1961, pp. 496-497.

think in terms of mercantilistic population policies: even bigamy was tolerated for a brief period after the Thirty Years War, and again in the eighteenth century.[1] Some governmental house building projects were sponsored to help build the birth rates. But these efforts were vitiated by epidemics and famines. Populations continued to stagnate.

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Mercantilists feared their populations were too small: Yet their efforts to correct this "problem" were of little effect. Later, in the nineteenth century, the Malthusians would worry about the opposite problem--populations becoming too large: In his own field Malthus was no more successful than were the Mercantilists.

Nevertheless, both thought systems are central to an understanding of the modern world. Modern mercantilists favor large states and centralized control within states; while the Malthusians are bent on reducing population as a good in itself. We shall next examine how these two ideologies clashed; and how others--such as Godwin and Marx--viewed the population question. Our study will shed some light on how and where we can go from today into tomorrow with a minimum of prejudice.

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[1] Peller, 1947, pp. 60-62.

CHAPTER VI:
MALTHUS AND THE DEBATES OVER OPTIMUM POPULATION

There is no objective standard to measure "optimum" in population. A peasant who sells his labor to a landlord would want an abundance of land relative to available labor power. His landlord would want cheap labor for hire and precious land. An economist might measure optimum in terms of per capita income. A proxemics theorist would measure space available per capita. A ruler might put the optimum at some figure maximizing his state's military punch. And so on.

This thorny question is at the center of the debates over population growth and its possible control. Few people would advocate an extreme position on the numbers question without structural adjustments. So the question resolves itself into two sub-questions: (1) at what number level, and (2) for what purposes do we optimize population?

The twentieth-century debates were set into their basic forms at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. There is much talk today of a "post-industrial" era; but this era could also be

seen as continuous with the original Industrial Revolution era. Indeed the coming of the Industrial Revolution was not an event; rather it was the reorganization of social relations where man and machine assumed relationships unknown to the previous agricultural and guild-centered societies. As man's relationships with his machines changed--so too did relationships among men. Furthermore, societies have grown so large and complex in today's world that the very matrix of traditional social customs has been metamorphosed to fit new functional requirements--but not always to fit constant human needs.

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Economic theory from 1500 to the eighteenth century has been given the generic name, mercantilism.[1] Policies designed to build the economy and power of the state were mercantilistic. In contrast to the later period following the acceptance in some quarters of the laissez faire doctrine of Adam Smith, the mercantilist era saw states intervening in economic relations on all levels. The spirit of mercantilism indeed remains with us on the modern scene: Today it is called neo-mercantilism, as large countries attempt to orchestrate diverse economies and military-industrial complexes

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[1]Clough, 1959, pp. 207-232, presents an excellent survey of this philosophy and its applications.

for the interests of each state government.

A modern analysis of power is supplied by Alfred Sauvy of France.[1] He does not equate power with military power, but with a collective aim which may or may not be military. Likewise, his concept of collective aim is not the same as economic aim, which to the contrary leads to a division of economic output by the country's inhabitants. Sauvy is a neo-mercantilist who, as a chauvinistic Frenchman, is sensitive to the relative weakness of modern France when compared to other countries. His computations of the relative strengths of France and the United States[2] show Americans with both a higher standard of living and a larger population; thus, the populations exist in a ratio of 4 to 1, but the ratio of potential military strength is computed at 13 to 1. Latent xenophobia aside, Sauvy's demonstration that a power optimum is higher than an economic optimum per capita is important to our analysis.

A key element in the classical utilitarian philosophy of "the greatest good for the greatest number" is thinking in terms of the integrity of the

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[1] Sauvy, 1969, pp. 51-59, 73-266 passim.
[2] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

total state, assuming that all citizens in a state share in the benefits of collective security. We will examine this in detail later, but for now let us discuss the relationship between this ethico-political principle and increase of population.

John Rawls[1] has a treatise on justice which deals centrally with this question. He notes that the concept of <u>average</u> utility (which directs society to maximize the average, not total, utility) is <u>not</u> part of the classical principle. The classical principle

> entails that so long as the average utility per person falls slowly enough when the number of individuals increases, the population should be encouraged to grow indefinitely no matter how low the average has fallen. In this case the sum of utilities added by the greater number of persons is sufficiently great to make up for the decline in the share per capita.[2]

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On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, around 1750, the world's total population was between 650 and 850 million people; eighty per cent of that was in Eurasia.[3] Europeans were destined for technological greatness and it was they, not the Asiatics, who continued to spread their cultures into the Western Hemisphere, gathering colonies in an orgy of imperialism

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[1]Rawls, pp. 161-163.
[2]Ibid., pp. 162-163.
[3]Cipolla, 1965, p. 99.

which lasted well into the twentieth century. Only the exigencies of a world war stopped the plunder.

The first census of England and Wales was taken in 1801, counting 8,900,000 persons. In contrast, France already had 30 million persons (a contrast indeed to Sauvy's world). England had fully 33 millions by the end of the nineteenth century, a growth facilitated by her pioneering the Industrial Revolution. All of these statistics are impressive--until we note that the scintillating cultural and political achievements of Elizabethan England were accomplished by a nation of just five or six millions.[1]

Just as important as the revolution in machinery was the revolution in agriculture which had already begun in England in the fifteenth century with enclosures of common lands, accelerating in the following centuries with new scientific ways to improve productivity per acre. Opportunities for exporting wool and the demands of a growing population led to an extension of land farmed. A market economy was stimulated in England by increasing numbers of townspeople. Added to this was the influx of bullion and the subsequent inflation which shattered landlord-

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[1]Nathan Keyfitz, "Population Trends in Newly Developing Countries," in R. Freedman, ed., p. 151.

tenant relationships based on long leases. The end result was a continuous process of consolidation of diverse plots of land and the ousting of surplus laborers--most going to villages and towns, some to find work, the rest to beg.[1]

The influence of London on her countryside was profound. In 1700 London was the largest city in Europe; in 1800 London was nearly twice her previous size. London became a huge market, and more and more farmers oriented their production to this market; investors in the city put money into commercial farming. Thus, a positive feedback network flourished. Nevertheless, while London brought economic life to the surrounding countryside the air of London was deadly for her inhabitants: A net immigration of eight to ten thousand people each year was needed in the eighteenth century just to make good the burial surplus.[2]

The year 1798 saw two events of major importance for the future: First, this is the date of Edward Jenner's publication of his discovery of a smallpox vaccine. Second, Malthus issued the first edition of his essay on population.

A full century later was required before the principle of immunization was clarified by Robert

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[1]See the classic study of Tawney, 1967, and this edition's introduction by Lawrence Stone.

[2]Wrigley, 1969, p. 150.

Koch and Louis Pasteur. Pasteur's germ theory led to the acceptance of asepsis (exclusion from the body of disease organisms) and of antisepsis (cure of disease by antibiotics and other agents). Many vaccines followed. Notable too was Fleming's 1928 discovery of penicillin. Sewage disposal systems, garbage collection, sanitary drinking water and adequate quarantine measures when needed--all were new social measures awaiting the nineteenth century.[1]

Edward Stockwell demonstrates how the traditional death rate of 40 to 45 per 1,000 people per year in a population decreased by three ten-point drops in three stages, to where now a rate of 10 per 1,000 is not unusual:

> The first ten-point drop in the death rate occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and came about largely as a result of an increase in the amount and availability of the food supply. The second ten-point decline in the death rate (from 30 to 35 per 1,000, to 20 to 25 per 1,000) took place during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and was primarily the result of public health measures which led to a decline in the incidence of infection and facilitated the control of epidemic diseases . . . . Finally, in the third stage death rates fell to levels of 10 to 15 per 1,000 (even lower in some areas) as a result of the development of medical science and the spread of improved individual medical care . . . .[2]

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[1] Stockwell, 1970, pp. 33-35; also see Bates, 1962, pp. 178-189.

[2] Ibid., p. 37.

The history of nineteenth-century England thus became one of enormous population growth. However, the standard of living did not suffer in England because of concurrent increases in agricultural productivity. Food production—aided by the fertilizer revolution, improved stock breeding, imported American grains, rail transport, and other factors--fueled the industrialization of Britain.[1]

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The second key event of 1798 was the publication by Thomas Robert Malthus (b. 1766) of a long pamphlet entitled An Essay on the Principle of Population with the long subtitle as it effects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, Mr. Condorcet, and other Writers. Five years later he revised and enlarged his work, taking a cue from the fresh 1801 census (England's first ever). The new subtitle reflected a change in emphasis: A View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness with an Inquiry into our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils Which It Occasions. In all, six editions were to appear, the

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[1]See Hutchinson, 1966. [This President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science claims that population growth has now outstripped productivity, and that a reduction (i.e., N.P.G.) in population to some 40 millions would ameliorate British living conditions.]

last edition published in 1826.

The times of Malthus were as revolutionary as those of our era. The Americans and the French had just experienced uphevals in government; the New World was being conquered in blood and sweat; the philosophes were upgrading philosophical experience; and the Industrial Revolution was already underway.

Utopian thought was in vogue, and one of the most utopian thinkers was William Godwin (1756-1836) whose Enquiry Concerning Political Justice was published in 1793.[1] Godwin was an individualist anarchist who tried to become a free thinker. He detested emotions, as his Calvinist upbringing taught him to do; but he was a very emotional person anyway. His daughter is noted for her authorship of Frankenstein.

As we shall soon see, Malthus was a defender of traditional society even while being critical of some of its welfare ideas. Godwin attacked the state and its property arrangements, especially hereditary wealth. Godwin felt there was plenty of land to feed all the new generations, if only the "territorial monopoly" of the landowners could be overthrown. He felt the world's population could increase to 18 billions

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[1] See Spengler, 1971; also, Petersen, 1971.

under good government, that it was desirable for "the number of mankind [to] be carried to their utmost extent."[1]

Godwin saw into the distant future a zero rate of population growth. But by then his brand of utopia would have no children and no deaths: "Generation will not succeed generation, nor truth have, in a certain degree, to recommence her career every thirty years."[2] He sounds like the later Christian Scientists when he proclaims the triumph of mind over bodies, when disease is to be conquered by cheerfulness.

Godwin predicted the inevitable disappearance of distinctions between rich and poor. Malthus was not so sanguine. Malthus did move later toward advocating social policies aimed at the embourgeoisement of some of the proletarian masses. To accomplish this adjustment of the system Malthus advocated a system of universal free education, an extension of suffrage, free medical care for the poor, and state assistance to emigrants; he opposed child labor, and sided with other progressive measures. This is very much a part of the man who became the villain of many progressive theorists.

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[1]Quoted by Spengler, 1971, p. 4.

[2]Quoted by Petersen, 1971, p. 17.

There were deep flaws in the character of Malthus the man. He was culture bound, feeling morally superior to the poor. An infamous passage in the second edition showed his ill humor toward the unfortunates:

> A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents . . ., and if the society do not want his labor, has no claim of right [emphasis added] to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is.[1]

The offending passage was removed from all later editions.

This is rather stern language from a man of the cloth. Perhaps it came in part from a fear--based on presumed knowledge--of the qualitative degeneration in life which would accompany too many mouths to feed. His reasoning was most forceful, if simplistic, in the first essay. Chapter I of the 1798 edition contains the following:

> I think I may fairly make two postulata,
> First, That food is necessary to the existence of man.
> Second, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state. . . .
> Assuming then, my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.
> Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will shew the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.[2]

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[1] Quoted in Meed, ed., 1971, p. 8.

[2] In Hardin, ed., 1969, p. 7.

Malthus felt the fundamental direction of his argument precluded any perfectibility of the mass of mankind. His argument formed the basis of the so-called "Iron Law of Wages," the chief reason economics got to be called the "dismal science." Simply put, the "Iron Law" always asserted that the supply of people would be there to push down wages to the subsistence level, just high enough to generate a supply of workers.

Malthus's geometrical ratio made politicians more population conscious than ever before. His principle of population was elegantly deductive: conclusions flowed from the axioms presented. The checks on population would be disease, war and famine. Only later did he enlarge this list to include the critical element of individual volition, which he called "moral restraint." This change can be seen in the subtitle of his second edition. By then Malthus had turned the corner from total pessimism to guarded optimism. His "moral restraint" was however defined by him to include only postponement of the age of marriage, and chastity before marriage; only this brake on population got Malthus's seal of approval.

He did not put too much faith on this last check, short of an educational awakening of the masses (shades of modern birth control efforts!). He felt man was naturally indolent and that his natural

passions would direct him from productive work if the whip of a hungry brood of children to care for were not there.

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A cogent summary of the essential differences between Godwin's world view and that of Malthus has been supplied by Spengler.[1] He contends that below the surface differences their differences are mostly of degree, rather than of kind. Godwin saw the condition of the land and applied technology as being critical for his utopian scheme; but Malthus saw population as being more significant in the long run, and even in the short run.

Since the possibility of significant increases in average consumption was downgraded by both men, the increase in constraint was seen by them as coming from eventual population pressures rather than from a large rise in per capita consumption, which would make the cost of children higher. Today's affluent world rejects both men: But today's poor, baby-factory areas of the world are more Malthusian than ever before, despite the affluent world's example.

The first editions of Malthus's book appeared at a time when growth was accelerating in

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[1]Spengler, 1971, pp. 10-11.

England and Wales. Whereas growth was below two per cent in the 1701-1741 period, it shot up by twenty-two per cent in only half the time during the 1781-1801 period.[1] This demographic acceleration would have proven Malthus right <u>if</u> the economy had not risen apace. Even though population growth outstripped economic growth before 1785, after 1785 per capita output grew, rising about forty-four per cent in the 1811-1831 period.[2] This made Malthus appear to be a fool, for a while.

Many anti-Malthusians today point to the successes of the Industrial Revolution as the way out of population's pincers. They are known as <u>cornucopians</u>; and their numbers include the likes of Buckminster Fuller, Jane Jacobs, John Maddox, assorted Marxists, and a host of others. But <u>how</u> wrong was Malthus? We must remember that he was less concerned with short-run events, than with long-run trends. He was concerned with the potential for mischief which the power of geometric propagation could provoke.

A unique European test case was provided by Ireland soon after Malthus died. While England was leaping forward into prosperity Ireland suffered the terrors of a potato famine in 1848-1852. Before the

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[1] Ibid., p. 2.

[2] Ibid.

famine Ireland had supported eight millions: Today her population has dropped to less than three millions. Population is now held in check by an elaborate system of "moral restraint" à la Malthus, where matchmaking is reserved for the one son on a farm who is to inherit; one daughter is dowered to that one young man. Thus, only so many are accommodated on the land at one time. The other children must travel elsewhere looking for a livelihood.[1]

Ireland was at that time a colony of industrial Britain. Except in Ulster, the country had been deindustrialized by the mercantilist policy of the British government and by the efficient competition from English industries. The people lived on small, technologically backward farms, paying rent to a small body of generally absentee landlords.[2] When the potato was introduced more rent paying tenants could be squeezed onto the land. All this was tolerable, if only at the lowest level of existence--until the potato blight struck: Roughly one million people starved or got fatal diseases brought on by malnutrition; another million managed to emigrate before 1851.

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[1]Good details are provided by Conrad M. Arensberg, "The Irish Countryman," in Goode, ed., 1964, pp. 68-71.

[2]Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 198-200, espec. p. 199; see too Bates, 1962, pp. 145-149.

There were no airlifts of Red Cross food supplies; there were no relief trains. These things belong to another era. But despite modern transportation famine belongs to our era and to the future.

Malthus saw all this in advance: He had warned of the dangers of a one-crop staple diet, however nutritious: ". . . When, from the increasing population, and diminishing sources of subsistence, . . . a scarcity of potatoes would be, in every respect, as probable as a scarcity of wheat at present [shades of the 1970's!]; and when it did arrive, it would be beyond all comparison more dreadful."[1] Even though he was premature with his wheat forecast he was devastatingly accurate in his potato analysis. The basic reliability of Malthus's forecasting powers is brought vividly to the modern world as population pushes against commercial farming's ability to supply grains at reasonable market prices for the poor to purchase.

The Irish experience is unique too in the world's experience. This is the only modern country where famine led to the establishment of conditions making the recurrence of famine unlikely. Repeated famines in the Orient have <u>not</u> led to altered changes in population-relevant social habits. The next chapter dealing with the Third World will detail this observation.

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[1]Quoted in J. Morris, 1966, p. 25.

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Strong theses well put forward usually generate polarities among readers. Those who were favorably influenced by Malthus would agree with William Pitt who was persueade by this tract of Malthus to withdraw his proposed new poor law. Charles Darwin was led by reading Sir Charles Lyell, a contemporary Malthusian, to a sharper understanding of the struggle for existence and the potential for organic alteration through natural selection.[1]

Others were not so favorably impressed by the thrust of Malthus's arguments. Most critics confused the arguments of Malthus with Malthus the man. His dislike of the poor was well known, and his ideological battles with Godwin, Ricardo and others provided food for the tireless army of pamphleteers of his time. Critics of high intellectual caliber spoke out against his data and against his distracting attention from more concrete and immediate cures to social ills. Among his critics we find William Cobbett, William Hazlitt, Benjamin Disraeli, J. S. Mill, and Karl Marx.[2]

Antony Flew compares the principle of Malthus with the first law of motion in physics.[3] This modern critic points out that both describe not what goes on, but what would go on if there were no counteracting forces.

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[1]Eiseley, 1961, pp. 178-182.

[2]A good anti-Malthusian essay is provided by Maddox, 1972, pp. 35-71.

[3]Flew, 1967, 5, p. 146.

Both theses' main purpose is to generate questions about such counteracting forces. (Such irony is common in the progress of human knowledge.) Flew furthermore notes a valid objection to Malthus's use of "tendency." This word can be used in two ways: "A tendency to produce something may be a cause which, operating unimpeded, would produce it. But to speak of a tendency to produce something may also be to say that the result is one which may reasonably be expected to occur in fact."[1] Malthus the propagandist sometimes overstepped his science, making what are essentially metaphysical statements.

It is interesting to note how Malthus incorporated Godwin's love for naturally large populations into his theory after a time. The fifth edition of his Principle shows his fear of the effects of birth control (or even a too efficient "moral restraint") on the underlying "acknowledged indolence of man." Malthus asserts: "The population of any large territory, however fertile, would be as likely to stop at five hundred, or five thousand, as at five millions or fifty millions. Such a balance therefore would clearly defeat one great purpose [sic] of creation . . . ."[2] Thus, Malthus unwittingly became his own critic!

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[1] Ibid., p. 147.

[2] Malthus, 1963, p. 264.

The sharpest and most influential attacks on Malthus have come from Engels and Marx (the two "godfathers" of Marxism) and their faithful followers. Petersen[1] suggests that Marx came down so hard on Malthus because they both had similar analyses of the economy: Malthus was the first significant economist to recognize effective demand, to suggest serious weaknesses in laissez-faire policies, and to supplement the analysis of income with the concept of standard of life.

The old system of poor laws at the time of the first edition was still based on the principle of relief tied in with one's parish (county). In 1795 the so-called Speenhamland system of wage subsidization was introduced to put a floor on wages adjusted to the price of bread. However, the net effect of this approach was to boost the wealth of agricultural employers who could offer lowest wages, knowing the state would pick up the tab for any difference.

In 1834 a new Poor Law was passed which helped out the industrial bourgeoisie.[2] This new law abolished outdoor relief; it forced people into workhouses--that vicious system Charles Dickens wrote so eloquently about. The burden for unemployment was now on the backs of the unemployed themselves. Luckily, this

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[1] Petersen, 1971, pp. 23-25.

[2] A good account is in Schweinitz, 1964, pp. 118-122; see Petersen, 1964, pp. 72-89 for a discussion of Marx vs. Malthus.

release of individuals from local charity and simultaneous turning of them into commodities for hire did not result in a national disaster. The reason is found in the general population growth which stimulated demand for output, along with increased worldwide demand for the fruits of English Industry. In addition, this was the era of the "escape valve" effect, with millions emigrating from England to America, opening up jobs for those at home. In this way the workhouse was superseded by a few generations of national economic prosperity.

Marx and Engels did not approve of the workhouse; but the shift to a free labor market was a prerequisite for the later development of a large working class and trade-union movement. In supporting the idea of the workhouse, Malthus became a secret ally of the Marxian dialectic! For the parson whose heart lay with the landed gentry was moved by his Smithian laissez faire ideology to support a program which complemented new industry.

Engels was the first to bring forth a critical counter thesis to Malthus's principle of population upon which Marx built, and upon which modern leftist criticism of Malthus largely stands--and falls. It was a variant of the cornucopian theme which we have already seen with Godwin. Engels saw population leading to an overthrow of the society as was then constituted in the

following extract from his Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy (1844):

> . . . Surplus population or labor power is invariably tied up with surplus wealth, surplus capital and surplus landed property. The population is only too large where the productive power as a whole is too large. . . . After overcoming this economic despair we have been made for ever secure against the fear of overpopulation. We derive from it the most powerful economic arguments for a social transformation.[1]

Engels agrees with Malthus that education of the people makes possible moral restraint of the propagative instinct. But Engels would emphasize in his education how man is collectively turned into a commodity. This emphasis would then lead the masses to seek the abolition of private property and economic competition. Malthus's educational purpose would be accomplished by another type of consciousness: one in which individuals chose moral restraint for the sake of higher morality, and for their family's welfare.

Most significant is Engel's further observation invoking science's magical powers:

> But Science increases at least as much as population. The latter increases in proportion to the size of the previous generation, science advances in proportion to the knowledge bequeathed to it by the previous generation, and thus under the most ordinary conditions also in geometrical progression. And what is impossible to science?[2]

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[1] In Marx, 1964, pp. 219, 221.

[2] Ibid., p. 222.

Here at last is a classic example of naive hubris (that arrogance which precedes the fall of the hero in classical Greek tragedy). Science becomes a fetish for Engels. Value emerges from "knowledge bequeathed" to forever overcome the cries of hungry mouths. Nevermind the limits of the earth's carrying capacity, or her finite stores of nonrenewable wealth, or shifts in climate. Just as Malthus and Godwin look lovingly to empty spaces on the earth yet unsettled (ignoring ecological devastation involved in occupying marginal lands)--so too Engels and then Marx would unleash man on his global spaceship to subdue recalcitrant nature. The magic of science will conquer all.

Lest the Christians and the Jews look down too smugly at the atheistic Engels and Marx, there is that classic message allegedly spoken by God, in Genesis 1:28--"And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue [sic] it: and have dominion over . . . every living thing that moveth upon the earth."

Marx did elaborate and thereby theoretically improve somewhat on Malthus's concept of diminishing returns by showing how a surplus of workers could lead to a dialectical transformation of relations inside a capitalist economy. Marx saw each "historic mode of production [having] its own special laws of

population, historically valid within its limits alone."[1] This surplus is part of the law of capitalist accumulation which, according to Marx, allows the ultimate bloom of this mode of production; but which accelerates contradictions within capitalist society. Contradictions lead to heightened consciousness among the workers, opening the door for the expropriation of the capitalist expropriators by their hired labor, according to this scenerio. In this way population pressures are central to the Marxian dialectic.

Marx's critique is, however, of the same logical structure as the first law of physics, and of Malthus's principle: If only machines did not themselves contribute to the dialectic of wealth production; if only unions had not later formed countervailing power to the capitalists; if only children did not cost more to raise after child labor was curtailed; etc.--then Marx would be right and Malthus's dismal science wrong. In fact, Marx was wrong here; Malthus was himself wrong about the affluent West.

There is another dimension to this question which leads us into an examination of the Third World's economics. If Engels is right and "science" will come to the rescue with various "green revolutions"--how long

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[1]Marx, 1967, 1, p. 632.

will it last against the exponential power of the growth rates now extant in the poorer sections of the world? Economies require stability to operate, even socialist ones: witness the agricultural chaos in the First Five Year Plan in Russia, and later in the Great Leap Forward in China.

Primitive agriculture can absorb the impact of social chaos more easily than can mechanized, specialized (i.e., scientific) agriculture. What would it take to cause worldwide famine if there were a generalized chaos of extended duration in the breadbaskets of the world twenty years from now? Therefore, there is indeed a hidden cost in Engel's and Godwin's solution of science. That cost is the requirement of continued stability in the complex economics of modern agriculture and its supportive industries. With populations bulging, the prospect of continued political chaos accompanying droughts over large areas and other natural disasters--can only lead to mass misery on a scale never before experienced by man. The equation of survival needs more flexibility than mere "science" can provide: and the best solution is less people to strain the finite dimensions of our earth.

Malthus thus cannot be ignored or refuted. As recently as 1963 the very editors of a printing of Malthus's Principle could boldly declare on the back cover

of their edition: ". . . the theory has long since been validly refuted . . . ."[1] But the parson's theory still has resilience, even if the details of his argument are flawed. The theory is a phoenix; even while the bones of the man rest in eternal sleep.

Malthus was our first spaceman; for he saw (if only imperfectly) how feedforward and feedback in one critical--human--portion of the earth's ecosystem could alter the very nature of the entire system. He therefore sought to fashion cybernetic systems of selfcontrol over fertility to avoid natural disasters consequent of overpopulation. However he hampered his efforts by rejecting as immoral the very thing the Neo-Malthusians hold central to prevention of excess fertility, birth control technology. His position was similar to that of the modern Roman Catholic Church of Pope Paul VI. Both the Roman Catholic Church (which is strictly Malthusian) and the Marxian movement (which misunderstands both Malthus and its own laws of dialectics) could do well by a reappreciation of the parson who was born on St. Valentines Day.

CHAPTER VII:

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS

Sir Thomas More put his Utopia out in the ocean off shore from the unrest which beset the mainland. Whenever a Utopian city's population grew above the fixed number allowed for each household the surplus population was used to fill gaps in other cities on the island, or to set up colonies on the nearby mainland where the inhabitants had too much land to cultivate.[1]

Our quest for an American eutopia, a "good place" rather than More's "no place," cannot ignore significant events in the rest of the world. More's Utopians were able to manipulate their environment by controlling all meaningful variables on their island. More's friends' neighbors could likewise be manipulated by crafty statesmanship; their gold supply would be used to hire mercenaries when necessary. Modern problems with a worldwide scarcity of cultivatable land were too remote for More to consider--even while speaking out against the enclosure movement already under way in his native England. Life would forever be simple and smugly static for his Utopians.

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[1]More, 1965, pp. 57-58.

Today's world laughs at any such attempts to build either an economic or a military fortress in which to hide from pressures outside a community. The sheer force of four billion voices, the sheer complexity of international trade relations, and so on, all conspire to frustrate any potential utopia. Literally--there is no place left to be "no place."

Not all of the world is equally feeling the crunch of our species' population boom. Most of the industrialized world has experienced a demographic transition which has virtually established zero population growth conditions. In contrast, the poorer majority in the world still feels the pressure of its population boom. Affluence has been a temporary shelter. Even though some areas of the Third World are beginning to show signs of a slowdown in their rates of increase, their future should be darker than their present condition. There might be some so-called "light at the end of the tunnel" ahead; but that tunnel is long and loaded with many traps. This chapter will examine some of these phenomena, and tentatively search for bridges from explosion to healthy homeostasis.

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There are four possible combinations of birth and death rates: (1) high birth and high death rates; (2) high birth but low death rates; (3) low birth and

high death rates; and (4) low birth with low death rates. What is "high" and what is "low" are of course relative to each other, and relative to the general conditions of societies in the world at the given time.[1]

We have already mentioned how death rates dropped sharply in Europe during the nineteenth century. The new-born of the eighteenth century had just two chances in ten of living beyond sixty, and a mere three in one hundred of reaching eighty.[2] For reason of his age alone Benjamin Franklin would have been a respected man. As late as 1840 one-fourth of all babies in the Netherlands perished before they were two and one-half years old; one-half of all people born died before 37.5 years; three-fourths were gone by 62.5 years. In sharp contrast, one century later (1940) it took 62.5 years--not just 2.5 years--for one-fourth of the male infants born to be dead; three-fourths reached the lofty age of 82.5 years in 1940.[3] This figure contrasts sharply with the mere three per cent of Europeans living to eighty years in the eighteenth century.

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[1] See Wrong, 1961, pp. 14-24, for a critical discussion of transition theory. See too: Chamberlain, 1972, pp. 8-9; George J. Stolnitz, "The Demographic Transition . . .," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, pp. 30-46; Irene B. Taeuber, "Population Growth in Less-Developed Countries," in P. Hauser, ed., 1969, pp. 44-58; Stockwell, 1970, pp. 171-183; Petersen, 1964, pp. 166-192; Wrigley, 1969, pp. 180-202; et al.

[2] Pressat, 1971, p. 18.

[3] P. Hauser, ed., 1969, p. 14.

The world's population is controlled by just two factors: fertility and mortality. A nation's population can also be influenced by emigration and by immigration. Indeed, we can see in the succession of ethnic immigrations to America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a reflection of the path that industrialization and subsequent population booms took in Europe. Undoubtedly this vast escape valve which was America and South America helped populations remaining in Europe adjust to the turmoil of a new social order, as well as keep down their absolute size. But as strong as the outflow to America was this factor acting in isolation would not have been sufficient to explain the drop in national growth rates in Europe during the last century and into this century. A sophisticated model is available in the theory of the demographic transition, sometimes known as the "demographic revolution."

All nations in our era which have moved into an industrialized culture from their traditional cultures have moved from a condition of high mortality with high fertility to a condition of low mortality and low fertility. Whether or not a population grows or recedes depends on the relative balance of these two life and death factors. The net balance, rather than the absolute levels, determines the rate of shift.

Thus: if any high vs. high gives us a stable population, any low vs. low can too give us a stable population--if one rate balances the other. Since people want to live long and happy lives it follows that the prevailing fertility and mortality rates of industrialized societies are preferable to the old patterns of times past, and to the patterns still found on large areas of the modern globe.

The following paradigmatic illustration shows how a transitional period from one stable pattern to another stable period causes a population boom:



A stable period may or may not be a stationary period. Shown here is a slow growth rate. Stability with no demographic growth would have both birth and death rates

equal over time, on the average. It should be noted of the illustration above that the eye follows two downward slopes during the transitional period--but the demographic reality is that of an increase in absolute population during this time.

Historically it has been preferable to at first reduce death rates as quickly as possible, and then try to bring birth rates into line with the changed death rates. It has been easier to control death rates, since science has given governments new, indirect tools for this purpose in the last century; governments are still shy about directly interfering with what they believe are private procreative havits. Where death rates are high it is most imperative to quickly drop them for the immediate psychological health of those living under such conditions. But where death rates are already low, a drop in birth rates below the existing level of death rates may also be desirable for a number of reasons dealing with eutopic possibilities.

It is theoretically possible, and quite practicable, for birth rates to drop before death rates catch up. This could lead to population shrinkage in the transitional period. The historical demographic transitions of the West show us but one transitional pattern possibility. The opposite pattern, with birth rates falling below death rates, is likewise possible as a demographic transition.

In the European West the experience of a demographic transition was much more leisurely than the modern phenomenon of death rates changing in much of the Third World since the Second World War. It is interesting to note that the first instances of a falling national birth rate were in predominantly Roman Catholic countries in Europe: by 1750 birth rates had begun to fall in France; Ireland has already been documented. But the birth rates in non-Catholic England and in the Scandinavian countries remained high until after 1850.[1]

Changes in mortality rates, especially those of children, affected the composition of the existential family, rather than the number of live children born to women. Wrigley[2] notes that this meant children grew up with more siblings and a better chance to have both of their parents survive their childhood. It was the upper classes who first began contraceptive reductions in fertility in England, with the lower classes folling their lead later. By 1961 fertility differentials had narrowed considerably among the classes in Britain.[3] All classes have thus shared in the changes in demographic composition.

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[1]Robert C. Cook, "World Population Growth," in Shimm and Everett, eds., pp. 5-6.

[2]Wrigley, 1969, pp. 183-184.

[3]Ibid., pp. 185-186.

Both families and countries became large as a result of the transition period. It is not generally known that the large population densities of the developed countries today were not antecedent to and causal of their rapid economic growth. None of the first countries had over thirty million inhabitants on the eve of their industrialization. Even the United States had less than twenty millions in the 1840's.[1] Once industrialization began, growth in population size in these increasingly worker-hungry economies was necessary for the new factory system. Unlike the modern situation in automated industry, the earliest factories were universally hungry for bodies to man their machinery.

Putting this picture into systems theory language, we can say that the expanding systems capacity of these new economies was fed by a population increase, and that the rate of population increase did not overload the system's carrying capacity (i.e., the system could provide for levels of subsistence at or above the Malthusian minimum). Machines did not have sophisticated, interlocking feedback networks: man's brain and his dexterous hands were still welcome, even if his muscles were superceded.

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[1] Simon Kuznets, "Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-Industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries," in Feinstein, ed., 1964, p. 14.

Another dimension of growth is suggested by Rostow's concept of "take-off." He notes: "Historically, population rates of increase during the [European] take-off decades were generally under 1.5% per annum."[1] Stolnitz notes that the high growth rates in large areas of the Third World imply a doubling of population in the twenty-five year range: ". . . the same rates are about double the maximum rates of population growth in the European parts of the West during theikr century-long transition."[2]

The American experience before and during the transition cannot be cited as a clear refutation of the transition theory. In 1790 population was increasing from the excess of births over deaths and from immigration at thirty to thirty-five per cent every ten years. Malthus took the 1790 Census as a cornerstone in the attempt to prove his theory of geometric reproduction of populations under favorable conditions. At the time of the take-off into sustained growth in the mid-nineteenth century the birth rates were still high, relative to the European pattern. Capital, land, immigrants (a type of population with

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[1] W. Rostow, 1960, p. 141.

[2] George J. Stolnitz, "The Demographic Transition . . .," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, p. 43.

a lower dependency ratio than the indigenous Americans), advancing technologies, the demand pull of a war economy's demands, and other factors all facilitated take-off for America.

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The case of Japan is special, for this is the only non-Western country to experience a demographic transition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries along with the Europeans. For over a hundred years prior to Commodore Perry's military visit in 1853 ending the isolation of Japan from the West the Japanese population fluctuated around the 26 - 27,000,000 level. Subsistence levels of food production were not able to support a rising level of population. Infanticide was often practiced by midwives at the behest of the head of the family, for economic reasons among the peasantry. The samurai warrior families themselves practiced infanticide for younger sons, whenever there was the "danger" of their son's social degradation to economic activity.[1] Colin Clark compares this second half of the Tokugawa Japan with Baroque Europe.[2] Trade was regulated by despotic

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[1] M. Bronfenbrenner and J. A. Buttrick, "Population Control in Japan . . .," in Shimm and Everett, eds., 1961, pp. 169-170.

[2] Clark, 1967, p. 78.

public officials; the country was fairly urbanized; taxation was excessive and famines were frequent. The nobility became increasingly parasitic on the masses. Only the drastic abolition of the old political order in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration could lead to demographic changes.

After the revolution in 1868 the people began to rear larger families simply by not resorting to abortion and infanticide on the level previously practiced. Population thus rose in just one century from 27 millions to 90 millions, and Japan became after Holland and Belgium the world's most densely populated nation. (Actually, Japan became the most densely populated nation, if one considers the vast portions of her small territory dominated by mountains.)

Despite this astonishing record of fertility two factors must be noted for proper perspective: (1) the rates of increase were not constant over this century, and (2) the transformation from Asiatic agriculture to industrialized, westernized sophistication took a full century. Those who would hope to find in Japan a prototype for the rest of Asia to follow--must also consider how very different this isolated island nation was from the rest of Asia, even before the Meiji Restoration, and how energetically her people have responded to the challenge of modernization.

Irene Taeuber warns us not to expect replication of the Japanese experience in the future, just as the world cannot hope to replicate America's unique experience.[1] The precipitant declines in the birth rate to where now the net reproduction rate has stayed at or below the 1.0 level in Japan since 1956 actually began with individual families choosing to limit their family size. Taeuber notes:

> The development came after almost a century of industrialization and urbanization. It accompanied a rate of economic growth even more miraculous than the rate of demographic transition. . . . If Japan's demographic transition is to be a model for countries now less developed, that model has to involve the total transformation of Japan rather than simply its family ideals and its reproductive performance.[2]

The Japanese story does not end on a clearly successful note. In 1969 some recommendations were made by the Population Problems Inquiry Council, a cabinet-level advisory group, which were then advocated by then Prime Minister Sato. These recommendations were for an <u>increase</u> in Japan's birth rate! The mass media reacted passionately, clamoring for a return to higher fertility.[3]

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[1] Irene B. Taeuber, "Population Growth . . .," in P. Hauser, ed., 1969, pp. 47-49.

[2] Ibid., p. 49.

[3] See Boffey, 1970; also, Rosenthal, 1972b.

Boffey notes that Japan's success in curbing its population growth helped free a sizeable portion of that nation's capital resources that would otherwise have been used for the rearing of new numbers. But Japan as recently had some problems finding enough cheap labor for its factories. This phenomenon is only partially explained by the decline in the birth rate. Another major factor has been the growing number of youths continuing with their education, rather than beginning work at an early wage at those low wages.

At the bottom of the issue over whether or not to expand population is the disagreement over priorities. According to Boffey: "Those who regard economic expansion as the greatest good want more bodies to man the assembly lines. Those who are worried about overcrowding are willing to sacrifice some economic growth in return for more living space."[1]

It is interesting to note that Sato's Japan did not seriously consider importing workers in the manner of the prosperous European nations, West Germany and Switzerland. Does this myopia reflect a racist, purist elitism in these people--of such strength

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[1]Boffey, 1970, p. 962.

that policy makers are willing to further limit the freedoms and endanger the health of all the Japanese people themselves with an even higher population density on their resource-poor islands? Man can become adjusted to crowded conditions especially when the cultural norms support crowding. But can a man withstand high levels of pollution such as those found in Tokyo where the traffic cops have to wear gas masks with oxygen pumped in? And where does a person turn when he wants to get "outdoors"? The miniature gardens are things of classic beauty; but so are the simple things which unspoiled nature provides. When choices are increasingly limited by man's own activities is man's freedom thereby expanded?

CHAPTER VIII:

POPULATION BOOMS AND THE THIRD WORLD

Everybody is an authority on the population explosion in the Third World. If only those illiterates would take the pill . . . . Or so the solution would seem. Surprisingly, many people in the over-populated Third World think a larger population would be desirable--or at least a larger family of their own. The pill itself is an elusive panacea. Indeed this chapter offers no panaceas. Rather, its function will be to highlight some of the processes which operate unseen and silent today, which will distort the future if ignored sufficiently. This chapter will attempt a topical, not encyclopedic, overview of the modern Third World, along with offering some suggestions for action. We are aiming for a cultural and political framework in which to see clearly America's fragile prosperity.

The reader will recall our discussion on Malthus and his description of potential geometric growth rates for populations. Just before I began this chapter my body experienced a pathological population explosion in miniature; I developed an acute case of "strep throat." Thanks to Dr. Fleming's discovery penicillin quickly performed its task of restoring order to my body's system.

The potential for population booms is the same with microbes as it is with humans. A system can embrace either the world's entire biosphere, or it can be a single human body, or even a single cell. However, the succession of generations is much faster with microbes than with humans. While their life spans as individuals are much briefer than ours, and their individual bodies certainly are as nothing when compared to ours--they make up for these one-to-one deficiencies by their gross numbers.

A society accustomed to "cleaner than clean" laundry, to white eggs, mouthwashes, white bread, deodorants, white teeth, overcooked and disguised food, and other signs of a "germ neurosis" does not allow into its collective consciousness the eloquent facticity of those germs which live inside the body as a matter of course. Each healthy person harbors thousands of microbe species, each species present in abundant numbers. Some, such as the bacteria in our intestines which are essential to proper digestion of food, are critical components of our survival system.

At times of stress that ecology, that balance, is upset. Disease hits the human body-system. One species (such as my streptococcus friends) may seize on the opportunity to grow in a Malthusian way.

If the process were to continue until the system collapsed from their entropic force, then all of the various microbe colonies in the body system could be imperiled. If the deceased human were cremated they would have in fact engineered their own destruction. Ironically, what began as individual survival and procreative activity would end up as suicide for these microbes.

Can I rightfully blame them for attacking me? To them I am just another mass of food substance at the proper temperature and moisture. I am the abstract host with no name. They are unable to relate to the whole man and to respect him as a whole because they are unable to experience this person beyond their primitive needs; their powers of perception fail below comprehension of my totality. It would, in fact, be dysfunctional for any microbe to see and respect the whole man, even if such were possible. Everybody must eat, even microbes.

Let us turn from one man as object to mankind as subject. Does not modern man treat his lands, his seas, his air with a sense of abstraction? We see the whole earth in the exploitative I-It sense, rather than from an I-Thou perspective, because of our linear preoccupation with personal "success." The microbes instinctively know that in numbers there is safety for their species. Small mammals such as mice and rabbits

multiply rapidly to keep alive as a species. Atavistic man needed a high fertility rate to keep alive in the species game. But "civilization's" drive to power has ignored one thing: A good brain is not enough when there are no bodies left for those brains to inhabit.

Our study of the quantity-quality dialectic leads us to question any linear extension of the "numbers = strength" relationship to its logical end point, modern man and his atomic society. Modern man has slain his ancient enemies (for the time being), famine and disease. Man now stands alone without predators--except his brother. Therefore the relationship for modern man armed with The Bomb and other insanities of technology has become not "numbers = strength"; rather it is "excessive numbers = weakness and probable extinction."

Man is large and his presence upon the earth's surface is growing. But the physical earth is a relative constant. Man multiplies his impact through brainpower applied by technology to the energy elements of the earth. Man's sorcerer's apprentice genius has left chemical tracks on lands never trampled by his boots. Those chemical tracks, and especially atomic tracks, will persist for eons. Our examination of the threshold effects phenomenon now leads us to but one question: Will Faustian man's interference with his spaceship end before he as a species ends?

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The story of man's numerical expansion is different in each land. The problems facing Brazil today are not those of India, for example. About two-thirds of the people live on seven per cent of the land area of the world. There are many factors dictating density, not the least of which is the fact that huge expanses of land are worthless to conventional farming. The world's settlement pattern has shifted disproportionately to the overall rate of increase. As of 1960 the 1,440 urban places of 100,000 or more residents held sixteen per cent of the world's people, instead of the less than two per cent in 1800.[1] In 1920 there were just 83 big cities in the world with 500,000 inhabitants or more, and a mere seven with 2,500,000 or more. Only forty years later the first number had soared to 234, while the second figure had climbed to twenty-six.[2] Even though problems may differ, the worldwide pattern seems clear: more people dictate more and larger cities.

Kingsley Davis' classic study of urbanization[3] shows this process is generally finite, a cycle through which nations have gone in their transition from

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[1]Amos H. Hawley, "World Urbanization: Trends and Prospects," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, p. 81.

[2]Nobile and Deedy, eds., 1972, p. 56.

[3]K. Davis, 1965.

agrarian to industrialized society. Urbanization refers to the increased proportion of the total population concentrated in urban areas. Cities can thus grow without any national urbanization, provided the rural areas grow as fast or faster. Even though urbanization as a process of proportions has an end in practice, the growth of cities itself has no limit.

Davis[1] points out that advanced countries were economically helped by their urbanization when agricultural holdings were consolidated and increased capitalization was used to improve efficiency on the farms. In comparison the underdeveloped countries are experiencing an even more rapid growth in their cities. Because of the generalized population explosion, ". . . city growth is disproportionate to urbanization. The discrepancy is paradoxical in the industrial nations and worse than paradoxical in the non-industrial."[2]

In relatively rich countries the countryside tends to depopulate as industry attracts rural people with higher wages, and as farming becomes capital intensive rather than labor intensive. Poor countries expand everywhere simply because of their higher excess of births over deaths. Between 1950 and 1960 in twenty-four

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[1] Ibid., p. 51.
[2] Ibid., p. 52.

countries with per capita incomes below $250 cities of 100,000+ grew sixty per cent faster than the total population. The average growth rate of these cities was over four per cent each year. This astonishing rate means they double in size every seventeen years.[1]

The following table shows the profound effects of slight variations in rates of increase:

Annual rate of growth	No. of yrs. required for a doubling
less than 0.5 per cent	more than 139 years
0.5 to 1.0 per cent	139 to 70 years
1.0 to 1.5 per cent	70 to 47 years
1.5 to 2.0 per cent	47 to 35 years
2.0 to 2.5 per cent	35 to 28 years
2.5 to 3.0 per cent	28 to 23 years
3.0 to 3.5 per cent	23 to 20 years
3.5 to 4.0 per cent	20 to 18 years

Explosive population growth rates may actually retard economic progress, even though there are ostensibly more workers available after a time. If the growth rates are mainly the product of new anti-death technologies, and not from demand pull generated by labor hungry industries, general welfare should suffer. The pnenomenon of growth itself works against its amelioration. Jacob Viner calls

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[1]Roger Revelle, "Some Consequences of Rapid Population Growth," in H. Brown and E. Hutchings, eds., pp. 52-53.

this a paradox of the population problem, where

> . . . the attainment of high levels of per capita income and of education appear to be almost essential prerequisites of a cure of the problem and that the excessive rate of increase of population in itself the most important barrier to the establishemnt of these prerequisites. [1]

If the only path to reduced fertility were the classical demographic transition the cause of stabilized world population control would appear to be doomed, short of a worldwide famine. Must this be so?

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The widely known ecologist-demographer Paul Ehrlich thinks the battle to feed all of humanity is indeed over. He predicts in his The Population Bomb that the 1970's and 1980's will witness the starvation of hundreds of millions of people, in spite of any crash programs launched now. He offers the following "cheer" to those who attempt birth control now on a mass scale: ". . . efforts toward solving the population problem may not be in vain. . . . Suppose a billion people perish. At least if we have called enough attention to the problem, we may be able to avoid a repetition of the whole mess."[2]

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[1] Jacob Viner, "The Economics of Development," in Feinstein, ed., 1964, p. 291; also see Cipolla, 1965, p. 105.

[2] P. Ehrlich, 1971, p. 158.

It is technically possible for a Stone Age people to be endowed with a twentieth-century death rate within a very few years. Whereas the people of New Guinea go on as before, modern technology has been applied to many other areas of the Third World. For example, the people of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean saw an increase in average life expectancy from 33 to 51 years in a short time; a similar gain took Sweden 130 years to achieve. Because the shift has been so sudden there has developed an excess of youth over old age in Mauritius and like cultures, resulting in a natural increase per 1000 per year of 26.7 in Mauritius in the 1950 to 1960 decade. Other countries were experiencing even higher rates in this period: 31.8 for Mexico, 33.9 in El Salvidor, and 37.3 in Costa Rica.[1] We remember from our table that 30 per 1000 is a 3.0 per cent rate, yielding a doubling in just 23 years.

This decade of the 1950's represents a high point in worldwide growth rates. Those rates are beginning to subside somewhat in most areas of the world of poverty. But just how significant will this demographic reversal of today be for the future?

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[1]See K. Davis, 1963, pp. 68-71.

The best answer is supplied by Nathan Keyfitz who discusses the momentum of population growth.[1] He supplies the example of Ecuador in 1965 with a rate of natural increase per 1000 of 33.31. By accounting for the birth rate, the expectation of life (60.16 years), and the mean age of childbearing, the results give ". . . an increase of about 60 per cent over the present total if birth rates fall to a stationary level immediately and mortality remains constant."[2] What happens when the drop is delayed just a few years? Keyfitz computes: "If the drop to stationary birth rates occurs . . . in 15 years, the . . . population would then be . . . 2.79 times [279 per cent] the present population."[3]

The eloquence of simple momentum mocks the optimism of a Donald Bogue who notes himself that the world experienced a "switch-over" about 1965 where the rates of growth (due to the death rates declining faster than birth rates) slackened some. He asserts that,

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[1] Keyfitz, 1971; Gunnar Myrdal observes [Myrdal, 1968, Vol. II, p. 1458] of South Asia: "Even if fertility were to decline substantially during the next decades--which our analysis indicates could not happen spontaneously but would require radical policy measures to spread birth control among the masses of people--this would not change the trend in population size very much within the span of one, two, or even three decades after the decline began."

[2] Ibid., p. 79.

[3] Ibid.

"the rate of growth [worldwide] will . . . be zero or near zero at about the year 2000, so that population growth will not be regarded as a major social problem except in isolated and small 'retarded' areas."[1]

But will the real issue at that time be the growth rate—or will it be, simply, sustained maintenance of that huge number of hungry mouths already accumulated? Even if the rate becomes stationary, mass starvations accompanying droughts, diseases, wars and other entropic catastrophes will be a chronic presence. In 1969 El Salvador and Honduras fought a brief but nasty war over the inflow of Salvadoran migrants into Honduras. Is this first "population war" an omen for the future?

With such a huge population base the earth's nutritive slack will be severely stretched. For the poor peoples the distribution and price systems extant in nationalistic money economies hold additional terrors. The problem will be with more than just food: Already the world has experienced a wave of high prices for petroleum, as demand pull drives prices skyward. Rich countries can suffer these increases; but the poor lands which are not lucky enough to have their own oil wells can hardly afford to pay the extra amounts.

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[1]Donald J. Bogue, "The Prospects for World Population Control [1967]," in Pohlman, ed., 1973, p. 45.

In systems theory terms, the latent entropic possibilities built into huge population maintenance will require perpetual negentropic forces maintained on an even keel to sustain all the life and social systems man has erected for his self-glorification.

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There has been much excitement among the neo-Godwinians over the so-called "Green Revolution" in Third World agriculture. This is supposed to be the "out" for population problems which have persisted despite other efforts to date. Let us examine the record of this "revolution" and its future.

Through most of the nineteenth century the world could enjoy the luxury of new lands opening up in the Americas, along with many new transportation technologies to market the new foods. Now that most of the non-marginal farming areas are occupied it is becoming more important than ever to have an increase in productivity per unit of land. The standard of living for the world is dependent ultimately on worldwide agricultural productivity. If for example population is increasing at a rate of five per cent over a given time unit, and if production increases by the same five per cent, there will not be any increase in per capita standards of living. Only if the increase in population is slower than that of production can the wealth of each person rise in the long run.

Countries already wealthy can tolerate very low percentage rates of growth, because the economic base for their population base is already high. In contrast, poor countries are handicapped even when their economic growth rates are high; their absolute increments in per capita growth are still small vis-à-vis the more wealthy countries. In an era of rising expectations throughout the modernizing world this gap can only point toward continued political tension.

Let us illustrate the magnitude of the task of modernization, given a high growth rate for population. Philip Hauser points out that with projected population growth Asia must achieve an economic growth rate in excess of thirteen per cent each year until the year 2000; and Latin America must advance at a ten per cent annual rate—all just to catch up with the levels of living for Europe in 1968. Using the formula, $L = \frac{O}{P}$, where "L" equals levels of living, "O" equals aggregate output, "P" equals population size, it thus becomes obvious that the smaller the "P" is the larger "L" will be, given the same level of output.[1]

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[1] Philip M. Hauser, "World Population Growth," in P. Hauser, ed., 1969, p. 29; see too Wrigley, 1969, p. 210; and J. J. Spengler, "Population and Economic Growth," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964.

The challenge of increased productivity is incredible, leading much support to Ehrlich's prediction of mega-deaths in the next generation. Nearly half of those living in many developing countries are less than fifteen years old! India requires twenty per cent more food in 1975 than in 1965 just to feed those already alive in 1965; adults need to consume more than small children. Food transport is vital for getting rural crops to urban markets, but India has just 0.7 mile of access farm roads per square mile of cultivated land. In contrast, western countries have three to four miles of comparative roads.[1] India will require in 1985 an additional production of food calories equal to 88 per cent of its total in 1965.[2]

Introit the "Green Revolution"!...

The massive introduction of new high yielding wheats and rices along with support technologies has pushed forward into the indefinite future those Malthusian famines. A chief characteristic of these new grains is their greater fertilizer responsiveness. Dr. Norman Borlaug was given the coveted Nobel Peace Prize for his work in Mexico with new wheat strains.[3]

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[1]Dr. Ivan Bennett, Jr., "People and Food," in M. Hamilton, eds., 1970, pp. 90, 117.

[2]Dr. William G. Pollard, "God and His Creation," in ibid., p. 52.

[3]See Sterba, 1973.

As rosy as things appear to be in the short-run, the spread of these new varieties requires either abundant rainfall or irrigation. Such land is a minor share of the total used for growing wheat.[1] More important than the total grain crop is the nutrient composition of that crop. The total tilled land in the United States could today feed today's world population--with all the calories required, if the northern zone were to grow sugar beets, and the southern areas sugar cane.[2]

Simple additions of more starch into the world's food basket will not solve the basic hunger problem. Man needs proteins more than he needs empty calories: Protein can be broken down by the body into simple sugar; but sugars cannot be broken down into essential amino acids. Borgstrom suggests protein intake, not calories, as the best gauge for nutritional standards.[3] In some areas of India the introduction of more profitable new wheats has actually reduced the amount of protein-rich pulses planted--resulting in less protein on the dinner tables, while there is yet available "more food."

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[1] An excellent discussion is in L. Brown, 1971.

[2] Borgstrom, 1972, p. 29.

[3] Ibid., pp. 44-60; also, L. Brown, 1971, pp. 16-21.

There is no denying that major famines have been pushed into the future. Some people hope massive famines have been forever eliminated by the "Green Revolution." But let us quote from Dr. Bourlaug's own 1970 Nobel Prize acceptance speech:

> The green revolution has won a temporary success in man's war against hunger and deprivation; it has given man a breathing space. If fully implemented, the revolution can provide sufficient food for sustenance during the next three decades. But the frightening power of human reproduction must also be curbed; otherwise, the success of the green revolution will be ephemeral only. [1]

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The Ebers papyrus, dated at 1550 B. C., contains an effective formula for a tampon medicated to prevent conception.[2] The society of man and woman has long been aware of the perils of overpopulation. However, just as Rostow could postulate a take-off point for sustained economic growth, we could likewise postulate take-off forces for sustained population growth beyond safe limits, under specific conditions. Death control is engineered by the greater society, but, in the absence of a totalitarian effort by a government, birth control is left in the hands of the baby producers themselves. If conditions are right these baby factories will seek only their private and immediate interests—careless of the long-run effects on the world of their unborn grandchildren.

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[1] In Pohlman, ed., 1973, p. 240.

[2] Dubos, 1968, p. 189.

A valuable paradigm is provided by Garrett Hardin's concept of the "tragedy of the commons."[1] Hardin's analysis centers around subsystem dynamics and their effects on the encompassing system as a whole. His model of the commons is the model of a common grazing land in a traditional village, where each villager has the right to graze his cows on common land. In the absence of community regulation it is, according to Hardin, in the interest of each villager to overgraze his cows on the commons. The reason is simple: Each owner gets all the benefits of grazing, but pays only his fraction of the cost of deterioration.

If a population density of the village were low it might not be destructive for each farmer to unleash his private cows onto the common land. Hardin is led to an interesting moral law: "The morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time it is performed."[2] This model of the commons applies equally well to pollution, where polluters "externalize" their costs, forcing the greater society to "internalize" them by suffering the effects of that pollution. As it is with cows, so it is with smokestacks.

A sharp critique of Hardin's model is offered by the laissez-faire analyst, David Friedman.[3]

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[1]See Hardin, 1972. [This book has appended his original essay of 1968, "The Tragedy of the Commons."]

[2]Ibid., p. 256.

[3]Friedman, 1972.

His concern is with excessive government regulation, just as much as it is with population density. For him the ideal situation would be where there were no externalities, with each person internalizing the costs of his own actions. He observes of Hardin's commons the following:

> The herds will stop increasing when the return from an additional animal falls below the value of that part of the cost paid by the individual herdsman; at that point, even though he absorbs only part of the cost, the addition is still unprofitable. This point usually occurs before the commons is grazed to extinction.[1]

What Friedman is describing is a feedback mechanism working through the cost : benefits ratio. This is an autonomous governor which works through the self-interest of each herdsman. After all, the herdsman would rather put his cows on his own land than put them on common land virtually stripped of grass to eat. The government is not needed for this sort of regulation. Herdsmen are rational people when selfinterest is the issue. There is no psychological "ego" involved in these actions. How then is it that Third World peoples appear to not think likewise on birth control?

A complete answer to this last question of comparative values is beyond the scope of this book. A lot of the differences in operant values can be

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[1]Ibid., p. 10.

traced to misinformation and generalized mistrust. For example, a Jat farmer in India speaks of his son and the birth control advocates: "These Americans are enemies of the smile on this child's face. All they are interested in is war or family planning."[1]

A fair amount of erosion of the traditional social fabric has accompanied the demographic growth in poorer areas of the world. But the sluggish pace of modernization of family patterns reflects the failure of emergent social patterns to provide viable alternatives for the masses of the people.[2] Gunnar Myrdal is driven to observe that there is little hope for South Asia without greater social discipline, seeing nothing more dangerous for democracy than lack of discipline.[3] But discipline as such is a tricky thing to put into practice, without reforms and incentives.

Despite little objective change in the life styles of the average Asiatic villager, there are those forces for change. The very fact of reduced infant mortality rates makes it more probable that male heirs will be guaranteed with a smaller number of children. With shrinking land available per farmer, the problem

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[1]Mamdani, 1972, p. 147.

[2]Goode, 1970, pp. 268-269; see too Wrong, 1961, pp. 62-66.

[3]Myrdal, 1968, Vol. II, p. 895.

of providing dowries sometimes looms large, eroding plans for several male successors.[1]

Nevertheless, that which is plentiful need not be taken too seriously. Children are cheap whenever they can be put to work at an early age and fed the minimum.[2] A high proportion of children overburden school systems; even chances for education at home are reduced when parents themselves are uneducated and overworked. It is a brutal irony that children and other peripheral humans must first bear the brunt of the suffering caused by a population explosion relative to available resources.

People are not poor because they have large families. They have large families because they are poor. Every Indian farmer knows that the cost of adding one more child is less than the one before; but the benefits may increase. Over one fourth of these families resort to emigration of some of their children to the city to supplement their family incomes.[3] This pattern follows the same dynamism which motivated many rural families in poorer areas of Europe to send their virile children to America in the nineteenth

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[1] Wrigley, 1969, p. 219.

[2] See the classic Mayo, 1927; also, D. Mace and V. Mace, 1960; P. Ehrlich and A. Ehrlich, 1972, p. 29; and Lelyveld, 1968.

[3] Mamdani, 1972, p. 44.

and early twentieth centuries. This option for savings in itself helps to explain much resistance to birth control programs.

This syndrome is however different from that in America's land extensive agricultural community. The option for increased mechanization is not realistic for the poor farmer whose reality is labor intensive agriculture. If the Indian government were to opt for an enclosure program in the style of England's past experience, forcing millions to the cities for the sake of more efficient use of tractors and other machinery--the results would be catastrophic, considering the already grievous state of many of the Indian cities. Just because a city is there, it does not mean the jobs will also be there.

Does the Indian peasant want male heirs solely for sexist ego gratification? Again the obvious may escape the American's jaded perspective. American government provides an efficient system of public welfare, guaranteeing even the poor and childless a modicum of comfort until death. Such a system is beyond the system capacity of India's government, as it is presently constituted. Thus, the Indian peasant's life is literally tied in with that of his progeny; they are his social security.

Both in Asia and in Latin America the main barrier to agricultural development is the concentration

of land ownership. In response to Lester Brown's suggestion for more equal distribution of lands Lakshmi Kant Jha, Ambassador to the United States from India, thinks this step is inadequate and ill advised. Perhaps so, for he notes that if all land holdings of more than twenty acres were distributed to those with less than five acres, this would raise the average size of holdings from 0.31 acres per capita to only 0.54 acres.[1] Nevertheless, this small absolute increase would be in fact a nearly 100% improvement for each farmer. Even this new soil, given in lieu of other social changes, would only briefly postpone the Malthusian spectre. The population-land issue should soon reduce itself to two options: radical reforms, or radical revolutions.

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Let us look now at Latin America. As elsewhere in the Third World their post-World War II upsurge in population is largely due to reduction in death rates, mainly through control of communicable diseases. The same themes of poorly distributed population concentrations, undercapitalization, wishy-washy governments, and other factors are abundant here.[2]

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[1] In L. Brown, 1971, p. 49.

[2] See T. Lynn Smith, "The Population of Latin America," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964; Illich, 1971; Stycos, 1968; and Borgstrom, 1972, espec. pp. 285-370.

Both North America and South America have experienced high rates of growth. North America had an average annual rate of population growth of three per cent between 1750 and 1850. Many areas of South America have experienced this rate since 1950. But there is one critical difference between the north and the south: the base level of population was lower for North America during its upsurge. Thus rates alone cannot tell us much. Furthermore, many economic opportunities were open to the North American which are effectively denied to the South American. Stycos notes that, "the relative flexibility of the class structure, the more even distribution of wealth, the favorable market situation, all created in North America less 'social density' than in Latin America."[1]

Whereas population growth in Latin America is proceeding at an average annual rate of 2.9 per cent per year, during the first eight years of the heralded Alliance for Progress economic growth moved forward at a modest 1.5 per cent per year.[2] A totally inefficient tax system allows the elite to pocket twenty or more billion dollars each year in foreign bank accounts. At the same time most Latin American countries are drowning in debts; the servicing of earlier loans is becoming an increasingly large part of new loans

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[1] Stycos, 1968, p. 24.

[2] P. Ehrlich and A. Ehrlich, 1972, p. 406.

secured through the World Bank.[1]

Just as in India, Latin America is generally overurbanized relative to the basic economy. Even in a country such as Brazil, which has a high rural to city ratio, there is a city problem. Rio and São Paulo suffer from a too rapid growth in relation to the cultural needs of other cities, and in relation to their own capacities to absorb newcomers from the rest of the country.[2] Only the industrialized, urbanized, and well-educated nations of Argentina and Uruguay enjoy modern fertility levels.[3]

We might suspect that the Roman Catholic Church is deeply involved in the population boom, expecially since the current pontiff has come out against modern birth control technology. The truth is somewhat obscured by many forces affecting fertility, of which the Church is but one major force.

Saint Augustine declared all intercourse except that with one's wife for the sake of conception "unlawful and wicked."[4] Augustine was the first in a long line of misinterpretors of why Onan was punished

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[1]Borgstrom, 1972, pp. 313-314.

[2]Schurz, 1964, pp. 359-360.

[3]Stycos, 1968, p. 300.

[4]Norman St. John-Stevas, "A Roman Catholid View of Population Control," in Shimm and Everett, eds., 1961, p. 69.

by his God. Augustine thought it was because Onan spilled his "seed," whereas modern interpretation supports the idea that Onan was punished for breaking the levirate law and denying his deceased brother's family legitimate heirs.

The Majority Report of the Papal Commission given in 1966 recommended that," . . . married people need decent and human means for the regulation of conception. They should be able to expect the collaboration of all, especially from men of learning and science . . . ."[1] Pope Paul issued his reply in his Humanae Vitae in 1968.[2] This incredible document underlines a profound human tragedy: Here we see a man of the best intentions encouraging conditions leading to mass tragedy.

Paul repeats all the crusty clichés of his conservative colleagues.[3] He sees a causal link between "artificial" birth control and "the general lowering of morality." He sees rulers imposing their favorite methods of contraception. Most interesting for our analysis is his ignorant appeal to diving law in the following sentence: "God has wisely disposed natural laws and rhythms of fecundity which, of themselves, cause a separation in the succession of births."[4]

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[1] In Hardin, ed., 1969, p. 265.
[2] Ibid., pp. 266-269.
[3] See Appleman, 1966, pp. 64-106.
[4] Ibid., p. 266.

This is meaningless; the mere fact of separation tells us nothing about the average time span of separations! This time span is the real critical factor. Here the quantity-quality dialectic applies clearly. The quantitative time measure of a society's average separation of births determines the qualitative demographic nature of that society.

If the Pope's word were as powerful today as it was in the Medieval Era the future of effective birth control in Latin America would be bleak indeed. Fortunately, most of the people adhere to a culture religion variant of Catholocism which lacks a close linkage to the orthodox sexual morality of the Vatican. The Church is a pillar of the establishment in these countries and as such is respected; but its teachings are often ignored if large numbers of children stand in the way of one's comfort or higher status.[1]

The real negative impact of the official Church position lies in its lack of support for birth control programs, a support which would have been there if the Papal Commission had been listened to by the new pope. Already enough girls have been born to

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[1]Thomas G. Sanders, "Population Planning and Belief Systems: The Catholic Church in Latin America," in H. Brown and Hutchings, eds., 1972.

guarantee a doubling of women of childbearing age by the 1980's.

The clearest light on the situation is provided by Ivan Illich[1] who criticises the system of government-education-birth control. Birth control programs stress fear of poverty, not joy of life. Illich links responsible parenthood to the quest for power in politics: "The decision to act as responsible mate and parent implies participation in political life and acceptance of the discipline this demands."[2] In college I had a Latin American history teacher who said he loved to teach the history of this region because it followed so closely his cynical maxim: "the masses are asses." Will the past be the future? Or will the future be enlightened by a fresh concern for the fate of the little children who never asked to be born but now must ask for a simple meal.

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Let us look briefly at what happens to an underdeveloped country when its high fertility declines. Cavin Jones' analysis of this phenomenon points to a number of hopeful factors. Growth in the economy requires savings. A country can only borrow so much

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[1] Illich, 1971.

[2] Ibid., p. 147.

from the World Bank. If surpluses are not generated and invested within the country no economic growth is possible. Foreign investments are not always a sufficient answer to the problems of investment, especially if one's country is not blessed with abundant natural resources. Jones notes that,

> . . . a decline in fertility, through its effects of holding back the growth of consumption requirements and lowering the dependency ratio, should enable . . . the rise in savings [to] come about through the voluntary decisions of households and/or the action of the government in collecting more taxes and devoting more of its revenue to investment.[1]

The savings ratio cannot solve the economic problem alone. Changes in the very structure of society, in the quality of government, and in the attitudes of individuals must also accompany this reduction in fertility.

Ansley Coale computes the effect of a reduced dependency burden resulting from fertility reduced by fifty per cent in twenty-five years in his model population.[2] Actual numbers available for employment are nearly equal in twenty-five to thirty years in both projections of constant and reduced fertility. But the population reducing its high fertility

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[1] Jones, 1969, pp. 13-14.

[2] Ansley J. Coale, "Population and Economic Development," In P. Hauser, ed., 1969.

can produce a more rapidly growing national product. Coal concludes:

> . . . in the short run not only does a population with reduced fertility enjoy the benefit of dividing the national product among a smaller number of consumers, it enjoys the additional benefit of having a larger national product to divide.[1]

During his successful campaign for the presidency of Mexico in 1970 Luis Alvarez spoke out for a larger population. Then, during a tour of his country after his election he was moved by the rapid rise of unemployment to reverse his earlier position. Mexico now has a policy promoting family planning. A Colombian woman tells workers at a family-planning clinic in her country,"Priests are for the soul, doctors for the body. This is a body matter; I'll keep using my IUD."[2] Whether this new realism will be of sufficient strength to allow Latin America to escape the shadow of Malthus is as yet unknown.

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This chapter, indeed this entire book, should not be stereotyped as projecting either a "pessimistic" or an "optimistic" forecast. Always, there is a large area of uncertainty when projecting

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[1]Ibid., p. 69.

[2]Rowan and Mazie, 1973.

what people in their praxis will do. Unlike the process of natural phenomena, people can behave in totally unpredictable ways. The range of possibilities is vast, even while the range of probable alternatives is somewhat more restricted.

How will the Third World's masses respond to the necessities of growing population pressures? Much has been written about "vanguard social ideology," mostly by Marxians. How accurate will such self-descriptions be in the area of population in the last decades of this century? Will policy be influenced by ideology, or will ideology yield to social necessities and pragmatic solutions? Most important: Will the Neo-Mercantilistic policy of the current Marxist governments create conditions self-destructive to the future of their own societies?

These thoughts preface my reactions to the World Population Conference, held in Bucharest in August, 1974. Out of that Conference emerged a "World Population Plan of Action."[1] Remarkably, this document contains no hard policy decisions, despite piles of dismal demographic data.

To illustrate the ironies abounding in this effete document, let us quote from paragraph #13--and then from paragraph #14. From #13: ". . . even if

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[1]United Nations, 1974.

replacement levels of fertility . . . had been achieved [in the developing countries] in 1970 and maintained thereafter, their total population would still grow from a 1970 total of 2.5 billion to about 4.4 billion before it would stabilize during the second half of the twenty-first century." (Of course this statement represents an idealized counterfactual model.) Later, in paragraph #14 we read: ". . . all couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number [sic] and spacing of their children . . . ."

Endless rhetoric was devoted to good ideals such as women's rights, information on family planning, better census counts, and so forth. But no teeth were attached to this rhetoric. Since the implied reason for convening this Conference had been the lack of effective national population policies, this toothless "Plan of Action" is equivalent to no action at all.

Some governments and the Vatican actually opposed restricting population growth. Foremost were Brazil and China. Speaking for this viewpoint was Dr. Han Suyin, declaring the Chinese people ". . . are looking forward to doubling their present population without any concern at all, for they are able to triple or quadruple their production."[1] Few would doubt that

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[1]Suyin, 1974.

the Chinese may in the future increase in population and still maintain or slightly increase their per capita food consumption. However, such a vast population mass requires perpetual political stability. A reflection on Chinese history, including the present era, would cast doubt on prospects for such perpetual stability. Even if ninety per cent of the next one hundred years were stable, that chaotic other ten years--if it involved a China of two billion hungry mouths--could produce a famine dwarfing anything previously known to man. In short, what began as praxis in choosing to allow population to mushroom during decades of prosperity--would dialectically change into the process of mass starvation and social entropy.

Closely following that ill-fated Bucharest Population Conference a World Food Conference was held in Rome during November, 1974. Despite famines raging in Africa and Asia no firm pledges were received for sufficient grain to meet even the short-term emergency food target of ten million tons in the next twelve months. Some organizational progress was made in Rome; but again the major product of this United Nations Conference was rhetoric, not effective long-range action.

Today's population momentum guarantees a significantly larger number of poor people to feed at tomorrow's dinner table. In the recent past science

(and the opening of new lands) has more than met the challenge. We have been lulled into forgetting Malthus. What of the future? The absolute certainty of an accelerating food demand cannot be matched in advance by an equally absolute certainty of increased supply equal to the new demand. It is always possible that supply will more than equal demand for generations to come (at least for those countries able to pay the higher grocery bill!)--but the relentless accumulation of more hungry mouths reduces the probability of that happy phenomenon. When activity reduces options, can freedom said to have been expanded?

CHAPTER IX:

AMERICA--AN EMPTY CONTINENT
JOINS THE POPULATION CRISIS

Only once in recorded history has the civilized world stumbled onto huge expanses of virgin land. The astronauts did step onto the vast emptiness of the Moon--but that is one table on which dinner is never served. The shock waves of excitement following Columbus' fifteenth century discovery have been referred to elsewhere. Nobody has sufficiently recorded the other shock: to the native Americans at the arrival of mechanized man. History is written by and for the victors.

In the year 1515 the Spanish governor of Jamaica was faced with the problem of getting enough manpower. It seems the native Arawak population was rapidly dying off from exposure to new diseases carried to them by the Europeans. Two years later the first Negro slaves were brought to the New World.[1]

The noble deed of giving pesty Indian tribes blankets as gifts which were incidentally infected by smallpox victims was undertaken whenever necessary by the English settlers in North America. European microbes were better marksmen than the

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[1]Darlington, 1971, p. 591.

European settlers. There was little if any guilt on the part of these Europeans for their actions: if the heathen could not be Christianized than his life was worthless. And besides there was all that virgin land they didn't know how to use.

When the first English settlers arrived the paleolithic North American Indians numbered only about one million. But they seemed quite numerous to the first settlers. In time the increasingly numerous immigrant Europeans began to think of themselves as "natives," especially those who were born here. Thus, the outsiders from Europe became insiders; the Indian insiders became outsiders, outlawed from European culture. Subsequent waves of European immigrants would first bear the stigma of outsiders, becoming accepted after they had assimilated into the predominantly English culture of America.

The only large immigrant group never quite accepted into the English-American culture has of course been the Africans. For what it is worth, blacks were on this soil before the Mayflower landed. Black Americans were hard at work in 1619 in Jamestown serving their new masters.

That same year saw the arrival of a boatload of wives to serve their new husband-masters. These and

subsequent wives are estimated to have given birth to an average of eight children during the colonial era, realizing an annual birth rate in those days of fifty-five or more per 1,000 inhabitants.[1]

The colonial era was characterized by abundant opportunities for self-advancement. People tended to marry at an earlier age than their European contemporaries. Though land was first given by the King to companies or to illustrious individuals, there was a general consensus that land should be transferred from public to private hands for the general welfare. In this way positive freedom was maximized for the individual.[2] Modern concerns with the effects of large, private polluters reducing the freedoms of the citizenry were alien to the juvenile nation. The quantity of pollutants turned on the environment in pre-industrial colonial America was of a sub-threshold nature. Our ecosystem was generally in balance because it could absorb the effluents of civilized man operating at low densities and with a minimum of mechanization.

An eagle's eye had Benjamin Franklin when he observed in 1755:

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[1] Stockwell, 1970, p. 94.

[2] P. Brown and Corfman, 1971, p. 92.

> . . . there are supposed to be now upwards of one million of English souls in North America (though it is thought scarce 80,000 have been brought over sea), and yet perhaps there is not one fewer in Britain, but rather many more, on account of the employment the colonies afford to manufacturers at home. This million doubling, suppose but once in twenty-five years, will, in another century, be more than the people of England, and the greatest number of Englishmen will be on this side of the water.[1]

To Franklin in 1755 one million was a sufficiently huge number to represent his land's population. Despite high birth rates, mortality was also high. The average life expectancy in Massachusetts and in New Hampshire was about thirty-five years in his day.[2] Nevertheless, Franklin was way off in his estimated total. Already by 1790 when the new nation conducted its first census there were four million Americans, not counting the slaves.

Part of this lusty increase can be attributed to continued high fertility. Only after the 1820's did the crude birth rate fall below fifty-five per 1,000 population; it was still at the forty level in 1880.[3] During the period 1800 to the present, death rates dropped gradually from about twenty-five per thousand to around nine. Thus, even though birth

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[1] In Hardin, ed., 1969, p. 20

[2] Mortimer Spiegelman, "Longevity and Mortality in the American Population," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, p. 100.

[3] Stockwell, 1970, p. 95.

rates began to taper off, falling death rates partially offset the downward shift in birth rates. The result was that, with immigration, the nineteenth century saw each decade an America one-third larger than the previous decade.[1]

America and a few other new countries were "escape hatches" for potential problems with overpopulation in Europe. Unlike today where all countries have population concerns (even parts of "empty" Canada have inflation and unemployment woes), the nineteenth century was a Social Darwinistic era. The future seemed bright for any aggressive pioneer, or so the Horatio Alger ideology would have it. Interestingly enough the mass emigration from Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentiety centuries took place at a time when overall standards of living were on the upswing in Europe. Dennis Wrong attributes this phenomenon to

> . . . the general sociological principle of 'relative deprivation'--that people are more likely to become discontented . . . when their material circumstances have somewhat improved with the result that their aspirations have also risen to the point where their 'reach exceeds their grasp.'"[2]

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[1] Frederick Osborn, "Qualitative Aspects of Population Control...," in Shimm and Everett, eds., 1961, p. 34.

[2] Wrong, 1961, p. 89.

One earlier immigrant group had little to say about their numbers. The black American was pre-industrialized America's substitute for farm machinery. Since there was all that free land it was hard for plantation owners to recruit wage earners. Not willing to accept a land-rich and money-poor status, the South embraced enslavement of the black man and his family.

This practice disturbed the founding fathers such as Jefferson, Washington, Wythe, Mason, Madison and Randolph.[1] However in order to get the Deep South's approval of the new Constitution they bent somewhat in their absolute opposition to the slave trade. The slave trade was the most odious, and most visible, element in the enslavement process: slave ships coming to our ports provided a sharp contrast to the ships bearing free, white immigrants.

The Constitution had a cut-off date for this activity: January 1, 1808. It was defended as a lesser evil and a necessary compromise by Madison in the Federalist, Number 38: "Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever."[2] Jefferson as President in 1806 urged

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[1]On Washington, see Adams, 1955, p. 97; other viewpoints are in Rutland, 1962, pp. 45, 63, 71.

[2]Fairfield, ed., 1966, p. 109.

Congress to disassociate itself ". . . from all further participation in these violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa . . . ."[1]

All of this rhetoric and belated action was excellent. However, had the founding fathers fully understood how indigenous populations can grow they would not have had so much faith in the efficacy of stopping the slave trade by stopping it on the seas. Despite the Act of 1807 which prohibited importing slaves, the slave population grew from 893,602 in 1800 to over two million by 1830.[2] Whereas international slave trade was eliminated, internal slave trade flourished as the old farm areas of the East bred and exported slaves to the West.

Ironically, it was the <u>partial</u> mechanization of agriculture by the cotton gin which encouraged slavery to expand. Had the tractor and other machinery appeared simultaneously this vicious institution would not have been so profitable, leading to the trauma of civil war. Today's Third World could likewise use partial mechanization to help solve its

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[1]Koch, 1966, p. 139.

[2]Harold Cruse, "The Historical Roots of American Social Change and Social Theory," in E. Rostow, ed., 1971, p. 316.

current agricultural underemployment problems. But would not this too merely hold off the day of reckoning without parallel population controls? America had a civil war. What will the Third World experience?

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By 1860 the national population was eight times (800%) that of the first census in 1790. At the first census only five per cent of the people lived in places of 2,500 or more; a half century later the percentage was just ten per cent. But by 1870 the urban areas claimed one fourth, by 1920 one half, and today over seventy per cent.[1]

The period 1820 to 1900 saw a scattered nation swell from ten to over seventy-five millions, close to twenty million of that number coming from Europe.[2] Despite this fantastic swelling of the species' numbers inside one territory, not all would stay satisfied with this long-term performance. Partially disguised by the two forces of immigration and declining death rates was another key phenomenon: Fertility had begun to decline in the early part of the nineteenth century, reaching a low point in the

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[1]Everett S. Lee, "Internal Migration and Population Redistribution in the United States," in R. Freedman, 1964, pp. 124-125.

[2]Stockwell, 1970, p. 180.

decade of the 1930's. The United States had indeed been one of the first nations to experience a demographic transition, but a gradual one lasting a century.

We recall from our discussion of mercantilism the idea that a nation's strength is directly related to the size of its population, among other factors. If a nation's economy were to suffer at the same time as its population's growth rate slowed this would shock the bones of a dedicated mercantilist. This pairing is exactly what happened in the 1930's.

By 1935 the U. S. birthrate had fallen to 18.7 per 1,000 per year. This was down from 25 in 1925. Even though the decade of the thirties did see an absolute increase in America's population, some thought a reversal would soon follow. Thoughts of "race suicide" (a strange concept indeed) haunted demographers of the time. A. M. Carr-Saunders stated in 1936: ". . . there is no assurance whatever that children will come in numbers sufficient to prevent a decline of population and ultimate extinction."[1] An economist of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, O. E. Baker, predicted in 1936 a stationary population by 1950 and a declining population by 1960 or 1965.[2]

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[1] From his World Population, in Young, ed., 1968, p. 304.

[2] In Pohlman, ed., 1973, p. 2.

S. J. Holmes of the University of California feared western civilization might lose its supremacy in world affairs, being eventually invaded by peoples from other parts of the globe who would first appear as peaceful immigrant laborers. Finally, according to Holmes, ". . .Nature will deal with us as she does with species which fail to adjust themselves to changed conditions of life."[1] This quotation is most incredible when seen in context of our discussion of systems theory, Malthusian potentials, and our look at current Japanese hysteria along the same racist lines! Surely Holmes would not include those little yellow people among his representatives of western civilization. Perhaps the Japanese would not include Professor Holmes either.

In Europe other equally hysterical voices were heard. Benito Mussolini spoke in 1927: "Let us be frank with ourselves: what are 40 million Italians compared with 90 million Germans and 200 million Slavs?"[2] Considering how poorly individual Italians fought (and how fortunate this was for the Allies) Mussolini was wasting his breath. Hitler too wanted to command more Germans. If the Second World

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[1] In Ibid, p. 4.
[2] In Ibid, p. 283.

War had been delayed fifty years or more, and if Hitler had been successful in greatly boosting Germany's birth rate, his actions might have been wiser. As it was Hitler failed to greatly shift his nation's birth rate upward: this failure in turn reduced their dependency ratio, making Germany a fiercer military machine than it otherwise would have been in the midst of a baby boom!

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Given this climate of mercantilist pessimism the actual postwar rise in America's fertility was unexpected. As late as 1946 the Bureau of the Census forecast an increase of 4.6 million over the next five years; actual growth was twice that, an astonishing error for such a short-run projection.[1]

Many actions lead to results totally unexpected. We have already mentioned Hitler's confusion. Likewise in America it was not generally appreciated that one of the most important effects of the war effort would be the impetus given to population growth.[2] Earlier marriages, the G. I. Bill of Rights with its pro-natalist policies, and the general excitement attendant to escaping the depression blues all fed fuel to the budding baby boom. Alvin

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[1] Petersen, 1964, p. 4.

[2] See D. Perkins, 1957, p. 171.

Hansen, an "American Keynes," in the late 1930's had provided a theoretical justification and explanation for such a positive feedback attendant to "mature" capitalism. The state helped population growth, which in turned helped the economy. He concluded that a controlled increase in the national population would be best for the expansion of capitalism.[1] His words are still echoed by certain businesses which have a vested interest in a bumper crop of babies: For example, both Gerber and Johnson & Johnson were looking forward to "favorable birth trends" as late as 1969, well into the population crisis.[2]

The older European countries experienced a baby boom by 1947 and 1948, but their growth rates generally subsided to a slow growth. In contrast, the newer United States experienced an extended growth period. A major reason for this burst was the fact of women having more children in the later portion of their fertile lives, making up for the depression and war years. By having children in rapid succession they were able to finally catch up with their own fertility ideals.

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[1] Heilbroner, 1961, pp. 263-266.

[2] Peck, 1972a, p. 27.

It should be noted that the new pattern of family building which emerged in the forties and fifties was not a simple swing of the pendulum back to the large family-building habits of nineteenth century America. Whereas in the twenties educated couples (the opinion leaders of society) preferred late marriage and few children, the new style in the baby boom era became earlier marriage--but neither huge nor small families--just moderate sized families.[1]

How many babies did these ladies want? The first national opinion poll for America to inquire about ideal family size was carried out in 1936. The figures for this year show the proportion desiring three or more children was fifty-nine per cent. Astonishing as this was, the same statistic for 1966 was seventy per cent.[2] The delayed baby boom was thus one of "wanted babies."

If the 1966 figure of seventy per cent of all women wanting three or more children is astonishing, it is even more remarkable to note what had happened by June, 1972. The Bureau of the Census

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[1]This is a conclusion of the Committee on Population Growth of the National Academy of Sciences in 1965, in Young, ed., 1968, p. 308; see too L. Day and A. Day, 1965, pp. 18-24.

[2]Kingsley Davis, "The Changing Balance of Births and Deaths," in H. Brown and E. Hutchings, eds., 1972, pp. 25-26.

reported a sharp drop in birth expectations.[1] The proportion of wives 18 to 24 years old expecting a total of two or fewer births was seventy per cent. This contrasts with sixty-four per cent in 1971, and just forty-four per cent in 1967 for the younger wives. Older wives still had high expectations for total births; but the data for the "wives of the seventies" strongly implies a demographic shift away from the baby boom mentality of the fifties and early sixties.

In 1960 reporting wives 18 to 24 years old expected an average of 3.1 births. But a follow-up of these women shows that they will complete their childbearing at about 2.9 births. This is 0.2 less than they had expected.[2] The same trend if applied to the ladies of 1972 would show an eventual childbearing of about 2.1 births per woman--replacement level.

All of these statistics are meaningless if they reflect mere flux. However, if a new trend is being established of major demographic (and democratic) significance we must seek the sources of

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[1] "Birth . . .," 1972.

[2] Ibid.

this trend. This is to be the major thrust of the remaining chapters in this Part I of our study.

It is a major contention of this book that there is coming into play a major corrective feedback mechanism. People are responding both to excessive, polluting population in itself and to the opportunities for a better life which could accompany a technologically sophisticated America where population excess was no longer a problem. World War II was our doorway into a brief, optimistic era of Pax Americana--and into the baby boom. The Vietnam War is another benchmark, leading us toward a new future: a future which is not obsessed with "kill ratios" and "body counts," SST's, space races, and all the other insanities of a people out of touch with their own humanity.

CHAPTER X:

POLLUTIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND OF THE SPIRIT

The "dead sea" is poised to attack New York.[1] For four decades New York and its surrounding cities have dumped huge quantities of sewage, about five million cubic yards each year, into an area twelve miles offshore. This was thought to be a convenient place to put the problem "out of sight, out of mind." But Mother Nature is not always willing to accept such a gift from man.

In 1970 this sea of sludge teeming with fantastic quantities of infectious bacteria and viruses started to move toward New Yord and the Long Island beaches. As of early 1974 the leading edge of this mass of black mayonaise-like filth was only a couple of miles offshore. With great luck the currents will shift again, moving the "dead sea" away from shore. Without luck--who knows? David Franz, a biologist studying the problem, says simply that when it hits the New York beaches with its proven infectious potential there could be a "panic situation."

Americans are not the only people in the industrialized West who are suffering from their

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[1] R. Jones, 1974.

ecological tunnel vision. Venice, the jewel of Italy, is facing a slimy water invasion at the rate of one inch every five years. Hundreds of artesian wells have lowered the water level of her lagoon, causing the city to sink. Dredging fifty-foot channels for tankers has strengthened currents which erode the lagoon. Since the tides have altered, her canal-sewage system no longer is efficient. Air pollution swirls toward the city from mainland factories, darkening her skies and eating away precious stone monuments and buildings.

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These two ecological horrors are just manifestations of a generalized problem of too many people asking too much from their environment. It is more than a simple numbers problem. Rather it is numbers multiplied by an index of average per person pollution.

Wayne Davis suggests we use for our standard pollution-impact measure the idea of "Indian equivalents." He defines one such equivalent ". . . as the average number of Indian citizens required to have the same detrimental effect on the land's ability to support human life as would the average American."[1]

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[1]W. Davis, 1970, p. 14.

He uses an Indian:American ratio which he thinks is "extremely conservative"-- 25:1.[1] This means the population of the United States is today equal to at least four billion Indians, if we account for the factor of pollution.

Even more striking is growth according to the multiplier effect. Malthus spoke of the geometric power of population; but now Davis adds his pollution factor to Malthus' geometrical mathematics:

> We are growing at one percent per year, a rate which would double our numbers in 70 years. India is growing at 2.5 percent. Using the Indian equivalent of 25, our population growth becomes 10 times as serious as that of India.[2]

America's affluence is such that for all individuals on the earth to enjoy our standard of living the world's population would have to shrink to one seventh of its present size, to about one-half billion. This population shrinkage must at the same time not reduce present worldwide totals of production in order for the world's per capita standard to meet our current standard.[3] One shudders to think how much pollution would accompany a per capita

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[1]Cf. P. Ehrlich, "The Population Crisis: Where We Stand," in Hinrichs, 1971, p. 13. [Ehrlich states: "The birth of every American baby is roughly fifty times the stress on the environment of this planet as the birth of every Indian baby."]

[2]W. Davis, 1970, p. 14.

[3]R. A. Watson and P. M. Smith, "The Limit: 500 Million," in Scoby, ed., 1971, p. 20.

standard of living for the world at American levels of affluence without a sufficient worldwide population shrinkage.

Looking closer at the United States, Barry Commoner provides a critique of those Americans who think only in terms of population statistics when they talk about the population crisis. His computations show that our ". . . population rise accounts for 12 to 20 per cent of the increases in postwar [World War II] environmental impact, while the technological factor accounts for 40 to 85 per cent . . . ."[1] Very interesting for our own N.P.G. analysis are his data:

> . . . if we were to set out in 1946 to keep the pollution level from rising . . ., then, if the population size were allowed to increase to 1.4, the "technology" factor (pollution-emission/production) would need to be reduced to 0.7 if the pollution level were to remain at 1 . . . ."[2]

Commoner's mathematics lead him to a striking conclusion:

> . . . if the technology factor were allowed to increase to 7, then in order to maintain the pollution level at a value of 1, the population would need to be reduced (between 1946 and 1968) from 1 to 0.14 (since 0.14 X 7 = approximately 1). This represents an 86 per cent reduction in population size."[3]

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[1] Commoner, 1972, p. 209.

[2] Ibid, p. 319.

[3] Ibid.

Obviously we cannot drastically reduce our population overnight without serious disturbances in our social fabric, itself a pollution of the spirit of our community life. The better short-run remedy would be increased controls on polluters, making them internalize the costs of their current externalities.

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It is incredible to contemplate the amount of self-abuse modern man has inflicted on himself in the name of "progress." Part of the blame must go to distortions in the way we compute our wealth. Now everybody knows how to add gold and dollars; but the concept of Gross National Product is much broader. Broad as it is, it specifically excludes many things vital to the human spirit which cannot be quantified and fed into some bureaucracy's computer.

Robert Theobald points out how all economic outputs are assumed positive. Costs to protect one from burglars, to clean up smokestack soot, to commute to a distant work place are all additions to the G.N.P. He furthermore illustrates the sexual bias inherent in the way G.N.P. is computed:

> The value of the work done by a woman in her own home does not enter the Gross National Product. On the other hand, if she goes out to work and at the same time hires somebody to look after her baby, the amount earned at

> her job and the amount paid to the baby-sitter both enter the Gross National Product.[1]

Robert Lekachman uses the example of cigarette smoking increasing, and this increase in cigarette business showing up as an expansion of the G.N.P.[2] He cites this as an example of our defective quantitative society, which measures things susceptible to enumeration and implicitly discounts the remainder. Shall we not then say that G.N.P. really means: "Going No Place"?

Lekachman acknowledges his intellectual debt to E. J. Mishan, the British economist. Mishan himself focuses on the omission of the concept "negative goods" in any measure of a country's economy, an omission prompted by modern growthmania. His perspective is vital: ". . . what is really crying out for modernization is not technology but the institutional framework of the economy."[3] Science and technology then are neutral, but man's use of technology within his society is not neutral.

A good example of this syndrome is the ubiquitous automobile:

> Originally the motor vehicle was designed for the roads. Today roads are designed for vehicles. Originally the motor vehicle was to be fitted into the pace of life. Today the pace of life is adapted to the speed of the vehicle, the

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[1] Theobald, 1972, p. 31; see too Hodson, 1972, pp. 50-72.

[2] Lekachman, 1970, p. 40

[3] Mishan, 1969, p. 74.

> saddest casualty of all being an irretrievable loss of the sense of ease, space and leisure.[1]

Architectural spaces in cities are themselves metamorphosed. What were once festive streets and quiet squares are now taken over by the rumble of traffic and its smoggy haze.[2]

Whereas there is nothing intrinsically evil about the car itself, its private use violates public interest in many places. A good American example of carmania and its vicious circle is Los Angeles. The City of the Angels once had good public transportation, but the subsidized freeway system made public transportation non-competitive. Instead of growing upward as New York and Chicago have done, thanks to their subway systems, Los Angeles had to sprawl to grow.

The result has been a unique reputation well deserved for photochemical smog, an atmospheric concoction aided by frequent thermal inversions. Jane Jacobs calls this the air and open land paradox, where ". . . in modern cities generous scatters of open space promote air pollution instead of combating it."[3] If Commoner's reduced population were applied to the Los Angeles area, threshold effects of pollution would seldom be reached, other things being equal.

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[1] Ibid, p. 68.

[2] See Chermayeff and Alexander, 1965, p. 55.

[3] Jacobs, 1961, p. 91; see too Commoner, 1972, pp. 63-77.

Despite the energy crisis which has seen a shrinkage in supplies of gas delivered to the retail pumps it would still be accurate to say that automobiles and petroleum are at the center of the American lifestyle. The only other thing sacred to most of us is our television. Little else matters. What was once a curiosity, then a luxury, has now become a felt necessity.[1]

In many cases having several cars per family is indeed a necessity. Millions of people since the Second World War have escaped the city and settled into race and class-purified suburbs and exurbs. In 1950 only twenty-four per cent lived in suburbs; but by 1970 thirty-seven per cent lived there, while only thirty-two per cent remained in central cities.[2] The combined Federal policies of subsidized home loans and subsidized highway systems, and the opposite lack of Federal incentives for apartments and urban mass transit--all helped to fuel a baby boom which required land and spaceous housing for larger families.

However, every paradise has its pillagers. These pillagers did not come in as "outside agitators"; rather, they came in as the guy next door. Identity

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[1] A fascinating radical critique is found in Weisberg, 1972, pp. 98-145.

[2] Population R. B., 1971, p. 8.

trouble started when one exurbia coalesced with an adjacent exurbia of a nearby city. This has made it increasingly harder to find the "country" on the Eastern Seaboard. At the same time more and larger cars toward the central urban areas have slowed traffic, generating higher levels of pollution there per vehicle-mile and forcing central city dwellers farther away from the countryside.[1]

Neither the central cities nor the suburban areas have become desirable places to live for most Americans. A National Public Opinion Survey conducted for the Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American Future showed an inverse relationship between one's area's population density and his preference for living there. Whereas only twelve per cent live in open country areas, one third of the nation would prefer to live there. In contrast, fifty-five per cent live in medium to large cities and their suburbs, but only thirty-six per cent of the nation wants to live there.[2]

Most people would like to live in low-density land areas, but have access to high-density areas where the big money is. A Gallup Poll conducted after

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[1] Taylor, 1970, pp. 233-234.
[2] Commission, 1972, pp. 35-36.

the Commission's survey reinforced the original findings. Gallup found only twenty per cent living in cities preferring their location, a sharp drop from the thirty-six per cent of city residents in 1966 who liked city life.[1]

Wishy-washy governmental policies coupled with the population growth those very policies helped generate have left our major population concentrations a place to live to work--but not to work and live. I would hazard to guess that anybody who tried to remove America's escapist, security blanket TV sets would be faced with another revolutionary war!

Even areas not immediately overcrowded feel the relationship between population change and social change. An intensive survey of the interrelationships of social and economic variables in Ohio observed the changes in family life, in churches, in the political system and in other patterns of community life. The author of this study concluded that social change has become increasingly rapid in all areas of society, including even the more isolated rural areas. This is largely due to the networks of transportation and communications, all with a

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[1]Rosenthal, 1972a.

national culture focus.[1]

There is yet another perspective on the externalities generated by the mass use of automobiles: Our cars gobble up sixty per cent of all rubber used in America, fifty per cent of the lead (much of which adds poison to the air), twenty per cent of all steel, and so forth. At the same time their air pollution adds up to 90 million tons each year. Almost one million cars are abandoned each year. Worst of all, over 3.71 million linear miles of good land already are covered over.[2] The asphalt animal would rather look at streets and rows of open gas stations--rather than enjoy that land as farms and woodlands.

Despite the strong criticism I have put forth of our automania there is a good side to the auto. It was an early instrument of freedom for young people at the turn of the century: Stuffy Victorian mores could be circumvented in the perennial quest for love and wanderlust. Even today the anarchist spirit is fed by the joy of each person alone deciding where he wishes to go, when he chooses.

The trouble is, the most enjoyable places are those very places each anarchist-individualist

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[1] Munson, 1968, p. 105.

[2] Statistics from Nobile and Deedy, eds., 1972, pp. 385-386.

wants to go. The effort to drive to Jones Beach on Long Island on a hot day is more of a pain than one's first summer sunburn. There are only so many Yellowstone National Parks and other national treasures; no new ones can be constructed. Better roads have made national parks de facto city parks for millions, so that in the last ten years visitors doubled, while the area of our parks increased by only one fifth.[1]

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One of the most insidious aspects of spirit pollution is seen in the international money and nation-state system. Many times in this century our one globe has witnessed the extreme scenes of fatties worrying about their midriffs--while orphans cry dry tears for food that will never come. Money buys food on the international market; but it cannot buy Justice.

It is not generally known that the United States is the world's largest importer of fish and fish products (despite our two oceans and the Gulf), that the United States is a top-ranking importer of beef--that two-thirds of our marine protein gets diverted into animal feed.[2] If we are supposed to be

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[1] Commission, 1972, p. 64; see too proposals for recreation area "resource rationing" in E. Perkins, 1972, pp. 12-13.

[2] Borgstrom, 1972, pp. 405-408.

the world's breadbasket, why these strange statistics?

There are those who point to the Netherlands as the proof positive that population density is a pseudo problem. The Dutch people prosper even though they have a density of 960 people per square mile, as opposed to the continental American average of fifty-five. There is a catch to Holland's prosperity, already foreshadowed in our food imports. Holland exports cheeses and other protein foods, but these farm products are at the end of a long, wasteful line of food transfers. Much fish protein and oilseed cakes are shipped in from Peru, Indonesia, the Philippines and other underdeveloped countries. Holland's cows, chickens and pigs waste eighty to ninety per cent of the protein fed to them in the transition from plant to animal. The same waste can of course happen anywhere; but the irony is all the more intense when one ponders the fragility of this type of prosperity.

If ever the supplier countries were to run out of food for export, or if by their own internal needs generated by an indigenous population growth and perhaps coupled to a poor crop period, they were to cut out exports--what good would Holland's money wealth be? Already the prospect of continued marine supplies at former abundant levels is in ques-

tion. Changes in ocean currents off Peru, continued ocean pollution and especially pollution of breeder estuaries, combined with too efficient trawler fleets have done strange things to the fisheries. For example, in 1950 about forty per cent of all cod caught in Icelandic waters was a mature ten years or older; by 1970 that figure had shrunk to just two per cent.[1]

The luxury of meat protein is bought at the expense of wasted plant protein. Each unit of beef production requires eight units of food from plants; pork is more efficient at a four-to-one ratio, while chickens can crow over their fine 2½ to one performance. This energy loss is another manifestation of entropy at work, wasting negentropic energy which green plants have secured from the sun and the soil. As more countries shift their food preferences from grains to meats it can only mean higher prices for the consumer.[2] Even the increased price of crude oil affects the cost of food, since petroleum indirectly appears in fertilizer production and in many other phases of food production and distribution.

We in the industrialized world can afford higher costs for our grains. But what about the

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[1] Collins, 1973.

[2] See Sosland, 1973.

poorer lands faced with sharp, short-run increases in costs and a long-run population presence? New protein sources will open up: for example, cottonseed is rich in protein, and one mill in Lubbock, Texas already is making cotton flour. The question thus becomes one of relative accelerations: Will the acceleration of populations frustrate efforts to meet ever expanding needs?

I for one think America will meet its minimal energy needs, despite current despair. At the least, all we have to suffer is a lot more lung disease while we burn more coal to get our precious electricity. (By the way, how did our primitive great-grandparents get along without that precious electricity?)

Our long-term obsession with centralized energy sources has meant two things: first, we have wasted much fossil fuel through the process of heating water into steam, which is mechanically converted into electricity, then transferred many miles to customers where at last that energy is released as heat inside our homes--a thirty per cent efficiency performance. Second, private generation of energy is discouraged by lack of government subsidy and of course by the energy monopolies which would miss out on some profits. Solar heating, vertical axis

windmills (under development by NASA), and other on-site energy generation possibilities could ameliorate the energy crisis over the long-run and furthermore enable many individuals to become more independent of monopoly utility companies.

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I wish to close this chapter with a further discussion of infants and their role in our culture, and in our self-image. I define "infant" to be any small being which we cherish, necessarily nourish, and give a name. There are by this definition two types of infants we encounter: people infants and pets. Pets? Yes. Pets often are as close to us as our own children. But pets have a nationwide population problem and resultant mortality rate vastly more critical than do humans.

The real question here is that of human ethics and human responsibility. It is of course beyond our duty to be concerned with ant battles in our backyard. However, that which is nourished in our homes and given a name is within the realm of moral accountability. A brief reflection on the workings of quantity-quality, and an honest examination of the tender potentialities of cats and dogs critically confronts those who think of pets as just "cute playthings" which can be "got rid of" when the

mood strikes. Of course humans are more precious than animals, but humans too are animals and the dividing line between worthlessness and worth is hard to draw between one infant and another.

Every year more than fifteen to twenty million cats and dogs are deposited at city pounds and animal shelters. Three-fourths are brought there by owners who have washed their hands of their pet's presence. Only one-fourth of these animals ever get out of these places alive.[1] Nobody has tabulated the millions of pets abandoned each year and denied the "privilege" of dying a "humane death." Socrates said it is worse to harm another than to be harmed by another, because in the first case one's soul suffers while in the second case only one's body suffers. If one part of the spiritual body of our civilization is gangrened, is the rest healthy?

Turning now to human infants, our first impression is that of the baby as status symbol. Our commercial culture distorts the normal and natural pride which all mothers should have for their infants into a fetish. The "wives of the seventies" are not as swayed as older wives have been by the pregnancy

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[1]Statistics supplied by The Humane Society of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20006.

propaganda of a pro-natalist culture. Nevertheless, television and other media carry on as before. If the birth rate of our country matched the births on television soap operas we would rival Latin America in our national fertility.[1]

America is not really a child-centered society, nor has it recently been. Rather, love of technology has crowded out our love for human relationships. Urie Bronfenbrenner, the child psychologist, says we are at ". . .the point where a broken television set or a broken computer provokes more indignation and more action than a broken family or a broken child."[2] Women are forced by social expectations to forever seek child-like beauty as well as adult sensuality. Men love a dependent child-woman; but at the same time they want that child-woman to be their mother surrogate whenever they wish to regress to an infantile "take-care-of-me" state--of course in the privacy of their homes.[3]

And those babies... How many are wanted because of parental joy and awe at participating in

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[1]Peck, 1972b.

[2]Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Who Cares for America's Children?," in Howe, ed., 1972, p. 139.

[3]See Una Stannard, "The Mask of Beauty," in Gornick and Moran, eds., 1972, p. 203.

the creation and uplifting of a new and unique being? How many come for other, more selfish reasons? There are simply no firm statistics. For example, even if a parent-to-be were truthful in reporting he/she wanted the child, a year after that demanding individual was born that child could no longer be wanted. But the statistic would read: one wanted child. Of course, this "want-don't want" syndrome has its equally unrecorded reverse in the "don't want-want" syndrome.

The National Fertility Study of 1965 got one parent in five to admit to having unwanted children. How many were there ashamed to admit their hostility toward their flesh and blood? The truth bursts out later in the victim's testimony: Arthur Janov has opened Pandora's Box in his primal therapy and revealed primal memories of unloved children and their silent screams.[1] If his impressionistic judgment of the health of our adult population is any index of our child rearing habits, then the percentage of hostile parents is much higher than one in five.

Babies can be a status symbol for their parents while staying tiny infants--everybody "oos" and "ahs" the tiny one. Parents share in the flattery.

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[1]Janov, 1972.

Later when Tiny grows up the bills come in, but the flattery seldom does. For this reason among others Edward Pohlman suggests the best possible incentive scheme for the United States at this time is to reward women for months or years of non-pregnancy, and to discontinue the hidden subsidies baby makers enjoy.[1]

If most recent declines in the fertility rates continue for America even Pohlman's modest suggestion for amelioration will eventually be unneeded. With population shrinkage the pure people problem will have been set aside. This however does not solve the people-emotion problem. I think that one must be met through restructuring the very way people encounter others, and themselves, in society. He who would reify another will end up reifying himself.

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[1]Pohlman, 1971, pp. 94-120.

CHAPTER XI:

THE MATURE SOCIETY

What a joy to be old! When I was young, they
kept telling me: wait, and you will see.
Well, here I am, and I've seen nothing!
--Erik Satie

America is getting older. Not only are we reaching the two-century mark in our constitutional nationhood. We are also experiencing a rise in the average age of our population. This is a fact of necessity; but the real variable is how people relate to and react to this shift away from a youth-fetishistic culture to a culture more in balance among the age levels.

In nature, animal populations seldom have many old members among them. Only the highest status animals and those lucky enough to escape disease and predation live much beyond the average life expectancy around them. Human societies have been in metamorphosis from the "natural" pattern toward a civilized pattern which includes more old people simply because more people now live beyond their youth.

Demographers illustrate the two extreme types of age distributions in societies by drawing age pyramids. We can illustrate with two model

populations, both of which find several countries to represent them. In between these two extremes are many other nations. All nations must eventually approach the model of the more mature society.

MODEL 1: MODEL 2:



Among those nations approximating Model 1's pattern are Sweden, Hungary, France and Great Britain. Among those close to Model 2's shape are India, Syria, Guyana and all other areas facing a sharp population boom. The United States is moderately close to Model 1, and will come closer as the effects of the Baby Boom Era distribute themselves over the age spectrum.

Both models have large numbers at their base, but only the first model has large numbers among the aged. The reason for this is because the

Baby Boom Era of the Third World is largely the result of death control technology, whereas the aged members of such societies were born in the period before large percentages of people survived their youth. The presence of larger numbers of older people in the first model necessitates a higher average age of the total population. In a stationary population the average age would be (with current life expectancies) about thirty-eight years. In contrast, some of the baby factory areas of the world have fully half of their population under fifteen years old.

It is interesting to compare dependency ratios with age pyramids. E. A. Wrigley notes that however much fertility and mortality schedules of populations may vary their relative dependency ratios are close to constant. This is the result of larger numbers of children in one age pyramid being counterbalanced by larger numbers of elderly people in the other population.[1] For the United States, the statistical ageing of our population is retarded by our belated drop in infant mortality. The infant mortality rate in 1970 was 20.0 per thousand live births; this is down 4.3 per cent from 1969 levels.[2] More infants surviving means more young people to offset the increase in older people.

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[1] Wrigley, 1969, p. 26

[2] "Summary . . .," 1974.

Despite higher survival rates for infants the key short-run factor in determining both age distribution and overall population growth rates is the fertility rate. Recent drops in birth rates foreshadow a Z.P.G. society, or even a temporary N.P.G. society, if declines continue. Despite the current "baby bust," the persistence of a surplus of youth over age means that our population size should stabilize only after about seventy years of continued replacement fertility levels.

In 1900 the median age in the United States was twenty-three, and now it is slightly below thirty. It must however be emphasized that the average age has nothing to do with an individual's agerage age at death; it is the average age of living persons. The average does not reflect solely life expectancy, but is also influenced by past patterns of fertility.[1] Nor should the expectation of life at birth be confused with the species' life span: the first is a socio-medical function, while the latter is the unknown genetical limit.

One of the reasons our society's overall death rate has been satisfactorily low, at about

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[1]See Ansley J. Coale, "How a Population Ages or Grows Younger," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, pp. 47-58; also see Pressat, 1971, pp. 18-29.

9.5 per thousand, is because America's median age has been low and reasonably stable. The influx of immigrants who are generally youthful had partially offset the natural ageing of our population following our demographic transition. The median age was a low 27.7 years in 1968, but at no time in recent decades has it been lower than twenty-five years. With declines in the birth rate, that average age must rise.[1] The statistical death rate, which has not risen lately, must likewise eventually rise.

A death rate much below twelve to fifteen per thousand cannot be maintained by a balanced population--unless its life expectancy is over one hundred years.[2] At first glance this coming increase in the national death rate would appear to be a great tragedy. A closer look shows the increase in deaths to be a natural resultant of more old people living, then dying natural deaths. The national death rate could indeed rise--even while overall health improved, with a higher percentage of infants surviving and with the average life expectancy of each individual rising.

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[1]Philip M. Hauser, "The Population of the United States . . .," in P. Hauser, ed., 1969, pp. 98-99.

[2]Wrong, 1961, p. 31.

Americans have lived during what demographers call an abnormal situation. It is ab-normal because all viable ecosystems must fluctuate around a norm over the long-run. Our short-run (four centuries!) experience on the North American Continent has been that of constant expansion of the numbers of people who call themselves Americans. Our relatively slow rate of population growth (one per cent per year, as opposed to three in some Third World places) will give us twice as many Americans in the year 2000 as we had at mid-century.

By the middle of the next century we could have a population as huge as today's mainland China.[1] Who wants to goose step en masse in Washington Square? The real question before us is not if population should level off, but when. Do we really want a few more decades of statistical "youth" at the real cost of a vastly huger polluting population?

We could opt for a stable population which boasted of a low average age of population: The "only" cost would be a vastly higher mortality rate for the elderly. Who would be the first to surrender his last years for the sake of an abstract national youth? In 1930 the number of people over sixty-five

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[1] See Stockwell, 1970, p. 206.

was just 6.6 million in America; by 1950 they had numbered 12.3 million. From 1970 to 1980 the number of elderly people should rise to twenty-two millions.[1] If current population trends continue, by the year 2000 fully half of the population will be over fifty, and a third will be sixty-five or more.

Before panic strikes the mind of youthful readers imagining hoards of grouchy grannies and grumpy grandpas oppressing youthful spirits, let these readers ask themselves how old they themselves will be in the twenty-first century. Just as the ghosts of Queen Victoria and the Great Depression sit on the shoulders of our elders, so too the spirit of the Flower Era will color our own consciousness as elders.

Alas, I am sure this simple explanation will not suffice to ease the pains thumping unfelt in the breasts of many readers. The reason is simple enough: they associate ageing with their own death. How many of us have the philosophical and psychological maturity to comprehend and to accept our finitude? It is to this topic we now turn.

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[1] Rosset, 1964, p. 275. [This very detailed and excellent book is marred by his latent gerontophobia. For example, the above statistic is framed in terms of "aging at a terrifying speed," and reference to "the army of old people."]

The only permanent thing is change. For every birth there must be a death. The countdown to death begins at the moment of fertilization. As our years add up, our time counts down. Each generation makes way, literally, for the next generations. The only way out of the cycle of life and death would be to achieve William Godwin's ideal of life without death and without births.

Strangely enough, it is death itself which can give life its deepest meaning: for death acts as a frame in which the drama of life is acted. Without death one day's events would be trivialized by the knowledge that a coherent eternity lay ahead, full of the expected and the unexpected. Modern philosophy in its existential phase emphasizes death in order to glorify life, especially the life each individual lives.[1] Just as the rise of science has given man new tools with which to pry from Nature her secrets, so too a reconsideration of death helps us to find the essence of our existence as unique citizens in a unique would at a unique time in space.

The prospect of absolute annihilation of the "I" in our selves holds more terror to us than

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[1]Albert Camus [Camus, 1955] declared suicide to be the only serious philosophical problem, for only man in health can choose a pre-natural death, imposing his volition on erstwhile fate. Camus holds that even within the limits of nihilism one can go beyond nihilism, through self-actualization.

the prospect of a painful transition. An exception to this could be a religious person who fully expects an afterlife and who is experiencing a long period of painful, terminal illness. Paul Edwards says one's own death is hard to imagine.[1] Even the passing of one's self includes that very self as spectator. Man's innate solipsistic tendencies nudge him toward feeling the world ends when his private world ends.

This latent solipsism could be a manifestation of the primitive defense michanism, denial. However, denial of the framework for our morality can lead to distortions of that morality. Herbert Read, the English philosopher, lists two original sins in man: lust for power and the fear of death. He offers as the proper corrective: "neither to believe, nor suffer, nor renounce; but to accept, to enjoy, to realize the anarchy of life in the midst of the order of living."[2] "Anarchy." "Order." These are indeed two powerful words to place in juxtaposition. Too often the individual puts his trust in the chimera of temporary order, at the expense of enjoying a creative anarchy <u>within</u> the order of society.

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[1]Edwards, 1967.

[2]Read, 1971, p. 125.

Alfred Adler notes that a fundamental difference can be seen in the metabolism of the cell as opposed to the self-sufficiency of each atom. He finds the fundamental law of life to be overcoming, ". . . that to be a human being means the possession of a feeling of inferiority that is constantly pressing on towards its own conquest."[1] Man sees the world as posing potential, imminent chaos for himself. Our social knowledge of the impending entropic chaos of personal death makes us sensitive to any immediate signs of coming chaos. This is why ageing is as difficult to accept as age, for the young. If chaos is by its nature complex, one strategy of coping with its challenge is to mentally simplify it, and out of the felt simplicity to snatch meaning.[2] However, denial of life's own complexities is a denial of one's own potentialities for growth as a sensitive being with reflexive consciousness.

Theories of "death fear" have been with mankind through recorded history. This fear, along with various strategies of confrontation, have absorbed

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[1] Adler, 1964, p. 73; also pp. 68ff.; see too Menninger, 1967, p. 85. [He contrasts the steady-state goal of homeostasis with the growth goal of heterostasis as it seeks transitional unsettled states on the way to a higher negentropy.]

[2] See Meerloo, 1968, p. 70.

the Eipcureans, the Stoics, Christians, the philosophers Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Sartre--just to name a few.[1] Freud went one dialectical step beyond and suggested man has a death drive (Todestrieb). Freud claims the first instinct is the instinct to return to the inanimate state from which all life emerged; only the sexual instincts do not seek to restore an earlier state of things.[2]

As brilliant as Freud's ideas were, we must question his weak understanding of the quantity-quality dialectic. He does not "weigh" the life instinct in its opposition to the earlier death/nirvana instinct. There are so many evolutionary and social layers of experience added onto the original death instinct--that Freud's reductionistic, psychologistic thesis must be cast into question. Despite the weaknesses in Freud's formulations, there is no doubt that the idea of a Nirvana is pleasing. Nirvana is what Buddha called a blissful nothingness. Nirvana is entropy of consciousness. The mind may temporarily prefer it to a current state of tension and ambiguity; but the life instinct (negentropy) rejects the idea of any irreversible nirvana.

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[1] See Olson, 1967; also Choron, 1972.

[2] Freud, 1967; a more sociological treatment is in Freud, 1962.

Only when the mind sees its body defeated does it then surrender to fateful destruction. The essence of mind is volition: when volition is negated, so too is mind. There is almost no clinical and experimental evidence to detail this thesis. There is, however, one fascinating study carried out by Curt P. Richter.[1] He showed, in brief, that a rat put into a situation where he feels escape is impossible will soon die; but that the same rat in a situation where he has the slimmest hopes for escape will struggle to the end of his strength. A parallel to this kind of death is the "voodoo death" among those cultists who surrender their volition to live in the face of believed supernatural forces directed against them.

Another way to deftly sidestep the issue of individual death is to deny it altogether. This seems to be the pattern among primitive man. The living and the dead make a pact together: in return for certain rituals among the living the dead will remain grateful and not interfere with the living.[2] Traditional societies, we recall, don't have many elders. Added to the natural respect their experiences

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[1]Curt P. Richter, "The Phenomenon of Unexplained Sudden Death in Animals and Man," in Feifel, ed., 1965, pp. 302-313.

[2]See Lévi-Strauss, 1963, pp. 214-231, espec. p. 217.

command, and considering the minor drain on society their reduced numbers make on available resources--is the key fact that the elderly are soon to become ancestors, wielding supernatural powers.[1] The net result is a highly revered set of old people. All three of these traditional props to respectibility for the elderly are missing in our scientific, overpopulated, skeptical culture.

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Our culture puts its highest value on money. Unless the individual has self-perpetuating capital his income falls upon the coming of age. Gabriel Kolko notes the usual cycle of rising, then falling, income as the worker moves from youth to age. Movement up in income position is undercut after virility recedes and one is no longer worth as much to employers.[2] When your reputation is only as good as your pocketbook the social perils of approaching old age can loom larger than nature's perils in a money fetishistic society. It would seem that no matter how much you have given society in spiritual capital your money capital is what determines your style of burial.[3]

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[1] D. Mace and V. Mace, 1960, p. 300; see Beauvoir, 1972, for an exhaustive survey of the old and their early societies, and a discussion of senilicide.

[2] Kolko, 1962, pp. 86-91.

[3] See Pressat, 1971, pp. 37-54 for a discussion of class-specific life expectancies.

The American way of death is as money-green as our well manicured cemetery lots. The systematized denial of death reaches its frantic peak in the costly preparations for display to the mourners of the deceased; all efforts are made to make it appear that the deceased is "just sleeping." My caustic comments on burial value systems should not be restricted to modern America: Western Civilization has a long tradition of hypocrisy--Mozart was rudely tossed into an unmarked pauper's grave.

Our fear of death is a conglomerate of fear of time loss, decay of the body, the unknown, the irreversibility of the passage, the loss of pleasurable sensations, the loss of independent thought--the loss of the whole self.[1] Erich Fromm declares:

> Our own era simply denies death and with it one fundamental aspect of life. Instead of allowing the awareness of death and suffering to become one of the strongest incentives for life, the basis for human solidarity, and an experience without which joy and enthusiasm lack intensity and depth, the individual is forced to repress it.[2]

At no time is this repression more evident than in the burial ceremony. Even erstwhile atheists sneak in a prayer to the Almighty and wish the deceased bon voyage--for the living know that their turn is

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[1] See Gordon, 1972, for an in-depth discussion of these separate fears.

[2] Fromm, 1968, p. 271.

coming up all too soon. Ritualized repression does not begin after death, but extends before death to the moribund patient. Kierkegaard complained:

> In our courageous age one does not say to a patient that he will die, one does not dare to call the priest for fear the patient may die of fright, one does not dare to say to the patient that the same day a man died of the same illness.[1]

Tolstoy's portrait of Ivan Ilyitch's death clearly portrays thanatophobia rampant in bourgeoise culture.[2] Here is the case of Everyman who dies at the age of forty-five after a lingering sickness, surrounded by people afraid to love. Ivan's chief torment was the lie others insisted on: that he was only sick, not dying. Despite the panic of his intimate friends and relatives Ivan grows in inner strength: "Now it was despair, and the expectation of an incomprehensible and frightful death; now it was hope, and the observation of the functional activity of his body, so full of interest for him."[3] In short, he gains Zen--while the others foolishly cling to their role stereotypes in an inauthentic denial of their own innate mortality.

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[1] Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 108.

[2] In W. Kaufman, ed., 1964, pp. 66-116; also see the commentary of Sampson, 1965, pp. 126-131.

[3] Tolstoy in W. Kaufman, ed., 1964, p. 111.

Let us turn now to the treatment of older people in our culture, both as individuals and as an age caste. It has been hypothesized that fear of the aged permeates the consciousness of young people. Herman Feifel notes that thoughts of death occur with frequency in childhood second to the seventies in one's life.[1] If what a person seeks in the present is a function of what he has attended to in his past it would follow that fear of one's own death would be an unconscious or semi-conscious spur to having babies of one's own, for "immortality." Lincoln and Alice Day believe this may be an underlying factor in continued opposition to rational population control.[2]

The psychotherapist, Viktor Frankl, suggests there is no meaning in one's life to be found in future generations. He declares a life whose only meaning lay in its propagation activities would be just as meaningless as the propagation itself. Furthermore, our elevation of motherhood to be the sole repository of meaning in a woman's life not only debases the life of a childless woman; it also trivializes the post-mothering life of a mother.[3]

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[1]Herman Feifel, "Attitudes toward Death in Some Normal and Mentally Ill Populations," in Feifel, ed., 1965, p. 118.

[2]L. Day and A. Day, 1965, pp. 108-111.

[3]Frankl, 1971, pp. 54-55.

Certainly the mass media do little to show mature people in a favorable light. The worst offenders are advertisers. Almost never do you find older people buying cars, clothes, etc. The only commercials they seem to get in on are those pushing potions for their pains. Commercials for products which help retard the early signs of ageing are notorious for their agitation of hardly latent fears. For example, a recent Clairol advertisement in the Reader's Digest declares: "You're not getting older. You're getting better!" Sure.....

Even the mathematics of ratios seem to conspire against the happiness of mature people: The ideal age match-up for couples is for the man to be slightly older than the woman. If a woman marries a younger man, this does not fit the culture's stereotype. When a man twenty-five marries a woman twenty their age ratio is 2.5:2.0. Few women in their earlier years can succeed in getting a man five years younger. If a woman fifty-five and a man fifty were to marry, the absolute age spread would be identical to our first example--but their age ratio would be 55:50, much closer to parity. Nevertheless, the behavior norm is set by the actions of the younger population precisely when age spans also mean large ratio differences!

Fortunately for the mature women they are already overcoming this handicap in West Germany, Great Britain and in Sweden. Women outlive men and should be given the same opportunity that a man has at having a companion for their last years. The European pattern was stimulated by wartime deaths of men which resulted in a large number of mature women in the current decade looking for men, or perhaps it would be better to say they are looking for companionship. When husbands die off they leave their surviving wives all of their accumulated wealth. Older American women sometimes are quite affluent. This fact when put into context of a crassly materialistic culture should bend the hearts of more mature men when the opportunity comes for a marriage alliance with an older woman. America soon will join the European pattern of mature marriages when larger numbers of older people are able by their subculture actions to modify the American stereotype of proper age-sex separations.

The transition from full-time employment to full-time retirement in our culture is a double shock: both money and prestige are eroded. A person becomes "officially" old at retirement. The prospect of retirement rather than retirement itself often leads

to morbid states of mind.[1] If we only measure a person's age by the calendar rather than also by his or her physiologic age and state of mind we are doing a great disservice to those who still have much life to share in their last decades.[2] Simone de Beauvoir says that our culture dictates it is old age rather than death itself which is contrasted with life:

> There is only one solution if old age is not to be an absurd parody of our former life, and that is to go on pursuing ends that give our existence a meaning—devotion to individuals, to groups or to causes, social, political, intellectual or creative work.[3]

Eighteen years of research on what happens to intelligence from adulthood to old age effectively explodes the widespread myth of declining mental competence.[4] Early IQ tests begun in the 1930's led researchers to hypothesize that intelligence reaches a peak in early adulthood but declines regularly around the fourth decade of life. What these early tests could not control for was the generation gaps in educational experience. Only with longitudinal testing of individuals over their life span has it

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[1] See Bromley, 1966, pp. 73-77.
[2] Montagu, 1964, pp. 247-256, espec. p. 248.
[3] Beauvoir, 1972, p. 540.
[4] Baltes and Schaie, 1974.

been shown that major dimensions of intelligence actually can increase with age. Only viso-motor flexibility seems to suffer. These findings question the morality of mandatory retirement ages for most occupations.

Despite the many negative stereotypes attached to mature people, many lead a happy life. Having been freed from the frustrations and pressures of "making it" in our economy, many older people get a fresh perspective on life's possibilities.[1] Images of hordes of little old ladies exerting political pressure to kill off reforms are, for example, a fantastic stereotype. Angus Campbell's study of the political behavior of the elderly shows that their political attitudes are a function both of early socialization and of current life circumstances.[2]

The elderly are pragmatists, flexibly responding to issues which affect them. Therefore, it would follow that the elderly have potential for issue-oriented radical action, just as the young. Groups such as the American Association of Retired Persons, the Grey Panthers, as well as other groups are increasingly vigilant in securing a just existence for the elderly in affluent America.

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[1] See Neugarten, 1971.

[2] Campbell, 1971.

Not only are political innovations in store for the future, the elderly are moving into other areas the young thought they had a monopoly on. The basic pattern of living arrangements is for the elderly to not live with their children and grandchildren, but to live less than an hour away from one child.[1] Lewis Mumford suggests that any process of residential reorganization should not try to restore the traditional three-generational family, but should try to restore three-generational communities where possible.[2]

Out of the role ambiguity which pervades old age should emerge new living arrangements, often communal. Most of the elderly are not confined to institutions: in 1971 only 8.1 per cent of women and 6.0 per cent of men over seventy-five were in institutions of any kind.[3] The potential for widespread communial living among independent adults is there--because the older people are there, and too often isolated from meaningful human contact.

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It is hoped that our survey has put into a healthy perspective the mature society with its

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[1]Arlie Hochschild, "Communal Living in Old Age," in Howe, ed., 1972, p. 300.

[2]Mumford, 1968, p. 41.

[3]Duval, 1971.

stable or temporarily declining total population. Anybody who focuses his value system on the individual, rather than just on the society, will see the benefits coming to living a good life all of one's life, and not just over the first fifty or so years. Anybody who is primarily concerned with the health of the community can appreciate the advantages of having a smaller total population density. We will detail these additional advantages in the next chapter.

There is a wide gap between intellectually "agreeing with" life's natural processes, of which death is but one--and emotionally accepting our very human limits. Even so illustrious a demographer as Ansley Coale of Princeton finds the mature society difficult to accept: "A world population with the age composition of a health resort is a mildly depressing prospect. Such a population would presumably be cautious, conservative, and full of regard for the past."[1]

Anybody who has followed the arguments of this chapter should know that the future is never a carbon copy of the past. Rather, today's youth are tomorrow's elders; and tomorrow's world will have only as much reverence for life as we ourselves do.

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[1]Ansley J. Coale, "How a Population Ages or Grows Younger," in R. Freedman, ed., 1964, p. 57.

CHAPTER XII:

THE ROAD TO N.P.G.

On Manhattan's 53rd Street just off Madison Avenue is a tiny park with, of all things, a vertical waterfall. People from the area flock there during the day to sit on its benches contemplating this phony bit of nature. For a brief while that ugly crowding which is mid-Manhattan recedes from the contemplator's consciousness. This waterfall is an expression of the "artificial nature industry." It began with artificial flowers, artificial gems, then artificial Christmas trees, artificial snow, and moves on to other quasi-natural creations. This phenomenon is both the product of scientific ingenuity and a response to people's increasing physical alienation from maternal nature.

The artificial nature industry is just one way overpopulated, affluent man tries to recover the image of nature. But will the mere image of nature be enough to restore harmony between man and his natural milieu? Or will it take a real restoration of real contact with real nature? Can man find his deepest spiritual qualities in a world existing at the edge of

starvation, where strange people bounce off each other and continue on toward their personal voids?

It is an established cliché of our culture that New York City is not America, but that America wants to become New York City. Even small cities covet that Manhattan skyline effect. Another cliché of our culture states that California is already where America will be in a generation. California used to be the Mecca for those weary of other states. For the past seventy years California has grown at least twice as fast as the rest of America. Now, however, its growth has slowed dramatically. Both miasmas of phallic skylines and endless auto arteries may soon join Horatio Alger in ideological obscurity.

In the California towns of San Jose, Pleasanton, Livermore, Petaluma and in other areas of California people have increasingly opposed subdivision developments which don't pay their way.[1] San Mateo County near San Francisco is reeling from the effects of suburban growth. A recent poll of registered voters there found eighty-three per cent wanting no more growth, while more than one in four supported a reduction in the current population.[2] California is changing from being a vagrant, gold-rush

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[1]Morgan, 1973.

[2]"Growth . . .," 1972.

society to one more concerned with community.

Other areas of the country are also rejecting the New York-California stereotypes. Oregon invites tourists, but not settlers. Deleware turned away a $360-million chemical complex because of quality of life concerns. The governors of West Virginia and of Florida are taking more critical looks at development schemes. Louden County, Va. refused the final permits for a new Levittown project after county properties had to be reassessed upward to help pay for additional services demanded by yet another project, Sugarland Run.[1] The City Council of small Salem, Va. recently banned new multiple family dwellings because of quality of life and tax level concerns.[2]

Only recently many people thought of zero population growth as an extremist response to the baby boom. Now with the baby bust upon us and its incipient replacement levels of fertility--the idea of zero population growth (stability) is accepted by increasingly large numbers of Americans. The issue has recently been framed between "positive population growth" and "zero population growth." However, the opposite of a "+" is a "-"; not a "0." The true opposition to expanded populations is population shrinkage: N.P.G.

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[1] "Fellow . . .," 1971.

[2] Turner, 1973.

If the reader has followed the often labyrinthine ramblings of the previous chapters he should now be thinking in terms of options for eventual social size. Likewise the reader should think now in terms of long-run homeostasis, which means long-run zero population growth.[1] Indeed, my proposal for N.P.G. is designed to help restore human sized relations among humans. Given enough room people might be able to do an "end run" around the mass of machinery which stands before them.

Population shrinkage is designed to be a transitional corrective to compensate for excesses in population and pollution growth, called "popullution" by S. Fred Singer. I do not propose either any special rate of shrinkage or any special final level of size. Those two dimensions of change can only be dealt with by the masses who look at their own welfare and those of their fellow man.

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There is a certain mentality which finds the idea of America shrinking in any way a heresy to its secular religion of mercantilist Manifest Destiny. Formerly, Manifest Destiny was the urge to put the

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[1] See Frejka, 1968. [He plots a sinusoid curve with gradually damped oscillations over time. A pure stationary population thus would be difficult to achieve with precision. But long-run Z.P.G. need not worry about such short-run oscillations, as long as the average is stationary.]

continent under the Stars and Stripes. That nifty task was completed three quarters of a century ago. Yet the idea of linear progress lingers on: it is today's version of Manifest Destiny.

The true modern mercantilist thinks in terms of what the masses can do for the nation state. The definition of patriotism (doing what is best for the people in one's father land) is subverted into the concept of nationalism ("my country right or wrong"). Those who oppose the realpolitik of nationalism are thereby automatically "unpatriotic." We Americans have recently learned the disastrous consequences of such New Think. We now need to go one step farther and be aware of all forms of New Think. For example, "pesticide" literally means a "pest killer"; but pesticides used indiscriminately kill more than pests. Ask the dead birds.

Even so-called utopians have not been immune to the siren's call for linear growth. Robert Owen in his Report to the County of Lanark (1821) suggested: "That, under a proper direction of manual labor, Great Britain may be made to support an incalculable [sic] increase of population, most advantageously for all its inhabitants."[1]

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[1]In Bowditch and Ramsland, 1961, p. 125.

Modern Utopians still rise to the lure of defining man in terms of his quantitative output, rather than in terms of his qualitative soul development. Perhaps the worst offender is the ever ebullient R. Buckminster Fuller. His book, Utopia or Oblivion, contains several gems of cornucopian excess. The worst example of this technofantasy is the following:

> Man is physically miniscule and lives in scattered patches covering less than 5% of the earth's surface. As of 1965--and despite the hullabaloo about a world population explosion--all of humanity could be brought indoors in the buildings of greater New York City, each with as much floor room as at a cocktail party. All the cities of our planet cover sum-totally less than 1% of the earth's surface.[1]

Fuller nevertheless comes to the conclusion that world population will eventually stabilize, then decrease, as industrialization swiftly amplifies to serve all peoples.[2] Perhaps. Unexamined are many questions, not the least of which are those of the social and political infrastructures needed to support all that wealth. Fuller's technocratic viewpoint is unconcerned with the messy human element. His focus is on ". . . the world's prime, vital problem . . . how to triple . . . the overall performance realiza-

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[1]Fuller, 1969, p. 217; C. A. Doxiadis [Doxiadis, 1967] envisions up to thirty billion people in the next century living in a universal city covering the earth in major and minor concentrations!

[2]Ibid, p. 201.

tions . . . of the world's comprehensive resources."[1] But suppose Third World population increases outrace that elusive efficiency goal: how will people psychologically and politically respond to each other while awaiting the new technology?

Other cornucopians confuse size of population with the health of the body politic. We have encountered Mr. Sauvy before. His opposition to N.P.G. comes out clearest in the following: "It is a historical fact that because it allowed its population to age too fast, France fell into a dangerous decline."[2] He adds: "A body can only improve through growth."[3] Furthermore he declares: "A population without children does not believe in the future and can hardly be expected to have the pioneering spirit."[4] If Sauvy were not a professor at the prestigeous Collège de France and Director of the Institute de Démographie at Paris University, as well as past président of the United Nations Commission on Population, we might quickly dismiss his mercantilist chauvinism.

In logic there is an important relevant fallacy: the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

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[1] Ibid, p. 178.
[2] Sauvy, 1969, p. 288.
[3] Ibid, p. 289.
[4] Ibid, p. 291.

It means that just because something follows another this does not by itself prove that the earlier caused the latter. France fell into a "dangerous decline" not merely because of its mature population, but because of the consequences of its Maginot Line complex. Speaking of improvements "only" through growth--is it not true that a human body is physically grown by adolescence, but that the full flower of adulthood occurs only years later? Likewise, a culture cannot be defined by the numbers of adherents to that culture; the qualitative accomplishments are of equal or greater importance. Finally, there is a vast difference between a fictional population literally "without children" and a real population with realistic numbers of children. Yes, even a shrinking population has many children.

Another argument for increased population is the "more people--more geniuses" theory.[1] Admittedly the random probability of more genetic potential for genius increases in direct proportion with population increases. However, human genius does not work like computers. The social and psychological surround of the individual genius is more important than genes to how much and how well that potential will be used. In theory there are more genetic geniuses in the street

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[1] Simon Kuznets in his Economic Growth and Structure (1965) argues along this line; see also Chamberlain, 1972, p. 81.

sweeper caste in India than in all of America's dynamic upper classes.

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Religious objection to population shrinkage has not been as well crystalized as it has against contraception, which may or may not affect population size. The Roman Catholic position is that, "whether population decline is an absolute evil is open to question."[1] The nation that does not replace its population could ". . . justifiably be regarded as in some respects decadent."[2]

If one is convinced that there is an afterlife, life on earth becomes trivialized for the believer. Both individual experience and group experience are as nothing compared to the assumed divine design. Questions of population size and their effects on social life become non-questions. Even individual misery brought on by density stress and starvation are easily framed in Job's trials and final blessing. The Hindu and Buddhist doctrine of transmigrating souls likewise trivialize existent problems.

Just as the psychologistic perspective reduces all biological and social phenomena to

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[1]Norman St. John-Stevas, "A Roman Catholic View of Population Control," in Shimm and Everett, eds., 1961, p. 73.

[2]Ibid.

psychological terminology, so too a purely theological perspective trivializes existential actualizing which is man's vehicle for a moral life. Any number, no matter how large, when put in a fraction over infinity is the same as any other number: these fractions are all equal to zero. Questions of transcendence are indeed valid, if unanswerable, questions--but the population-pollution crisis is very immanent.

For the fun of it let us take a highly unorthodox look at the Book of Genesis. We recall this is where the infamous "be fruitful, and multiply" (Genesis 1:28) is found. Yet are we really sure things were meant to turn out this way from the first?

Man was made in God's image, it is said. God puts his first humans into the garden "eastward in Eden," a marvelous place which happens to have two unique trees: "the tree of life" and "the tree of knowledge of good and evil." Adam is commanded to not eat any of the second tree, ". . . for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." (Gen. 2:17) Interestingly, God says nothing about the first tree; so we can assume this one was not explicitly taboo. Or was it?

If Adam had eaten both the tree of knowledge (for which he was supposed to die) and the tree of life

a most delicate problem would have been presented to God. God quickly evicts Adam and Eve from Eden before they feast on the Tree of Life, since they now have knowledge and could become his rivals, rather than just puppet images. This is only to cover up his own two-tree mistake. If God had not botched his own creation things would have remained as they were. And how were they in this ideal setting? The population was not four billion; just two people. Admittedly, the size of Eden was small, but the density was low by any standard. Eve gives birth only after their expulsion. It is Cain, the murderer, who spawns the first civilization.(Gen. 4:16-17).

If we take the knowledge tree to be a metaphor of science, and if we consider the tree of life to be security and perpetuation of the species--we then will be in view of man's natural and progressive Tao: a small population with the fruits of science covering all essential needs.

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There are strong economic reasons for limiting both types of growth--in population and in gross national products. A most alarming and controversial study was released in 1972, The Limits to Growth[1].

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[1]D. Meadows, et al., 1972.

The findings of this M.I.T. group were based on a study of five major global trends by computers: accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, malnutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and the deteriorating environment. Their major conclusion was that, if present exponential rates continue, ". . .the limits of growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity."[1]

Their computer projections have not gone unchallenged. John Maddox, editor of England's Nature magazine, complains that they describe the world in oversimple terms, committing the error of aggregation.[2] He notes that the process of resource substitution can help ameliorate the depletion of nonrenewable resources, helped further by the cost-price system. However, even if all criticisms of their model are accounted for there still remains their conclusion--just pushed forward a few decades into the future.

There are several phenomena which their model accounts for which are easily seen in terms of

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[1] Ibid, p. 23.

[2] Maddox, 1972, p. 285.

systems theory, but not so easily seen in business psychology: " . . . population and capital, driven by exponential growth, not only reach their limits, but temporarily shoot beyond them before the rest of the system, with its inherent delays, reacts to stop growth."[1]

Part of the blame for this lack of efficient feedback before crisis occurs must be put on slowly changing political and social institutions. Although technology can metamorphose the physical world with breathless rapidity, man has not yet found ways to adjust his social institutions to fit new technologies. Within the vacuum of social responsibility unscrupulous profiteers can fatten their profits, at the same time many of the true costs of their operations are pushed onto the citizenry as externalities. The whole highway lobby-petroleum industry complex serves the common interest only after their special interests are satisfied.

The Limits study warns us not to expect any simple "fix" on the problem. Even stabilizing population alone is not sufficient to prevent overshoot and collapse. Their "Stabilized World Model 1" involves resource recycling whenever possible, pollution control,

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[1] D. Meadows, et al., 1972, p. 145.

increased lifetime of all forms of capital, soil restoral; also, value changes involving more food and services, and less resource-wasting industrial production.[1] If there is a delay in stabilizing population beyond their model of birth rates equaling death rates by 1975 (which means a temporary N.P.G. rate of fertility, considering the distribution of old and young today)--the extended exponential growth resultant means fewer possibilities remain for the final stable state. They warn: "Taking no action to solve these problems is equivalent to taking strong action."[2]

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The advantages of a stabilized economy have been best documented by Stephen Enke.[3] He shows population growth is not necessary for prosperity. At the same time it should be restated that not all human needs can be met in the money market. The changes in our G.N.P. responding to the new demographic picture will be changes in composition of the G.N.P.

In the kindergarten of economic theory we are told that the larger a production unit is the

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[1] Ibid, pp. 163-167.

[2] Ibid, p. 183.

[3] Enke, 1970; see also Welles, 1970; and Lawrence A. Mayer, "U.S. Population Growth: Would Fewer Be Better?," in Callahan, ed., 1971.

more efficient it becomes per unit of production: this is economies of size. However, after a point there can emerge diseconomies of size; this is especially true if we inject into the cost picture externalities generated by large-scale production's threshold effects on the environment. Even if there were no such thing as diseconomies, this alone would not be a sufficient argument for population growth. Enke notes:

> Today . . . there hardly can be any kind of output that is lacking because the U.S. market is too small. Even if this were the case, the remedy might be to negotiate with other countries for free trade . . . since it would be faster and cheaper to increase the size of a market through eliminating tariffs than by raising and educating many more children.[1]

Enke's analysis of the land value question is valuable.[2] Landowners are one of the few groups, taken as a whole, who would not generally benefit from less people; they benefit from increased competition for their fixed resource. Population growth increases land prices on the average: but that growth is just a redistribution-of-wealth effect, not an increase in real wealth and general welfare.

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[1] Ibid, p. 8.
[2] Ibid, p. 9.

Another look at the new economy is provided by Herman Daly of Louisiana State University.[1] His concept of a stationary-state economy is aimed at giving us a biophysical equilibrium along with moral growth. The guiding principle is to combine macro-stability with micro-variability. Instead of seeing growth as the norm, just because it has historically been the American experience, he sees the creative stationary state becoming the norm. This concept must extend to the world as a whole; while at the same time the poor must be uplifted.

It should be obvious to the reader that further raids on the earth's resources must accompany any efforts to upgrade worldwide per capita income without a massive shift in the world's fertility. The causes of most problems are narrow solutions. According to Gordon Taylor, before man changed the world's soils 9.3 billion tons of solids moved to the seas each year; now the figure is already 24 billions annually. Africa is losing 300 million net tons of top soil annually, and he estimates it may be unable to feed its population in fifteen years time.[2] Even if Taylor's fifteen-year figure is too pessimistic this does not change the essential fact:

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[1] Daly, 1971.

[2] Taylor, 1970, p. 215.

the situation is going to get worse before it gets any better. If that transition to better is to come by human choice and not by Malthusian calamities we must act now to cut total population, not just to slow its growth rate.

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The gap between rich, technologically efficient nations and the poor nations is widening. This is just one manifestation of the competitive differential wherein firms, regions of a federal system, or nations rise and fall according to how well they can manipulate each other.[1] The individual in a metropolis is also put into a similar competitive differential. The forces which affect the metropolitan resident are largely beyond his control: large societies are meritocratic, with the yardstick of personal worth being one's bank balance, not one's sensitivity.

Although there are many more things which affect the urban dweller's psychology than just his city's size, it can be shown that there is a positive correlation between size and per person cost of basic services--as well as a direct relationship

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[1]See John W. Dyckman, "Some Conditions of Civic Order in an Urbanized World," in Hoffman, ed., 1968, pp. 308-309.

between size and assault rates. Cities below 250,000 have nearly one-half the assault rate as do cities over 250,000.[1] Eric Johnson's study of per capita expenditures revealed the most efficient city size to be in the 50 to 100 thousand range. Very small cities do not fully benefit from economies of size, while huge cities suffer from diseconomies brought on by higher costs in housing, bonded debt, water and sewage, commuting expenses and so forth.[2] Cities over 250,000 tend to spend more per capita, prompting a study at M.I.T. to suggest the above fact, ". . . can be taken to indicate the benefit of assigning an upper limit of 250,000 for the population size of a new community."[3]

The basic purpose of a city is the facilitation of interchange of all sorts. When the means of interchange are altered so too will the very nature of the city. Before automobiles and trucks, before telephones, a city could be compact. According to York Willbern:

> When movement and interchange were pedestrian and horse-drawn, an efficient area for a population of 200,000 might be about four square miles; for 200,000 persons now, . . . the most efficient area might well be 100 square miles.[4]

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[1] Packard, 1972, p. 235.
[2] Johnson, 1971.
[3] B. Miller, et al., 1972, p. E-1.
[4] Willbern, 1966, p. 15.

Every change effects more changes. One of the ironies in "natural" expansion of a city's size to accommodate new transportation technologies is an accented edge effect: A declining ratio between the city's circumference and its area accentuates waste removal problems as transportation costs rise for removal.[1] This is a key to why the very large cities cost more per capita to run.

Lewis Mumford, the social philosopher, concludes that a manageable and visible city, a humanly lovable city, must range between thirty thousand and three hundred thousand inhabitants.[2] Even his critic in city planning, Jane Jacobs, concedes that it takes from thirty thousand people in cities the size of Boston to at least one hundred thousand people in the largest cities for a district to swing political weight in the city as a whole.[3] But where does this leave the average, alienated citizen; where does this leave the sub-threshold group; where does this leave the groups thinly spread over many districts?

Some may note that Manhattan has prospered with 77,000 persons per square mile. This is true, if we avoid looking too closely at certain areas of this island--as Harlem. Cities are synthetic environ-

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[1] See Commoner, 1972, pp. 131-132.
[2] Mumford, 1968, p. 157.
[3] Jacobs, 1961, p. 425.

ments with ecological ramifications affecting both nature and individual man. Unlike small and simple societies, modern cities accentuate class differences. Nowhere is the class barrier seen more clearly than at 96th Street and Park Avenue in Manhattan: below are luxury apartment buildings; above emerge the train tracks to the affluent suburbs, and straddling these ugly tracks are equally ugly tenement dwellings.

Affluent, effluent society is largely the result of technology and poor social organization. Both keys to affluence of education and acceptance into the social fabric are kept from the hands of many poor who are locked into self-perpetuating cycles of parent-child degradation. In the early part of our twentieth century white ethnic arrivals could force their way to the top of a labor hungry social pyramid; Puerto Rican and black Americans in this cybernetic, white collar age are not so fortunate. The ladder to success is still there; but a key rung is education, an area in which massive school bureaucracies are woefully deficient in the ghetto.

The city with its glittering skyline obscures the dreary melodrama below. Whereas the poor are condemned to their tenements on dripping hot days, the affluent can "escape" to more rural areas.

To illustrate the process of positive and negative accelerations of population size, given a constant rate of demographic change over time, let us take as our base or norm a population of 100.

First, let us increase this hypothetical community at the rate of 1.5% per annum. (We are talking about subtracting death rates from birth rates.) The first year's numerical increase would be 1.5 people (a statistical increase). Forty-seven years later--when that population had doubled--each year would add 3.0 people to the total. Their growth rate remains the same, but the base has now doubled.

We can likewise compute a negative change of, say, 1.5% per annum. Starting again with a base of 100, the first year's drop is the familiar 1.5 people. However, forty-seven years later, when the new total is about half of what it had been--the yearly drop is just 0.75 people. With this simple comparison we dramatically see how population growth at a constant rate accelerates total population away from the original norm: Population shrinkage at an identical rate of change moderates its numerical change from the norm! Whereas the first process is a "break away" phenomenon--the other has built-in brakes on its amount of change.

However, such open land that they flock to must decrease per capita if overall population increases and/or use of these areas increases--even if nobody settles on these rural lands permanently.[1]

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I am not the first to suggest population shrinkage as a partial solution to our popullution problems. We have already heard from Mr. Commoner. Jean Mayer, the nutritionist from Harvard, suggests:

> . . . to save the ecology the population will have to decrease as the disposable income increases. . . . Excellent human beings will not be produced without abundance of cultural as well as material resources and, I believe, without sufficient space.[2]

Paul Ehrlich realizes initial zero population growth is a partial corrective: "We must rapidly bring the world population under control, reducing the growth rate to zero and eventually making it go negative."[3] From the same planetary perspective, Richard Falk concludes:

> We have the techniques available, provided we can tame human appetites and limit human population to an optimum number--say 1,000,000,000 people--to provide all men and women with the material and social basis for a life of dignity and pleasure.[4]

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[1] Cf. Higbee, 1970, pp. 55-81.

[2] Jean Mayer, "Toward a Non-Malthusian Population Policy," in Callahan, ed., 1971, p. 153.

[3] P. Ehrlich, 1971, p. 127.

[4] Falk, 1971, p. 104.

These sentiments were put forward by Preston Cloud in a 1969 Congressional hearing: ". . . the present world population of more than 3.5 billion substantially exceeds [the] optimum and . . . the present U. S. population of more than 200 million is beyond the optimum for our own country."[1]

Every discussion of the United States must extend to the worldwide ecosystem. Likewise, every discussion of the world must return swiftly to America, the land with six per cent of the world's population which consumes one third of the world's resources. Even in 1948, in the afterglow of yet another war won by America (with a little help from our allies), the problem of our expansion and consumption was apparent to P. K. Whelpton who warned:

> It seems to me that even in countries like the U.S.A., the population is above the economic optimum; . . . if we could choose between a stationary population of say, 100,000,000 and 150,000,000 or 200,000,000 we should without question be better off with the former.[2]

This low estimate was itself cut in half by Joseph Spengler who in 1967 estimated that economies of scale substantially come to an end after a nation has fifty million citizens. Commenting on Spengler's evaluation, Garrett Hardin concludes:

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[1] In U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 4.

[2] P. K. Whelpton, from Proceedings of the International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family (Cheltenham, England, August 1948), in Hardin, ed., 1969, p. 67.

". . . it is hardly conceivable that the optimum population of the United States will prove to be as great as fifty million."[1] The former Secretary of the Interior, Stewart L. Udall, was quoted in 1970 by the New York Times as feeling we have already exceeded our optimum population level, putting the right number at about 100 million people, half the present level.[2]

We could play the numbers game for a long time and never get around to answering the question: What is the optimum level of population? Preston Cloud defines the optimum,

> . . . as one that is large enough to realize the potentialities of human creativity to achieve a life of high quality for everyone indefinitely, but not so large as to threaten dilution of quality, the potential to achieve it, or the wise management of the ecosystem.[3]

There is no magic number associated with "optimum," for our answer depends on the content of the welfare function chosen for maximization.

Society needs organic living relationships. Instead, hierarchically ordered economic success scales within mass society prevail. Homo faber in making things has literally made a thing of himself.

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[1]Garrett Hardin, "How to Specify an Optimum Level of Population," in Singer, ed., 1971, pp. 261, 262-263.

[2]In Pohlman, ed., 1973, p. 169.

[3]Preston Cloud, "Resources, Population, and Quality of Life," in Singer, ed., 1971, p. 9.

The Industrial Revolution freed nuclear families from the censure of extended family networks; but the price too often paid has been increased alienation from extended I-Thou relationships within community. In extending the range of our economies we have somehow overlooked constant needs of human psyches. Psychological ecology has been too long sidetracked to let the "Success Express" speed by. And when people flock to psychological therapists their money spent just adds to the glorious G.N.P.: Misery is progress!

A smaller population increases real options for each individual. This holds true both for the individual vis-à-vis his society, and for the individual inside his family. It is well known that birth order is strongly correlated with social eminence and educational attainment. First born among siblings show a higher statistical degree of achievement throughout life than do those following.[1] It logically follows that if the average size of families shrinks--the ratio of first born to the others will rise.

A larger total population may exhibit the facade of more mathematical options: But excessive

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[1] See Altus, 1966; also Lieberman, 1970; an economic perspective is in Spengler, 1966.

size and complexity demand increased organization and regimentation for the average citizen. It is OK to live in a high-energy environment only as long as you are on top of that energy. Residents of small towns have a higher degree of self-sufficiency than do urban dwellers. The "home range" of the small town dweller is restricted, increasing his opportunities for acquaintance with its demands and opportunities. Durwood Allen suggests a doubling in size of a town or a nation would more than double the problems; eco-social stress would accelerate faster than the simple growth in population.[1] This dialectic could also work in reverse, with a linear decline in population allowing a geometrical decline in eco-social stress.

We Americans should not ignore the very real leadership effect a robust declining population would have on the rest of the world: Where once our political revolution led the way to a new worldwide order, now our demographic revolution will show the way other states can travel for true prosperity. At the same time, our relatively higher proportion of educated adults will mean more people of the right kind running our increasingly automated industries.

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[1]Allen, 1969.

This can only help to increase through trade America's relative economic strength, at least until other nations join the N.P.G. pattern.[1]

Even businesses which would seemingly be hurt by less babies--if they did not diversify--are changing their attitude. For example, Dan Gerber, Chairman of the Board at Gerber Products Company, states now: "We are not in the least alarmed at the possibilities of population limitation. . . . I feel that anyone who would resist a rightful development for selfish reasons would be very shortsighted."[2]

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Our story does not end here. I have stated many times that just changing population levels will not significantly alter interchanges among people. A change in population levels itself facilitates other changes. For example, less people in the ghetto means more potential housing space per person. This is good, but unless renovation efforts are carried out to save the huge number of marginal buildings the net result could find a per person shrinkage in available housing, as apartments disappear faster than people.

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[1]Cf. Etzioni, 1973. [This point is overlooked by Mr. Etzioni who incredibly claims: ". . . a decline in population, while it might result in an increase [sic] in the individual's standard of living, will tend to bring about less demand and a slackening economy."]

[2]Quoted in Sollitto and Viederman, 1971, p. K-11.

Garry Wills recently suggested Americans are afraid to have children. Our culture is afraid of and for its children: "It would be wrong to dismiss the dips and rises of the birthrate as cyclic adjustments, rather than as part of a growing spiritual drama and dilemma."[1] He suggests our mask of self-indulgence is really a long night of self-denial: The generation gap cannot be crossed by many victims of its viciousness.

Where do we turn? Surely a reduction in excess population would not retard the overall solution. Some children must be born: If no children at all were born for the next forty-five or so years the species itself would become extinct. The question of optimum must not be looked at as optimizing a mess, the lesser evil alternative. With this sort of attitude our efforts will be defensive and not creative. Rather, the question of optimum should be seen from an ethical, ideal perspective. An ideal perspective need not degenerate into purist idealism, blind to the real world. We seek a realizable eutopia, not a mythical Utopia.

When will we know we have succeeded? That time will be here when all babies are loved, when all

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[1]Wills, 1974, p. 170.

adolescents feel free to explore lifestyles, when all adults feel at one with their workplace and their governments, when all old people feel honored for having lived long and well. Is this too much to ask of a trillion-dollar economy?

PART TWO

CHAPTER XIII:

FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY-- ANCIENT ORIGINS

There is no such thing as "absolute freedom." Even for a singular god. If God were alone over his creation, equipped with omnipotence, omniscience and beyond the bonds of temporality--his freedom would still fall short of the absolute. The one freedom denied even to him would be the freedom to autodestruct everything and then reverse the process. Entropy works even on the divine level.

We may, with this suicidal exception, apply the sub-concept of "absolute human freedom" to our species. This concept is an ideal concept, and can be used to measure degrees of freedom in given situations. Unlike a unitary god, each man exists in plurality and each man is severely limited in time he may enjoy the opportunities which this small planet offers. The character of each man's potential freedom is conditioned by his social matrix. A paradox develops in political society parallel to a god's problematical willed entropy: A political body can will its own enslavement. The question then becomes--are they indeed enslaved?

Most people would answer that they are not enslaved as long as they continue to will their own enslavement. Suppose a condition of their enslavement is erased memory of past freedoms à la George Orwell, so that they no longer have either the will to stay enslaved or the will to contemplate reversal to freedom: Mind is destroyed, and along with its destruction volition is destroyed. Can we now say that in their collective mental entropy these anthropoid creatures deserve to be called humans? The answer is less clear than before. If man's essential nature is freedom--options--, then man himself would vanish as a self-actualizing being whenever his mind-options-freedom is negated.

This degraded ontological state is the state of mass man. We recall the estimated one hundred million unnecessary human deaths already perpetrated in this century alone by mass man. Nobody has since demonstrated a fundamental change in mass man's heart: given "auspicious" conditions another hundred million would be ground into the dust.

Perhaps the problem is with the massness of mass man. The act of reification (making a thing of) is always self-reification. Conversely, a social

I-Thou relationship always results in an I-Thou dialogue within one's self. Massness directs the individual toward the Other as numinous abstraction. Personality is degenerated into mass personality. Man's Frankenstein technology displaces the personality of the individual who surrenders his idiosyncrasies to the general standard.

Is this horror show just another vicious circle, forever self-perpetuating? Must mass man's descent into spiritual entropy be an endless downward spiral? I think not: If we can turn around the mass monster before the final nuclear holocaust we can rediscover what it means to be a humane human. One of the lessons of the Korean War's episode of Chinese "brainwashing" was that a man's brain cannot be successfully "washed"--and still function quasi-normally. Social man's bewitchment is already showing signs of coming to an end. The Vietnam War and cotemporal ecological and energy crises have been catalysts for a healthier consciousness.

Individual man had de facto surrendered his freedom to the mass will. The masses surrendered their will to the more coherent will of militaristic leaders who ruled "in their name." I wish to demonstrate in detail later on how common people formerly

had direct and equal relationships with others in the exercise of political power, how that power was usurped; and finally how that power can be restored within a eutopic political society.

Power which operates in a moral vacuum is worse than the powerlessness of slavery. Power must be guided by an agglomerate of wills directed to socially beneficial purposes. A heuristic guideline for measuring this good will has been put forth by the philosopher, Giovanni Baldelli. His measuring stick is the concept, ethical capital. This he defines: "Whatever in human relationships is neither violent nor in any way injurious, and whatever dictates to one man actions which are beneficial to another, is a contribution to . . . the ethical capital of mankind."[1]

In economics, capital is goods used to produce more goods. "Goods" to the economist are any material items. When however a "good" is put into a bad social context that economic good can no longer be part of the ethical capital of man, even though it may be economic capital. For Baldelli, man is by definition that which is never final. "To be human," he notes, "is to know of a world where the laws of

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[1]Baldelli, 1971, p. 13.

power and biological need do not rule invariably--a world of harmony instead of strife, of intelligent creativeness rather than of stupidity and destruction."[1]

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Philip Slater thinks America's culture is at the breaking point. He finds the three human desires for community, for engagement, and for shared dependence frustrated. This is not something done to us, but rather done by us to us. A key to this self-destruction is, ". . . the powerful human reluctance to admit that an achieved goal was not worth the unpleasant experience required to achieve it."[2]

It would seem absurd that man actually sets out to hurt himself. And so it would be, if such were indeed the case. It would be more accurate to go back one step in the causal link and ask what sets off man's self-destruction. Mass man <u>is</u> what the times are. In contrast, anarchistic man is what he chooses. Of course both types presented here are ideal types. Nevertheless, this dichotomy points to the problem of today's culture: modern mass-man cannot get a handle on his social existence, because that existence has become <u>abstract</u> to him. As Anton

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[1]Ibid, p. 22.

[2]Slater, 1971, p. 115.

Zijderveld puts it:

> Modern society is, in the experience and consciousness of man, very concrete as to its coercive forces of control, but it evaporates into an awareness of loss of meaning, reality and freedom when modern man tries to keep this coercion under control and to evade the sense of absurdity and inauthenticity.[1]

The difference between being a cheerful robut with programmed happy consciousness and being a humane human with a built-in moral censor is the difference between mass man and authentic man. The first type is functional in our culture, while the second type is subversive. Authentic man is always a philosopher: literally, a lover of wisdom. Because he never can attain ultimate wisdom a philosopher never stops critically examining all that comes before him. This may illuminate Plato's plan to ban all philosophers from his static republic which he thought he had perfected (in his head) along utopian lines.

Mass man is molded by his over-repressive society, which disguises its repression in language and superficial attitudes that seek to dull opposition. Violence is held in reserve, while taught self-repression functions in organized everyday life.[2] Within role matrices one is taught to value his "what-ness" rather than his "who-ness," to value what he socially represents

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[1] Zijderveld, 1971, pp. 49-50. On the abstract "thingness" of social facts, see Durkheim, 1964, pp. 1-13.

[2] See Lefebvre, 1971, espec. pp. 146 ff.

rather than all of who he is.[1] The difficulty in perceiving moral truth lies in the immense power wielded by received opinion over the individual's precarious sense of self-identity in this unsettled age.[2]

The enemy of progressive change is not stability, but instability. Without dynamic social stability real progressive change cannot occur.[3] A cliché of the sixties was that given a choice only between Spiro Agnew and Abbie Hoffman people who disliked both but feared uncertain change more would choose Agnew, who posed for "law and order." The vicious hysteria surrounding the Kent State Syndrome was just one expression of Kurt Lewin's finding: ". . . we would expect a high degree of inner tension existing in apathetic autocracy in spite of its appearance of quietness and order."[4] After the apathetic calm of the Eisenhower era came the Democratic decade, and latent tensions within our racist, sexist, class conscious, petty bourgeoise culture surfaced.

Could it be that we as a species are biologically ill-equipped to control massive systems

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[1] Moustakas, 1967, p. 3.

[2] See Sampson, 1965, p. 202.

[3] See Vickers, 1972, pp. 121-127; Cf. Sennett, 1970, for an intellectualized panegyric to dense anarchy as the ideal adult condition!

[4] Lewin, 1964, pp. 209-210.

which mutate according to a military-industrial logos? The psychoanalyst, Karen Horney, believes an individual's freedom to act, to react, is denied by his neurotic struggles to reconcile fantasies of boundless power to determine his fate--and a feeling of entire helplessness. The social ideals of competition and success are at odds with the moral ideals of brotherly love and humility to the other person.[1] Thus, cognitive dissonance and social paralysis are individual man's fate when confronted with the massness of his milieu.

There are two responses to the "thingness" of massive, mass society. One response is "molecular motion" where people who have developed a "green consciousness" à la Charles Reich[2] drop out of the competition game and become atomized authentic people. The second response is enlightened restructuring of the politico-social matrix in which consciousness itself is nurtured for most people. The first process seems to be under way in these seventies. But will 1984 spotlight a reversal to New Think? In short, what fail-safe guarantees are there built into a mere change in Zeitgeist--if the understructure of this oppressive society remains intact?

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[1] Horney, 1964, pp. 288-289; see too W. Reich, 1970, pp. 276-277 [He notes that just overthrowing an authoritarian state will not necessarily romove the power of administrative functions to assume autonomous powers.]

[2] C. Reich, 1971.

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Mass society did not spring from the head of Zeus. It had concrete historical and functional origins. There had to be something advantageous in banding together--and subjecting the individual will to a central authority. There are several theories for the origin of states. The one which is most eloquent and comprehensive is Robert L. Carneiro's circumscription theory.[1]

Carneiro found not one example of a state arising voluntarily along a Rousseauean social contract. Nor did he find one example of "automatic" states arising from agricultural surpluses and natural banding together for division of labor, even though this is a natural process on a lower level than that of a state's organization. What he did find common to all early states was areas of circumscribed agricultural land. Any settlements confined to a restricted region of agriculture when defeated in war could not opt to flee (as, for contrast, was the case in the greater Amazon basin), but had to accept political subjugation.

The concept of "social circumscription" is added to "resource circumscription" by Carneiro.

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[1]Carneiro, 1970.

Simply this means: ". . . a high density of population in an area can produce effects on peoples living near the center of the area that are similar to effects produced by environmental circumscription."[1] A village in the center of a territory cannot opt to move away as can peripheral villages; there is no lateral slack near a densely populated region's center. Therefore such a pressured village must grow to counter aggressive threats. Carneiro's theory, in short, points to critical population densities as central to the rise of states.

We Americans living in a democratic age, when even the autocrats of the world must ritually genuflect to some aspects of popular will, take for granted that democracy is the norm for political life. What is was not. The traditional norm for states has been hierarchic and autocratic. Classical Greece's polis shines brightly against the surrounding darkness of despotism. Even later in the Age of Enlightenment we find democracy more in word than in deed: one of Voltaire's pen pals was that vulture for culture, Catherine the Great of Russia, under whom serfdom reach its cruelest refinements.

It is hard for one man to stand against two or three. How well can one man stand against the

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[1] Ibid, p. 737.

monolithic will that is the autocratic state? The oldest rule on the books is "divide and conquer," or "atomize and rule." The philosopher, Lewis Mumford, has definitively studied the origins and character of the "megamachine."[1] The archetypal machine he found was not invented during the Industrial Revolution: it began in ancient history, and this machine was composed of human parts.

No one political novelty can explain the development of civilization under divine kings. Centralized political power, class divisions, mechanized production, magnified militaries, slavery and economic and political exploitation of the weak all were some of the "improvements" made over simpler societies. Both work and destruction became organized and mechanized. Real gains of the machine--as, in irrigation, in written languages--were often undone by the mock-creativity of warfare among states. Mumford summarizes the early heritage of the megamachine as follows:

> The one lasting contribution of the megamachine was the myth of the machine itself: the notion that this machine was, by its very nature, absolutely irresistible--and yet, provided one did not oppose it, ultimately beneficent.[2]

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[1] See especially Mumford, 1967; and Mumford, 1970.

[2] Mumford, 1967, p. 224.

One of the differences between fertile soil for democracy and the weed patch of autocracy is size of population. As Mumford puts it:

> Democracy, in the sense I here use the term, is necessarily most active in small communities and groups, whose members meet face to face, interact freely as equals, and are known to each other as persons: it is in every respect the precise opposite of the anonymous, de-personalized, mainly invisible forms of mass association, mass communication, mass organization. But as soon as large numbers are involved, democracy must either succumb to external control and centralized direction, or embark on the difficult task of delegating authority to a cooperative organization.
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> The first choice is the easier one; or rather, it is hardly a choice, but what happens automatically when no sufficient effort is made to lift the spontaneous democratic mode of customary control to a higher level of intelligent organization. Historic experience shows that it is much easier to wipe out democracy by an institutional arrangement that gives authority only to those at the apex of the social hierarchy. The latter system, in its first stages, often achieves a high degree of mechanical efficiency: but at a prohibitive human cost.[1]

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To gain a deeper appreciation of our democratic heritage it is helpful to go back to the first democracies. Human nature is constant over the centuries, even while technology mutates every year. As will later be shown there are participatory elements critical to the spirit of democracy which have been lost to modern man, which the Athenians briefly had--

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[1] Mumford, 1967, p. 224.

which we too can have after some tinkering with the way everyday politics is conducted.

It was the Phoenicians who first fashioned a city-state. The transition from cities ruled by sacred kings to partial democracies was effected when rich merchant families formed an assembly of aldermen. Erosion of kingly power went so far that in Sidon aristocrats enforced decisions against his will.[1] These political advances were definite improvements over the oriental norm, but it was only in Greece that the common man became an active voice in decision making.

Greece started out as did other cultures of the day, but her landscape of mountains and valleys made it impossible, before Alexander the Great, for any local tyrant to achieve hegemony over all Greece. A similar situation has existed in small Switzerland, the only other nation to be run along the city-state principle. Unlike the Swiss, the Greeks lived along the seacoast--a sea which led to the more ancient cultures of Crete, Phoenicia and Egypt. They became merchants and cosmopolitans, as well as valley farmers.[2]

One of the effects of nascent prosperity on the Greek people was increased population. Since

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[1]Kahler, 1967, p. 77.

[2]Good histories are Robinson, 1955; Kitto, 1951; E. Hamilton, 1948; Finley, 1964; and Grene, 1965.

there was little room to expand inside their small valleys, they took to colonizing the shores of the Mediterranean. This pattern is similar to that of the Phoenicians who founded Carthage. When a Greek colony was founded the ties between it and the mother-city were sentimental. This contrasts with the European pattern of imperialism. The net result was an expansion of the Greek people without--at first--an expansion of any Greek empire. Only later after Athens dominated the Delian League did the city-states themselves suffer their fatal decline following the Peloponnesian War.[1]

The Phoenicians never developed a full-scale democracy, but the Athenians did. In Greece power had at first been tied to ancestral rights of clan-brotherhoods through their land ownership. New mercantilist wealth demanded a shift in authority. At the same time more citizens were forced into cities by the consolidated growth of estates. In 594 the great Solon was appointed "peacemaker." Because he knew the Athenians were not yet ready for full-scale democracy his reforms were designed to limit growth of estates, stop enslavement of debtors,

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[1]On this war and its effects see Thucydides, 1951; and Grene, 1965.

and increase Athenian prosperity through olive exports and domestic industry.[1]

Even though Athens remained an oligarchy under Solon he is regarded as their founder of democracy. The newly encouraged industrial and commercial classes grew to countervail the landed power. A Citizen Assembly was set up by Solon, admitting men of all classes; but the supreme power was still in the Aristocratic Council's hands.

Another reformer, Cleisthenes, in 508 moved Athens toward real democracy. He put taxation in money units rather than agricultural units. Furthermore, he abolished the tribal clans altogether. He extended citizenship to favored foreigners who resided in the city for a prescribed time. It was Pericles in 457 who first instituted integral democracy for Athens by extending full citizenship to all free men in the polis.[2]

Central to the spirit of Athenian democracy was the idea of community. It would have been unthinkable for a city-state to be the size of a modern democracy or, for that matter, the size of many modern cities. Only three poleis had more than 20,000 citizens. Two of them, Syracuse and Acragas (Girgenti),

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[1] Robinson, 1955, pp. 45-49.

[2] See Kahler, 1967, pp. 91-93.

were in Sicily; the third was Athens. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War Attica's total estimated population was just 350,000: half were Athenian men, women, and their children; a tenth resident aliens; and the rest slaves.[1]

Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics commented: ". . . although ten people would not be enough to compose such a [city] state, still if the [citizen] population rose to a hundred thousand, it would cease to be a city state."[2] He further observed in his Politics that a great city should not be equated with a populous one. He of course had in mind the gargantuan Persian Empire which had previously been beaten back by the sparse but valiant Greeks. "Most persons think," Aristotle observed, "that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small state."[3] Aristotle thus became history's first critic of populationist mercantilism.

Not all small settlements became democracies. A small population, given the limited communications technology of that era, was a necessary--but not sufficient--precondition for the democratic spirit.

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[1]Kitto, 1951, p. 66.
[2]Aristotle, 1943, p. 221.
[3]Ibid, p. 390.

We could not weigh the total amount of freedom within any society to determine its overall democratic health. Analysis must be made of the distribution of power/freedom within that society. Felix Oppenheim's discussion of the relationship between political power and equality leads him to conclude: "In a democratic society, each citizen has less total freedom and power than a dictator, but more than his subjects. . . . Democracy implies, not total freedom, but equal freedom."[1]

If, as Mumford notes, the tendency within societies has been for governments to become more efficient through hierarchic centralization— we may then ask what it was that helped the Greeks decentralize their government. When one's mind flashes back to ancient Egypt one pictures the pyramids—tombs. When one thinks not only of the Parthenon, but also of the ampitheaters and public gatherings in town squares one is now thinking of classical Greece.

The historical nucleus of many of the older cities was their acropolis, a hill stronghold which functioned much as a medieval castle did later in Europe. The town below an acropolis was where the people congregated. In its center was the agora, an area which was both the market-place and a place where

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[1]Oppenheim, 1961, p. 206.

citizens would "hang out" and conduct their political, commercial and social business.[1]

An interesting sidelight on the planning of these first cities was their lack of planning. Athens' street pattern was chaotic, as were the streets of other ancient towns. Along came a famous town-planner, Hippodamus: His idea was to neaten this mess with a grid pattern of streets (shades of Manhattan!). By the fourth century, Wycherley notes, careful planning was recognized as an asset to a city. Later, in Hellenistic and Roman times, long colonnaded streets and fine vistas were featured. Thus, we see in time an inverse correlation between democratic spirit and neat city planning. This example illustrate Professor Parkinson's observation:

> During a period of exciting discovery or progress there is no time to plan the perfect headquarters [or city]. The time for that comes later, when all the important work has been done. Perfection, we know, is finality; and finality is death.[2]

The agora of Athens was central to her political life. Magistrates multiplied in the great city, most of them setting up quarters in the agora. Politics and law courts were closely linked; the great democratic court, the Heliaea, was seated in the agora. All of this activity coexisted with merchants of food,

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[1]The best source on town-planning is Wycherley, 1969.

[2]Parkinson, 1957, p. 61.

of books, of slaves, of anything. Bankers had their section of the agora. Religious shrines and altars were erected within the agora.[1]

The old Aristocratic Council was bypassed. The Assembly of citizens became the sovereign voice. The people's decree was final and there was no appeal. But this system which worked so well internally could hardly be adapted to imperial rule. Citizen legislators of Athens could not benefit from Space Age communications technology. Thus, their powerful decisions were prone to error to the degree that they were denied critical information inputs and were influenced by sophistic orators. When Athens peaked in her culture and international prestige she was strongly dominated by one man, Pericles. When she was defeated by the Spartans and their allies Pericles was no longer alive, having perished during a plague.

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One of the sustaining inputs of the Athenian state was slavery. The exact number of slaves in Athens during the classical period is estimated to have been from 60,000 to 80,000--about the same proportion of the total population as prevailed in the American South before the Civil War.[2] Slaves

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[1]Wycherley, 1969, pp. 55-92, espec. pp. 70-71.
[2]Finley, 1964, p. 54.

were of two fortunes: the slaves who tutored and assisted domestic needs, and those mortals who worked on mass-production in industry and in mines.

Treatment of slaves in Athens was generally better than the usual ancient world's pattern. Sparta was even harsher, and Sparta had to pay the price of maintaining an ever-alert military to put down revolts. Athens was a sea power and did not wish to worry so much about her slaves. Slaves in Athens could not be struck without good cause. Some slaves could plan for eventual freedom. The racial question was not as severe in Greece as it was (and is) in America. Even the local police force was staffed by slaves. Nevertheless, a slave was not a citizen and could not become a part of the body politic. A slave was just a human machine, a source of labor power which provided citizens with the economic surpluses necessary for enough leisure time to cultivate political science.[1]

Aristotle justified the enslavement of foreigners--though not Greeks, as had sometimes been done even in the fifth century-- on the grounds that, ". . . among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and

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[1]See Robinson, 1955, pp. 124-134.

female."[1] He furthermore justified the existence of non-freedom within a free state on the grounds that, ". . . the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule . . . . The rule of a household is a monarchy, . . . whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals."[2]

Aristotle's logic was conveniently self-serving. He and all the rest of the Greek philosophers (and even later Saint Paul) never took the time to ask if slavish men would remain slavish under conditions of freedom. The existence of prosperous ex-slaves in their midst did not itself spark discussion of this essential question: Repression of this reality points to the central significance slavery had for the state's economy.

Engels observes that the mass of free citizens was impoverished by slaves in their midst; competing with slave labor promised little more than pauperization. Therefore, even though many thousands of Athenians were politically free, all of Athens' freedom was stained by the presence of slave labor. "It was not democracy that caused the downfall of Athens," Engels concludes,". . . but slavery, which brought the labor of the free citizen into contempt."[3]

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[1] Politics, Book I, in Aristotle, 1943, p. 248.
[2] Ibid, p. 257.
[3] Engels, 1972, p. 118.

CHAPTER XIV:

FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY-- AMERICAN ORIGINS

> My pride is that I know no statesman in the world who with greater right than I can say that he is the representative of his people.
>
> --Adolf Hitler[1]

> The sheep are happier of themselves, than under care of the wolves.
>
> --Thomas Jefferson[2]

Inside recorded history moments of true political freedom for the little man are indeed rare. The norm has been manipulation and intimidation. We have already examined Athens and the polis. There have been other states since then which afforded sanctuary for individuality. Geography was a protector of local autonomy for the Greeks. Italy's mountains likewise encouraged city-states. The ancient Romans for a period combined machine-like politics and military might to unite their empire--but as soon as Roman power faded the other Italian cities once again found autonomy. Renaissance Italy is noted for its city-states of Venice, Florence and so on. The Hanseatic League in northern Europe, the Dutch of the seventeenth century, the German

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[1] Quoted in Birch, 1971, p. 114.

[2] From his Notes on Virginia, 1787 ed., quoted in Padover, ed., 1939, p. 161.

cities and towns of J. S. Bach's time--all are examples of local autonomy and great cultural or commercial vitality.

Our American experience spans all or part of six centuries. Renaissance Europe furnished the creative energy which sent Columbus looking for a new world. The land he found was quite unlike his own, but it did not take long for energetic Europeans to graft their cultures onto America. Both traditions of local autonomy and monarchic authority were tried out in the new world. Some of these efforts took root; but mostly the American soil encouraged growth of hybrid political structures. Both new land and old intellectual baggage went into this hybrid.

One of the central experiences which Europe carried to America was that of the Swiss people. Europe had experienced occasional medieval democracy for the aristocracy.[1] Guilds in cities also had some degree of local autonomy as corporate bodies. The first parliament took place in the Spanish kingdom of Leon in 1188. England's Magna Carta of 1215 is a milestone on the road to representative government. But here were aristocratic voices being heard, not that of the little man as individual citizen. The decline of feudalism was

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[1]See Birch, 1971, pp. 25-30.

followed by an age of absolutism, where kings usurped powers which had been distributed by medieval custom. Again, the little man was left outside looking in.

While people of the plains were swept up into one autocratic storm or another, the Swiss were living the reality of local autonomy. The poet Schiller exclaimed: "In the mountains: freedom!" If longevity of autonomy is an index of freedom, the Swiss rate high: They date their national democracy from the Treaty of Everlasting Alliance in 1291. This Treaty pledged each community to come to the aid of any threatened member community; arbitration was to be used in settling all differences among member communities.[1]

Switzerland is the only modern country to combine direct democracy with an advanced society. They do have several levels of representative institutions; but the core of authority lies within each canton, not in the national government. The spirit of direct democracy still survives in several of the cantons, one of which is Appenzell. On the last Sunday of each April all male Appenzellers over twenty gather around an ancient tree. They here decide laws for the next year, appointing an

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[1]Codding, 1961, p. 21.

executive council to administer their laws.[1]

Appenzell has represented since 1408 a high point of medieval democracy. After a liberating peasant revolt these people decided to fit their simple society and low population to a form of government uncomplicated with social overtones. Their pattern of democracy, as Woodcock well observes, is far from perfectly adaptable to other communities: The people gather only once a year; initiative usually rests with the council; the voting majority always wins out, even if it is a majority of just one more than the minority; women have no franchise. Despite all these limitations, the government is in fact in the people's hands. The idea of a Watergate in Appenzell is as alien as the idea of a screen door in a submarine.

Swiss democracy is the most democratic modern state system. Whereas in America the initiative and the referendum are too often forms without substance--the Swiss are able to initiate changes in their constitution, and to force federal authorities to submit legislation and treaties for voter approval.[2]

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[1]See George Woodcock, "Democracy, Heretical and Radical," in Benello and Roussopoulos, eds., pp. 12-14.

[2]Codding, 1961, p. 55.

However at the same time grass roots democracy is under economic stress. Poorer communes are hardly able to find revenues for roads, schools, relief funds, and protection from avalanches and erosion. The effective end of pastoral agriculture has driven many young people to the cities, weakening future village electorates. Furthermore, local economic autonomy is threatened by an interdependent, technological world. Even the question of giving women the vote is a threat to town meeting democracy: a doubling of the electorate threatens to make it physically impossible for everybody to gather as the Appenzellers do.[1]

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The life style of the mountain Swiss has been not too different from that of those early Americans. A central part of life style is political reality. One of the freshest aspects of the New World was the many opportunities afforded each immigrant to experience his own renaissance. This rebirth went forward inside civil society, which was also political society. If the old world's village commune tradition was that of serfdom--the vastness of the new world (i.e., the low density ratio of people to arable land) gave each man the

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[1]See Barber, 1971.

option of settling or moving on. One is here reminded of Carneiro's "circumscription theory."

In New England, society was at first entropic for lack of tradition, so town communities acted to keep civilized their New-Englanders. Townships took on governmental functions, while counties sank into insignificance. This shift in influence is in contrast to the seventeenth century pattern in England.[1] In the South, Virginia's culture became plantation-oriented, as settlements were loosely spread along tidal waters: New England was crowded by hills pushing to the sea. In both areas the omnipresent reality of unclaimed virgin land kept governments friendly to the little man, for fear of losing him and his much needed labor to the virgin wilderness.

As late as 1710, almost one hundred years after Plymouth, there were barely sixty thousand people in Massachusetts, less than a hundred adult males in the average town. Even Boston had just fifteen thousand people in 1765, on the eve of the Revolution.[2] Tied in closely with the civil community was the religious community. One was born into the Roman church; but one was not automatically a member of those laymen's churches. Each man would be admitted by vote of his fellow members, and stay a member not until death, but only as long as his

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[1] Eggleston, 1959, pp. 278-284.

[2] Zuckerman, 1972, p. 47.

"carriage" was acceptable.[1]

The story of the meetinghouse is the story of early America's democracy. In the beginning, liberty was tied in with the rights of man inside a free society. No particular sacredness was attached to the building: on Sunday there would be preaching, and on Monday there might be a convocation discussing fence repairs, bounty for crows, or anything else relevant to community life. Each meetinghouse could only be made so large and the first New-Englanders expected no problems with population expansion. Each village was planned to accommodate a limited population: Once available lots were taken it was expected that a new settlement would be started for newcomers. Only the Spanish areas' pueblo rivaled the New England town for its concern with regional planning.[2]

In practice many villages soon grew beyond their first expectations, as farm lots were divided into home lots. Every ship seemed to bring new settlers; every pew space was needed, and more. Thus when a new meetinghouse was needed the question, "where to set," was raised with much gusto. Just as the agora was central to the spirit of the polis, so too the meetinghouse symbolized their community; and the question of where to locate it became critical.

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[1] Winslow, 1972, p. 34.

[2] Reps, 1969, p. 154.

Ola Winslow observes: "The willingness of townsmen to be called out as many as forty or fifty times to vote, debate, annul, and start all over again is evidence of how much it mattered."[1]

The role of the tavern is important to the story of early democracy. Unlike official gathering places the tavern was unstructured socially. The taverner himself was well known, offered legal liquor, was sometimes a creditor. Zuckerman observes that the tavern was the mediating mechanism for the entire political system, keeping campaigning at a minimum.[2] Because the tavern was open to all, and to all classes, it tended to strip the church of many of its traditional socializing functions. Political and social clubs were organized at taverns. In some towns, New York for example, most significant town life centered around high quality public houses.[3] Williamsburg's Raleigh Tavern played a key role in the Revolutionary War.

Williamsburg had more going for it than just taverns. Unlike the chaotic northern towns, Williamsburg was designed with baroque eloquence.

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[1]Winslow, 1972, p. 129; also see her pp. 118-170.

[2]Zuckerman, 1972, p. 175.

[3]Bridenbaugh, 1964, p. 426.

Using axial planning--formal, yet never pompous--the city was designed for a population of about two thousand. Unlike conventional two-dimensional planning, Williamsburg featured three-dimensional planning with principal buildings designed at the same time as its ground plan.[1]

Most other towns, with the brilliant exception of Savannah, Georgia (with its residential squares) were not designed with community in mind, rather with concern for squeezing the maximum number of building lots onto a given tract. John Reps suggests Williamsburg's approach to total design, not necessarily its architectural style, is its great lesson for urban planners.[2] Unlike the dreary grid-pattern of many large metropolises (which tends to separate people into blocks, but not into communities), a people-pattern was the hallmark of these atypical urban designs. Williamsburg's scale was human sized, so that one could easily walk to a neighbor's house or local business.

Not only design for living, but also limited population was critical for the spirit of democracy. In 1680 there were only four cities in England with more than ten thousand people. Williamsburg was meant for just two thousand. It is not surprising that

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[1]Reps, 1969, p. 143.
[2]Ibid, p. 426.

John Winthrop of Boston was led to record, "as people increased, so sin abounded."[1] Along with localized population booms came a more complex society, unlike the early equality of the first Americans. According to Bridenbaugh,

> with the accumulation of wealth and economic power in the hands of a few, and the coming in of numbers of artisans, indentured servants and immigrant laborers, class lines tightened and society crystallized into easily recognizable categories of better, middling, and poorer sorts.[2]

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Whereas European nations were built up through a complex and prolonged merging of stocks, the Americans established their culture by a process similar to that of the ancient Greeks founding their Greek colonies. Communities sprang up by design. Everywhere people thought themselves participants in a drama of discovery. Not only were they discovering the fruits of their land--they were discovering what they themselves could become when freed from the crusty fetters of European tradition.

In Europe thinkers could only imagine what things would be like in their countries if political society were given a fresh start. But three hundred years of colonial experimentation furnished instead their laboratory. A proper study of the interplay

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[1] Bridenbaugh, 1964, p. 69.
[2] Ibid, p. 478.

of theory and practice during this period is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, we should note such examples of popular sovereignty as the "Fundamental Orders of Connecticut"--which granted sovereignty to a general assembly of citizens, annual election of officers, as well as no property or religious requirements for office.[1] These examples of men of European stock rationally governing themselves without the "help" of a monarch were not lost on the motherland.

One of the major influences on America at this time was that of the writer, Harrington, who penned Oceana in 1656.[2] This treatise was built on the principles of a written constitution (we note that Britain's constitution was not in writing), wide use of elections, and separation of powers. He furthermore urged short terms of office, popular approval of constitutional change (shades of Switzerland), ballots and petitions, and safeguards for religious and popular education. When, for example, in 1669 the new colony of Carolina was given a constitution its substance was essentially Harringtonian.

When we observe a change in quantity we should be alert to possible qualitative changes. When

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[1]The best source is Gooch, 1959.

[2]Gooch, 1959, pp. 305-306; see too Bailyn, 1967, p. 75.

America was in its infancy low density of population made direct democracy the logical and natural form of political communication. However, with increase in numbers and with extension of peoples over vast areas--establishment theory was forced to adjust itself to the new realities. The old school of direct democracy (assuming the role of critic of massive states) was represented by Montesquieu and Jean Jacques Rousseau; while the newer theory of representative democracy was developed in America by James Madison.

Both traditions of city-state democracy and nation-state democracy have as common elements criteria of citizen effectiveness and system capacity. According to Dahl and Tufte the classical tradition differs most sharply from the nationalist perspective on these two dimensions.[1] Classical thinkers insisted on citizens having a direct say in policy decisions; this necessitated a built-in limit on the size of each body politic, considering the primitive state of communications technology before today's world. For example, Plato in his Laws put the optimal number at 5,040 heads of family. Classical thought insisted

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[1] Dahl and Tufte, 1973, pp. 20-25. [This is by far the best, balanced survey of the relationship of size to democracy.]

on complete sovereignty for popular decision makers. In contrast, nation-state theory grants autonomy only at the national level, not on the sub-unit level: Since large size in itself excludes the possibility of each citizen influencing policy sovereignty must be delegated to representatives.

A strong influence on Rousseau was John Locke's theory of government by consent. Whereas Hobbes had even earlier imagined a single social compact of individuals giving up their powers to an overreaching government, Locke conceived a two-step process of men agreeing to form a majoritarian society and their government executing their laws.[1]

More important than explicit consent in a large society is tacit consent. For Locke this is a saving hypothesis, introduced to meet the reality that men do not in fact give their express consent to their government.[2] Locke was interested in establishing governments of free choice. He was very relevant to the new communities of the new world. But once any government anywhere is established those who follow must accept the historicity of its structure, or change it. Short of internal decadence, change is more difficult than establishing a new order from

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[1] Birch, 1971, p. 33.

[2] See Partridge, 1971, pp. 9-27.

fresh materials.

Partridge finds "tacit consent" to be a severe weakness in Locke's theory: Consent is useless by itself as a specification of the special character of democracy; it does not necessarily exclude tyranny and authoritarianism.[1] Rousseau's concern was with this problem.[2] Writing from inside an authoritarian, autocratic France, with the memory of his tarnished citizenship in Geneva, Switzerland, Rousseau was obsessed with the contradictions between actuality and possibility. Mere consent was not enough for Rousseau's logic. He distinguished between true law and actual law. The former eminated from the general will; the latter from the will of all. The former was normative, the latter empirical. Government would be best when the empirical approached the normative. Above all, there is no metaphysical appeal to natural or divine law in Rousseau.

His political values are institution oriented, which leaves the door open to potential abuses by those institutions in fact. Rousseau in his vagueness thus joins Locke in failing to get a handle on a standard for Justice which would insure its application even during all sorts of stressful periods. For indeed who is to control the controller

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[1] Ibid, p. 23.
[2] Rousseau, 1968.

populace when their idea of general will is not congruent with the real general will?[1] The philosopher, Herbert Read, in our era has observed Rousseau's dilemma. Read feels the only real politics are local politics. He further states:

> do not let us confuse universal franchise, which is a system of election, with democracy, which is a principle of social organisation. Universal franchise is no more essential to democracy than divine right is to monarchy. It is a myth: a quite illusory delegation of power. Justice, equality, and freedom--these are the true principles of democracy, and it is possible . . . that the universal franchise can in no sense guarantee these principles, and may, indeed, impose a fiction of consent where in effect no liberty of choice exists.[2]

Closer to Rousseau in time was Immanuel Kant. Sometimes known as the philosopher of the French Revolution, Kant saw the social contract as a practical Idea of reason.[3] "Idea" for Kant is a regulative principle of Reason whereby experience is given order and unity. The general will is the will of reason. Reiss adds:

> It is not the united will of all, . . . nor is it the will of the majority. . . . [Kant] transfers the conception of the general will, which might be embodied in the government, to an Idea of reason which entitles the government to exercise the power of political action, to coerce others according to universal law.[4]

It is in this light that Kant declares: "If politics were to say: '<u>Be ye therefore wise as serpents</u>',

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[1] Cf. Wolff, 1970, pp. 48-58.

[2] Read, 1971, p. 105.

[3] Hans Reiss' "Introduction" to Kant, in Reiss, ed., 1970, p. 28; also see Rawls, 1971, p. 256.

[4] Ibid.

morality might add, by way of qualification: '*and harmless as doves*'."[1]

Rousseau's analysis of size as it affects government is vital for our understanding of Madison and the American experience.[2] Rousseau thought that a state can be too small or too large, within its area. Even while he was infected with mercantilist love for a growing population, he also understood what a large population would mean for real democracy. "The more the social bond is stretched," Rousseau declared, "the slacker it becomes; and in general a small state is relatively stronger for its size than a large one."[3] In large states, ". . . the people has less feeling for governors whom it never sees, for a homeland that seems as vast as the world, and for fellow-citizens who are mostly strangers."[4]

Rousseau's clearest statement on the subject is found in the following:

> Suppose the state is made up of ten thousand citizens. The sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body, but every member as a subject has to be considered as an individual. Thus the sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand is to one, that is to say, each single member of the state has for his own share only a ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he submits himself entirely

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[1] From Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in Ibid, p. 116.

[2] See the commentary in Chamberlain, 1972, pp. 112-143, espec. pp. 112-116.

[3] Rousseau, 1968, p. 90.

[4] Ibid, p. 91.

> to it. Now if the people is increased to a hundred thousand men, the position of the subject is unaltered, for each bears equally with the rest the whole empire of the laws, while as sovereign his share of the suffrage is reduced to one hundred-thousandth, so that he has ten times less influence in the formulation of the laws. Hence, as the subject remains always one single individual, the ratio of sovereign to subject increases according to the number of citizens. Whence it follows that the more the state is enlarged, the more freedom is diminished.[1]

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The only type of government where each subject of that government is not forced to follow others' wills at one time or another is "unanimous direct democracy." But such a purist solution to the problem of coercion can only work on a small scale where there is a high degree of agreement among all members before each vote. All other types of government allow political society to force individuals to obey somebody else's will.

Rousseau's (and Hobbes') ideal of each individual giving his all to the state solves the problem of legitimate opposition to a state; but it does not solve the problem of individual freedom. For them the only freedom is social freedom; individual freedom is too anarchistic. Marx and Engels would agree.

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[1]Rousseau, 1968, pp. 103-104.

However, there is another way to restructure society whereby strict limits to behavior would still be in force--but those limits would not crowd in on individual options. This ideal combination of order embracing disorder is what American political scientists have searched for. In our early decades America was naively such a "loose" society with invisible controls often imposed by nature on the pioneer. Since that day, until today, centralized technology and population density have tightened the circle of control faster than the individual has expanded his personal sphere of options.[1]

One index to this process has been the decline in influence of local politics and even of state politics. Those very institutions which were designed to countervail the federal monolith have themselves become vitiated. Within the federal monolith itself the Executive has aggregated power to itself, following the megamachine's logos.

On the eve of the American Revolution our society was half-way from its primitive beginnings toward its technological future. Some of the past had been overthrown; but only hints of the new order were available for inspection by the founding fathers.

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[1] On land distribution and freedoms see P. Brown and Corfman, 1971, pp. 96-120.

What they did have of universal value were humanitarian principles applicable to any era. The year 1787 marks the first time a national group of men sat down to devise a new government. They built on some solid tradition: Colonial society had wide suffrage and practical experience in self-government; property and political power were not yet polarized among classes, so options were still open for democratic participation. Most important, the revolution sprang from resentment against abridged personal and community rights by imperial order.[1]

Colonial America's tradition of representation was a partial re-creation of English medieval government. England's older system was superseded during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by a nationalistic, "modern" Parliament. Formerly restrictions were placed on members of the commons to make them attorneys of their constituencies. According to Bailyn,

> . . . local communities bound their representatives to local interests in every way possible: by requiring local residency or the ownership of local property . . ., by closely controlling the payment of wages . . ., by instructing representatives minutely . . ., and by making them strictly accountable . . . .[2]

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[1] Good discussions are in Brock, 1970; Main, 1965; and Bailyn, 1967.

[2] Bailyn, 1967, pp. 162-163.

In America isolated settlements and discrete local interests had reversed recent European parliamentary experience. It was only when the colonies were ready to link up in a union that representation, not genuine democracy, was turned to for the systemic requirements of coordinating a continental body politic.

Ambivalence between two desires characterized the first half century of the new nation: On the one hand, the founding fathers feared despotic rulers and huge populations; on the other hand, mercantilist and laissez-faire spirits propelled our country toward "Manifest Destiny" and all the atrocities associated with genocide and slavery. In the time of the establishment of our Constitution little was known about systemic abuses which would become associated with taking over an entire continent. More was then known about governing men than about government of the land.

Modern readers with their instant, but passive, access to Washington, D. C. via television could overlook the relatively isolated status of colonial settlements. Along the dimension of speed of access to the powerful (not mentioning for now one's degree of effectiveness, if any, upon reaching the powerful), it can be shown that the state governments used to be as remote from their citizens as the federal government is from us all today. The prospect of a still

more remote national government threatened to make government itself an exercise in de facto monarchy. For this reason alone it would have been imperative for states to federate--but not surrender all their prerogatives--in joining together. No American, except for a few monarchists, desired an empire with total centralized control.

The Articles of Confederation were put into effect in 1781; but by 1785 people were ready to junk this unworkable structure for a more powerful central government.[1] Without any power to levy taxes, to regulate trade, to coerce recalcitrant states--the central government had been a body without arms and legs. Furthermore, as Brock comments, the Articles were not really a triumph of democracy over centralizing authority: there was no direct representation, and no majority principle of decision because the states' dominant groups controlled their delegations.

The founding of a centralized Constitution in 1787 began the autonomous accretion of power toward the now efficient national power center. If the colonial period was a centrifugal experience for London, the national period would be a centripetal experience for Washington. Independence from London would increasingly mean independence for Washington--but dependence for the rest of the country. The

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[1]See Brock, 1970, pp. 42-45; also, Rutland, 1962, pp. 84-85.

power to tax is the power to destroy--and the central government was given this power. Even though the states had intended to give birth to a federal government, its character has since grown from federal to national. This development would have been a pleasant surprise to Alexander Hamilton, but not to Jefferson.

Jefferson, as all the other founding fathers, feared "mobocracy," and this appeared to be a distinct probability for a young land full of illiterate immigrants and slaves ripe for agitation. Nevertheless, Jefferson felt the small man, if he owned land, would be the securest repository for democracy. He along with George Wythe and Madison worked to sweep primogeniture from state statute books, and to separate the state from theocratic controls. The one thing Jefferson feared most was that America would become riddled with castes and artificial distinctions just as Europe had been, where every man was "either hammer or anvil."[1]

Even Jefferson, whom I consider a semi-anarchist, believed correct Destutt de Tracy's criticisms of Montesquieu's argument for direct democracy, believing large-scale representative

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[1]Charles, 1961, p. 75, also pp. 74-90.

government could make obsolete the classical tradition.[1] Later he would even modify his lust for a nation of yeoman farmers. By 1816 he could say: "We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist. Shall we make our own comforts, or go without them, at the will of a foreign nation?"[2]

Madison's status as master-builder of the Constitution makes him a formidable figure in political science. He was most concerned with framing the Constitution around ideals of justice. Justice for him concerned distributing rights to persons unequal in fact, but equal before the law.[3] The institutional framework surrounding that core of justice was also critical to the spirit of Madisonian democracy. Robert Dahl characterizes this as, ". . . an effort to bring off a compromise between the power of majorities and the power of minorities, between the political equality of all adult citizens on the one side, and the desire to limit their sovereignty on the other."[4]

Madison was virtually alone in welcoming factions in national government.[5] He realistically

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[1] Dahl and Tufte, 1973, p. 9.

[2] In Donovan, ed., 1963, p. 257.

[3] See Koch, 1966, pp. 53-99; see too, for example, Federalist, No. 51.

[4] Dahl, 1956, p. 4.

[5] See Birch, 1971, pp. 78-84.

saw representatives inclining to promote either sectional interests or their own interests. Frequent elections would enable the populace to monitor their behavior. To further weaken dominance by any one faction he advocated separation of constitutional powers--and the establishment of a truly national-oriented central government.

Just as Marx thought he had turned Hegel on his head, so too Madison thought he had turned Rousseau on his head. Whereas Rousseau had praised homogeneity, Madison praised heterogeneity. Most important: whereas Rousseau had rhapsodized over the advantages of small states for democracy, Madison surveyed America's large increase in population and concluded that a large, centralized government could more than meet the systems challenge.

In his famous Federalist No 10, Madison put forward his viewpoint:

> The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common

> motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.[1]

Parallel to his conception of sufficiently large size nullifying factions is his concern with keeping size within reasonable bounds. Fearing too much of a good thing, Madison decreed in the Federalist No. 14 that, ". . . the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration [sic] of public affairs."[2] Whether from rhetoric to sell the proposed Constitution, or from ignorance of the effects of a Malthusian growth rate, Madison was not too concerned with America exceeding those representative boundaries any time soon.

We have learned, however, that a change in size often effects a change in qualitative relationships. So it was that even while easier transportation allowed national representatives to physically meet--they could not literally administer public affairs. Their powers had to be delegated to officials not responsible to the electorate. This syndrome has become more acute in our bureaucratic century.

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[1] Fairfield, ed., 1966, p. 22.
[2] Ibid, p. 25.

Madison and Hamilton had looked to Britain for their ratio of representatives to population: There it was one to 28,670, and here it was at first set at one to 30,000. In 1910 the size of the House of Representatives was fixed at 435 members: Even though adding more congressmen helped bring each congressman numerically closer to his constituents, it also tended to increasingly trivialize each congressman who was not blessed with committee seniority.

According to the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future the 1910 congressman represented 211,000 citizens, the 1970 congressman represented 470,000 citizens, and the 2000 congressman ". . . will represent 623,000 persons under the 2-child growth rate, or 741,000 persons in the 3-child case."[1] These statistics are astonishing when juxtaposed to the 1800 census which counted only four and a half million free whites, or less than one million able-bodied males.[2] That million put into today's Congress would cough up just two congressmen for the entire nation--a Siamese-headed monarch!

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It was left for an "outsider," Alexis de Tocqueville, to most clearly see in Andrew Jackson's

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[1]Commission, 1972, p. 83.

[2]See Adams, 1955, p. 1.

era how early America was changing into Nixon-America.[1] He declared: ". . . local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty."[2] In just a half century after the new central government took over Toqueville could observe: ". . . in the United States the centralization of the Government is complete . . . ."[3]

Madison and Hamilton had had an ace debating point in the simple fact that the new government had never been tried. But Tocqueville could see where Madison's democracy was heading:

> All the passions which are most fatal to republican institutions spread with an increasing territory, whilst the virtues which maintain their dignity do not augment in the same proportion. . . .devotion to the common weal, which is the surest check on destructive passions, is not stronger in a large state than in a small republic.[4]

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[1]Cf. Schlesinger, 1945; and Bugg, ed., 1962.

[2]Tocqueville, n. d., Vol. 1, p. 45.

[3]Ibid, p. 72.

[4]Ibid, p. 146; see the footnote on p. 312 of Ibid, Vol. 2.

CHAPTER XV:

MACRO-POLITICS IN A MICRO-METROPOLIS--A CASE STUDY

> Men by their constitution are naturally divided into two parties. Those who fear and distrust the people. . . . Those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest & safe . . . depository of the public interest.[1]
>
> --Thomas Jefferson (to H. Lee, 1824)

This chapter differs from all the others in this book. It documents in outline form a specific struggle over school consolidation which occurred in Roanoke, Virginia during 1973. Some readers might at first fail to see why a localized struggle has been included in a book whose scope sweeps across the earth. It is a truism that to fully know anything one must know everything, that to know all things one must fully know one thing. Therefore, we shall use this example of politics to illustrate the structure of consciousness in our fair land.

An incorrect reading of previous chapters might lead the reader to think I believe a simple reduction of population would suffice to restore the spirit of democracy in America. Whereas such a

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[1]Quoted in Padover, 1939, p. 150.

reduction is indeed welcome, it alone is not sufficient. We must look at those invisible ropes which restrain individuals from exercising their potential freedoms. Some of these ropes are easily seen--as, group pressures on opinions. Others are less clearly visible--as, the Zeitgeist of a culture. Sometimes a massive presence is less visible than a removed presence. To illustrate: If one steps to within an inch of a large blank wall one cannot even recognize what he sees as a wall!

So it is with long established social viewpoints. Everyday consciousness is not ordinarily subject to objective analysis; we are too close to it. Most of the time this is fine. However, when the people's critical consciousness is weakened through lack of exercise power brokers can usurp the people's sovereignty, to achieve their private wills. It will be the primary objective of this and the next chapter to expose this syndrome, and to suggest ways we can reintroduce that critical consciousness--which is the hallmark both of philosophy and of real democracy--into this technetronic age.

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In March, 1973 the Superintendent of the Roanoke City Public Schools released a "green book" entitled Proposal for Raising the Quality of Education.

This booklet is a Machiavellian masterpiece. His idea was to cut in half the number of high schools (from four to two) in this city of 100,000; only a four-hundred student addition to one of the two remaining schools would be added. His rationale for this action was twofold: there was a decline in total enrollment, and this consolidation would allegedly save the taxpayers $600,000 annually in operating costs.

Over the next five months a struggle was waged between the patrons of one of the two schools marked for extinction and the Administration. The other high school's patrons put their entire faith in a three year-old federal court order which had directed that school open and integrated, rather than closed to keep it from being integrated with white students. It turned out in the fall of 1973 that the old court order was worthless in the hands of another judge. With both groups of patrons initially divided over strategy, the monolithic Administration could use its vast information and personnel powers (and residual prestige) to wear down the consciences of the City Council and the electorate.

My role inside the struggle was that of a participant-observer. I sided with the patrons, and aided them with ideas and two speaking appearances.

But my aid stopped with this: To have taken over the struggle would have prejudiced the outcome, making the whole event sociologically meaningless. I was just as interested in discovering how ordinary citizens would fare against the monolithic bureaucracy as I was in keeping my old high school open.

A total analysis of this episode would itself fill an entire book. For brevity, we shall focus on the dynamics of group size to education and training for citizenship. Second, we shall analyze the "hows" and "whys" of what went on.

In the nineteenth century a John Stuart Mill could be produced with just one tutor. Socrates never had a high school diploma. But today the ideological accent is on quantity of experience; and size is a direct function of quantity. "Bigger is better." It is believed that youth must be adapted to the large world: Never does conventional wisdom (stepchild of the megamachine) require the large world to adapt itself to small people. When all that is measured of "progress" are variables subject to quantification the elusive human psyche has no spokesman.

The word, education, comes from Latin ēducāre, which means to "bring out" or develop a

latent condition. The bureaucracy of education does not "bring out"; rather it literally impresses itself on the consciousness of youth. Each student[1] is reduced to the infantilized status of pupil[2].

The megamachine's mentality conceives of its ideal school as a factory which processes bodies to fit bureaucratic slots: "Citizenship training" is a sly metaphor for passive acceptance of other people's leadership. In ideological contrast, patrons opposing the Superintendent saw their school[3] as a community experience, not as a factory for pupils. They realized that education does not end upon graduation, but begins with receipt of one's diploma. Likewise, democracy is an active animal; as Herbert Read noted, voting by itself is not equivalent to democracy. All of this flies in the face of the bureaucrat's means of measuring meaning.

Central to the measure of meaning is the area of problem definition. That agency which defines boundaries, the rule structure, of a problem defines also the structure of power relationships relevant to the problem's solution. A function of bureaucratic organization is to convert all political problems into

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[1] From Latin, studēre, "to be eager."

[2] From Latin, pūpillus, "orphan" or "ward."

[3] From Greek, skhelé, "employment of leisure in disputation."

administrative problems.[1] The modern bureaucracy tends to be dominated by the monocratic, boss-man ideology. Control, predictability, reliability--all are facilitated by defining jobs and opportunities narrowly. Rewards are extrinsic: money, power and status.[2]

Bureaucracies are linear organizations, especially those exhibiting hierarchic one-man rule. Linear organizations think in terms of introverted problems, rather than possibilities. Both input and output channels of these organizations operate linearly.[3] We should expect a larger bureaucracy to minimize effective input by any one of its human subcomponents--except for those at the top of the heap.

The following illustration shows how power and information are in our case joined together in the person of a superintendent who acts as nexus between his bureaucracy and the public:

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[1] Cf. Boguslaw, 1965, pp. 187-196.
[2] See Thompson, 1969, pp. 14-17.
[3] Theobald, 1972, pp. 41-61.



Information is funneled through the Superintendent to his School Board (which in Roanoke is <u>not</u> elected, and has no independent information gathering facility). The School Board, based on a long tradition of subservience to the wishes of each Superintendent rubber-stamps his wishes. The City Council--trying to appear apolitical--takes the political position of itself rubber-stamping the "expertise" of the Board, which is really not the Board's expertise in origin. The City Council is further reluctant to go against people whom they have appointed, fearing reflexive criticism.

In this way representative democracy degenerates to representation of one bureaucrat's views. There is no "Devil's advocate" within the system. The entire process is subject to linear chain of command. Because of that bottleneck in this system's design, the Law of the Minimum applies: only that information which the Superintendent wishes to be conveyed will be conveyed. Why, it may be asked, didn't the press get around the bottleneck? Why didn't the patrons succeed in fully communicating their message? Why didn't the public become more informed? And so forth. The answers cannot be as neat as these questions.

Bert Swanson notes that the gap between specialists and the public is an increasing element of today's world. He suggests certain problems generate decisions which develop an aura of being beyond any layman's comprehension, thus requiring "expert" resolution. He states:

> When and if administrators engage in policy formulation . . ., an undesirable aristocratic or elitist orientation may pervade the political dialogue that follows. Administrators who engage unnecessarily in depoliticization are acting undemocratically, although their motives may be beneficent[1]

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[1]Swanson, 1970, p. 126; see too Chamberlain, 1972, pp. 128-129.

This aura of technical complication, combined with the permanent status of a bureaucracy vis-à-vis temporary, amateur coalitions of opposition leads to the news media seeking details only from the bureaucracy--while it solicits opinions from the opposition. Details are expressed in terms of efficient dollar signs; while opinions are represented as chauvinistic feelings. Details connote facticity, whether or not they are indeed factual. Opinions are supposedly subjective, not reflecting objective reality.

The editorial element of the press is more independent than the reportorial element. Reporters are subject to "turning off the information-spigot" pressures from regular news sources. Thus, it happened that while the Editorial Page of the local monopoly newspaper allowed patrons' letters--the education specialist reporters sought out only the Administration for the "facts."

The public thinks of letters sent to the editor as private opinion. News articles are thought of as fact, as we have noted. Even if these articles are totally factual, they seldom contain all the relevant facts. News articles must focus on the "new"; events are emphasized, not processes. Demands for space from competing articles and ubiquitous

advertisements dictate short, dramatic articles. Brevity opens the door to errors of omission: and these are more difficult to answer than errors of commission--because nothing is said when something should have been said for perspective!

At the time of the American Revolution thousands would study a Tom Paine pamphlet. Today a superficially more literate public gloats over the sports page and the cartoons. Nothing else. John Dewey cogently observed:

> Aside from the fact that the press may distract with trivialities or be an agent of a faction, or be an instrument of inculcating ideas in support of the hidden interest of a group or class (all in the name of public interest), the wide-world present scene is such that individuals are overwhelmed and emotionally confused by publicized reverberation of isolated events. . . . [We] are learning that everything about the public schools, its official agencies of control, organization and administration, the status of teachers, the subjects taught and methods of teaching them, the prevailing modes of discipline, set problems; and that the problems have been largely ignored as far as the relation of schools to democratic institutions is concerned. In fact the attention these things have received from various technical standpoints has been one reason why the central question has been obscured.[1]

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It is of interest to note that if one reads the very title of the "green book" without questioning

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[1]Dewey, 1963, p. 42.

the assumption of "raising" the quality of education, one might as well not read any further. One has already been "had" from the first. The "green book" suggested that a more diversified program would result from consolidation. More courses in more areas would be available. More different extra-curricular activities would vie for the student's attention. The professionally printed, neatly bound tract saw only benefits accruing to the halving of high schools.

Effective propaganda never presents viable alternative solutions to problems. To wit: Never was the alternative of having teachers themselves travel, instead of busing hundreds of students, examined in the "green book." With several high schools, teachers of special subjects could travel to different schools. Many small colleges and most larger colleges routinely rotate their courses to maximize course exposure to each student. This alternative too was not proposed. Only the proposal for pupil packaging was advocated in the "green book."

The question of student alienation was left unexamined. In a school more closely linked to his socio-economic background the marginal student could prosper; in an elitist academic environment he would more likely drop out of school for non-academic reasons. This loss to society would show

up as decreased costs for the school system. Extra costs on the statistical margin will be paid for by other state bureaucracies, as, welfare, police protection and public mental services.

In our example, the proposed saving of several hundred thousand dollars in annual operating costs comes mostly from dropping teachers. A total of thirty-eight high school teacher positions are eliminated under the reorganization--increasing drastically the pupil/teacher ratio. Higher pupil/teacher ratios remove the teacher from those very students most in need of individualized attention.

Justification for halving the number of schools was based on a temporary decline in enrollment. In contrast, the City's Planning Department in its Community Facilities Plan (August, 1972) projected an increase in total school enrollments--beginning just a couple of years after the reorganization was fully carried out. On top of this prospect, the City is on the verge of annexing a portion of its surrounding county: If more students than schools are brought into the municipality, increased pressure will be put on existing high school capacity.

Even more important than absolute size is change in size. This quantity-quality phenomenon has been dealt with throughout the book. It is especially ironic that even during a brief period of declining absolute student population--individual

students are to be subjected to severe population density increments as they are packed into these pupil factories.

How, it might be asked, could all this be overlooked on the road to the decision to destroy half the high schools? This question takes on heightened irony when it is noted that the elite private school in this community (which includes all grades) is less than a third the size of the new high schools.

Perhaps some of the answer can be found in the school size illusion: To an outside observer, a school with many students is impressive; a small school doesn't fit the American self-image. In contrast, an inside participant experiences the exact opposite. Roger Barker and his associates found the following:

> In terms of number of behavior settings, number of varieties of behavior settings, and number of inhabitants per setting . . . small schools differ less from large schools than in terms of number of students and amount of space, which are perceptually salient external attributes of schools.[1]

Their concern is with the student who becomes redundant in a large setting, but who is needed inside a small setting. W. J. Campbell in his chapter, "Some Effects of High School Consoli-

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[1]Barker and Gump, 1964, pp. 62-63.

dation," observes: "There is a temptation in a larger school to concentrate upon extracurricular goals and standards which can be achieved by only the most talented students at the expense of the rest."[1]

Each school fields just one football team, one baseball team, one basketball team, one cheerleader team, has just one student government, and so forth. Unless talents show early (usually helped by aggressive, status conscious parents), under such a "more competitive and challenging [system of] inter-scholastic athletics and extra-curricular activities" ("green book") a marginal student cannot participate. His immediate redundancy is systemically more important than his human worth, or even the possibility that he might be a "late bloomer" if given an opportunity to help out in his social matrix.[2]

Dr. James B. Conant, former president of Harvard University, contributed to the national debate over small and large schools in 1959 when he released his findings in The American High School Today.[3] He recommended consolidating small schools wherever possible. This thesis was widely reported, so much so that his renewed message eight years

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[1]In Ibid., p. 153.

[2]See Arthur W. Chickering, "How Many Make Too Many?," in Benello and Roussopoulos, eds., 1971, pp. 214-227.

[3]Conant, 1959.

later was uncritically received. In The Comprehensive High School Conant put a number on what he considered adequate for an excellent four-year comprehensive high school: 750 students.[1]

This size is the exact enrollment of the third high school. Ironically, this high school only a couple of years previous had had over one thousand students when the City had open enrollment. Too many students had "voted with their feet," making the other schools look comparatively bad. And so pressure was put on the Administration to establish residential boundaries over the City. Lines were drawn so tightly around the uppity third school that the Superintendent could now cite as one of his main reasons for wanting to close this school its too small enrollment!

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The political struggle which followed the Superintendent's announced plans offers us additional insights into power matrices which remove little people from the decision-making processes which largely control their daily lives.

A true Machiavellian is foremost a psychologist with a sense of timing. The only public

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[1]Conant, 1967, p. 2.

mention of this plan before release of the "green book" was at the P.T.A. Central Council meeting immediately preceding publication. According to representatives present at this meeting he told the group that "there's been some talk" about converting the schools, "but we don't know what we're going to do yet." These representatives foolishly gave him a tentative OK to go ahead, not knowing any of the unprecedented details--not knowing what was already at the printers in finalized form.

When the "green book" was released most of the teachers were shocked. But the Superintendent used his potential powers to ruin a career, telling them directly that any teacher who was against the school board he was against. When word of this covert overt threat leaked out the Superintendent went public, saying teachers could speak their minds freely. But the real message was his first; the second was for obfuscation, to fool a naive electorate.

There were many other sophisticated moves by the Superintendent. In discussions with youth leaders he implied that the plan would not go into effect for several years. He stubbornly appealed to students to come to his side because "the parents are set in their ways." He suggested that closing one school would just be a merger of equals. He gave a new and

potentially troublesome school board member the "green book" only an hour before she was asked to vote for money to support his plans. And so forth.

The patrons were not nearly as sophisticated or organized as the Superintendent. Student pickets converged on the Court House on March 30, 1973. On April 10 a petition with 1,200 signatures was presented to an uncomfortable School Board. Letters to the Editor were sent regularly. The Superintendent was queried about his plans.

On April 30 patrons appeared before the City Council and asked for a moratorium on appropriations until their P.T.A. could present in October an in-depth counter report regarding quality education. Council referred the moratorium request to budget study, one councilman explaining that the moratorium would cover (i.e., stop) any "emergency requests" from the School Board.[1] The patrons at that time felt time was on their side; and throughout the summer their counter report was being drawn up for the October deadline.

Just as timing is critical to a successful military blitzkrieg, so too correct timing is critical to a successful bureaucratic coup de grâce. Throughout

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[1] Roanoke Times, 5/1/1973.

the summer patron energy had been at a lower level than during the spring. School had been out and many people were occupied with vacations; but the fall semester was now ready to begin. The specter of renewed high energy must have frightened the Superintendent. The September 4, 1973 meeting of City Council got that request for money to go ahead with the package plan. It passed virtually without patron opposition. Their vote effectively ended the entire struggle. Why did an opposition which had mustered so many vocal bodies, so much energy, give up when the final battle was to be waged?

Cynicism about government is not restricted to mistrust of federal officials. It is the relationship of those in power toward those who are objects of power moves which is the key to attitudes. By ignoring their implied moratorium (which they cleverly did not fully bind themselves to), the City Council telegraphed—before the meeting of September 4 even started—an impression of having a closed mind on this issue.

Schattschneider observes cogently:

> . . . the relative strengths of the contestants are likely to be known in advance. In this case the stronger side may impose its will on the weaker without an overt test of strength because people are apt not to fight if they are sure to lose.[1]

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[1]Schattschneider, 1960, p. 4.

He notes that control of the scope of conflict in politics is a role so important that it calls for a new interpretation of the political system. If people are sure of losing in advance, their repression may assume the guise of a false unanimity.[1]

Such apparent apathy has discrete systemic sources, as we have seen. According to Morris Rosenberg:

> The mass nature of the society, characterized by wide disparities of power, promotes the sense of personal insignificance; the centralization of government fosters a sense of remoteness from the key decision-making processes; the periodic elections produce a discontinuous exercise of power; the system of representation draws power from the citizen and grants it to the representative; and so on. In other words, a political structure established with the aim of implementing democracy may unwittingly establish the conditions for political apathy.[2]

Ivan Illich declares:

> It is precisely for surprise that true education prepares us. . . . This presupposes a place within the society in which each of us is awakened by surprise; a place of encounter in which others surprise me with their liberty and make me aware of my own.[3]

What happens to a people who are crushed between a history of infantilism toward power, and an aggressive power move--is best characterized as mass neurosis. As Frank Barron puts it:

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[1] See too Schweinitz, 1964, p. 22; and Etzioni, 1970.

[2] Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," in Ippolito and Walker, eds., 1972, p. 63.

[3] Illich, 1971, p. 126.

> One of the most poignant aspects of neurotic suffering is the realization by the frustrated individual that "objectively" it is perfectly within his capacities for him to bring about the conditions for which he yearns. He is potentially free—but actually not, because of the structure of the self,[1] and because he himself is his situation.

Molluscan psyches are unequipped to handle the bureaucratic megamachine.

These events of 1973 in the micro-metropolis of Roanoke are not unique. This same story could be reported almost anywhere else in America. Where active understanding and exercise of Justice is generally absent government automatically becomes corrupted. Under systems theory efficacy is prized over all other virtues internal to the system. In politics, efficacy is activated through power vectors. "Might makes right" may get things done—but at a cost dear to the spirit of democracy. If the eighteenth-century experiment in self-government our forefathers set up is to survive—the people, the ultimate sovereign, must be removed from their infantilized relationship to power levers and given more immediate sovereignty.

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[1] Barron, 1968, p. 296.

CHAPTER XVI:

ASPECTS OF EUTOPIC GOVERNMENT

> There is good reason to doubt the capacity of the American governmental system to accommodate a third 100 million citizens in the final decades of the 20th century. There are strong grounds for doubting the ability of the government both to maintain political order and to attain social justice among a citizenry of 300 million.
>
> --Dr. A. E. Keir Nash, consultant to the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future.[1]

No one book can be an encyclopedia for a culture. This book has been written thematically, showing aspects of a culture freed from vicious circles--such as, where many people are produced because many people were produced. A renewed culture can reverse the quantity-quality degeneration mass man has suffered. Numbers need not dictate massness if the way those numbers of people interrelate is authentic, preserving the sphere of personality. We seek a cultured culture. Nothing less can dignify Homo sapiens. Nothing less can embrace the ideals of Justice.

Eutopia is Justice in action. Justice cannot be confined to law books and court rooms.

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[1] Quoted in Commission, 1972, p. 309.

There are essentially two (though interpenetrating) types of laws: rule-laws which administer systems, such as interstate commerce regulations; and criminal laws. A eutopic society will always have "rules of the game" laws; but criminal laws can largely become superseded by the social ethic of mutual trust. Admittedly this ethic is virtually a utopian vision, considering the long-term drift toward mass alienation we have experienced. Nevertheless, it is a goal toward which our systemic reforms should point.

Anarchy of the worst sort is latent in any "might makes right" legal system. Apparent stability can mask suppressed tensions. If laws are based on the "might makes right" ideology--it is "right" for me to stab or shoot my neighbor in his back, if I so choose. True Justice in society is congruent with the moral dimension. All laws are tautologically legal; but not all laws are just and moral. Paul Goodman declared: "The moral question is not whether men are 'good enough' for a type of social organization, but whether the type of organization is useful to develop the potentialities of intelligence, grace, and freedom in men."[1]

I have repeatedly pointed out dangers latent in a "peaceful" population growth. The violence

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[1]Goodman, Paul, 1968, p. 19.

threshold can under affluence be delayed decades after population has far exceeded its optimum. Order achieved at the expense of a creative cultural anarchy does violence to people, just as do bayonets. Because expressed human needs have a historical character, enslaving contentment (which is the hallmark of a wasteful, fuelish society) must give way to a new moral ecology. By their willful participation in this process materialistically seduced masses become their own enslavers.

A distinguishing characteristic of modern industrial technology is the universal use of interchangeable parts. The old tradition of manufacture (lit., "hand-making") was custom production of each item. That process was expensive when compared with machine production; but the stamp of each individual manufacturer was on his product. Today, interchangeable parts have become the modus vivendi of our whole way of life. A mobicentric society picks up and drops friends when necessary. Large capitalists treat workers and consumers as interchangeable parts.

Whereas in the past the individual was central, and the group an abstraction--today the group is central, and the individual functions abstractly. His public personality is reduced to how much money he has in his pocket. Interestingly enough, even

though each private individual has no exchange value--every class of individuals is critical to the interchangers. Whether workers and consumers will continue to exist in an abstracted relationship toward the large controller institutions, or whether they will live in a humanized relationship, depends now on the development of their consciousness of self and group.

Herbert Marcuse suggests that a new standard for our economic conduct presupposes reduction in the future population. He suggests that self-determination will come to mass man only when the masses have been converted into individuals liberated from manipulation and propaganda. He further contends

> that industrial civilization considers legitimate the slaughter of millions of people in war, and the daily sacrifices of all those who have no adequate care and protection, but discivers its moral and religious scruples if it is the question of avoiding the production of more life in a society which is still geared to the planned annihilation of life in the National Interest . . . . These moral scriples are understandable and reasonable because such a society needs an ever-increasing number of customers and supporters; the constantly regenerated excess capacity must be managed.[1]

Big government and big business have grown up together. The very existence of massive corporate monoliths confronting the individual consumer is a threat to real democracy. When giant corporations

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[1]Marcuse, 1966, pp. 243-244; see too his brilliant study of necessary repression and surplus-repression: Marcuse, 1955.

maneuver in the pluralist arena we have elephants dancing among the chickens. Andrew Hacker observes: ". . . corporate institutions are not voluntary associations with individuals as its members but rather associations of assets, and no theory yet propounded has declared that machines are entitled to a voice in the democratic process."[1] He continues his analysis with these incisive remarks:

> The corporation has transformed the small town and has brought the suburb into being. It has ironed out sectional differences and made us into a nation. But national citizenship remains an unworkable concept because the individual requires a smaller group setting if he is to achieve a sense of community. . . . The corporation has certainly not set out to weaken the foundations of democratic politics, but its growth as the characteristic institution of our time is having this consequence.[2]

When a President of the United States can be indirectly bought by a corporation, big government is big business. If the business of government is business — the business of big business is government. This two-headed monster confronts an isolated Joe Citizen and drives him to the wall. Reciprocity is non-existent when effective communication (power) is one-way. After an extensive survey of modern capitalism, Andrew Shonfield, Chairman of the British Social Science Research Council, was compelled to ask:

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[1]Hacker, ed., 1965, p. 7.

[2]Ibid., p. 261.

> The central question is how far an active government wielding great and varied economic power, intervening in the detailed conduct of private business affairs, discriminating between one citizen and another on the basis of subtle and complex judgements of the community's needs ten or twenty years ahead, driving bargains with particular interest groups as administrative convenience dictates, can be subjected to effective democratic control.[1]

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Only where the individual counts—only where there are feedback channels which are <u>immediately</u> effective—will government and big business listen to the hearts of little people, not just hear the cash in their hands.

I would like to introduce a simple illustration to clear up the <u>Left-Right illusion</u>:



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[1]Shonfield, 1969, p. 385.

For far too long political science (both academic and popularized) has labored under a dualistic conception of ideology. Conventional politics has confused historical developments with political types. The Cold War was in part a product of confusion over who and what was "Left" or "Right." The above diagram helps to clear up this confusion, shifting focus away from sterile dualism toward two functional vectors: power and ownership. Because coherent power influences ownership more than its reverse, the horizontal line is thicker than the vertical line within this diagram.

Traditionally, centralized power, and private ownership have both been thought of as "right" concepts. Conversely, decentralized power, and public ownership have been two concepts belonging to the "left." Some may object to my including all state governments having a coherent national power under the "right" umbrella—which means both the United States and the U.S.S.R. qualify. But it should be noted that Marxist theory only allows government to administer more than "things" during the transition from socialism to communism. Indeed, there has never been a true national communist state. Thus, the Union of Soviet Socialist (not Communist) Republics.

Starting with two elements— "L" and "R" — we combine them and end up with four combinations. It is fascinating to observe that three of the four could be called "leftist"; and three of the same four could be called "rightist"! Only the RR and the LL are pure types.

The RR type includes such diverse states as Nazi Germany (position 1), and so forth. Most modern states fall somewhere inside this square. The United States in the modern era should average out at about position 2. The RL type embraces the U.S.S.R. (position 3) and all the other socialist states. Even China (position 4) fits into this category: whereas cadres of neighbors can decide trivial policy issues, the overall direction of that society is centrally controlled from Peking. Both of these types are clearly distinguished from the other two types by their centralized control and alienation from individuals and small groups.

The LR type represents the laissez-faire ideal (position 5). However, even laissez-faire economic theory admits its Achilles heel is the issue of monopoly. For example, John D. Rockefeller used his monopoly power to underprice, then eradicate, competition in the nineteenth century. The United

States' average once was within this LR square, but has since moved above the heavy quantity-quality power line toward centralized economic and political power. The LL type has no national representatives, though it does have small scale representatives such as the communal movement now under way in America.

The LR and the LL have more in common systemically than they do either with the RR or with the RL types. The classical left and the classical right have more in common than they do in opposition, if seen from the power-vector perspective. This explains how a Karl Hess, ex-Goldwater speechwriter, could become a new-leftist.[1] Today's United States has more in common systemically with the Soviet Union than it does with eighteenth century America. The Soviet Union is closer to America than it is to pure communism.

Of course the above analysis is a heuristic simplification of complex reality, not mentioning for example America's Bill of Rights with its potential systemic influences. Nevertheless, the diagram serves

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[1] The early new left was clearly related to classical leftist thought. It was only after the S.D.S. and other significant groups were seduced by Leninist visions of vanguard violence that the new left "aged" and became old leftist. Thus its demise. In contrast, anarchist spirit in the counterculture has remained vital because it has stayed closer to classical American revolutionary themes and has spoken eloquently on alienation and its sources. See on this: Michael Lerner, "Anarchism and the American Counter-Culture." in Apter and Jole, 1972, pp. 43-69; Boguslaw, 1965; Runkle, 1972, espec. pp. 175-308; and Bookchin, 1971.

to make clearer how centralized Washington opposes any realistic call for return to America's democratic heritage. A Solzhenitsyn, or any anarcho-communist, is likewise feared inside the Soviet bloc.

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> The "ideal [state] legislature" is simply the one that best meets the needs of its state--that is, a genuinely democratic decision-making body, reflecting the various views and values of citizenry on the one hand and responding effectively and authoritatively to their needs and problems on the other.[1] In no state does such a legislature exist.

These words are findings of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures at the conclusion of their $200,000.00 study. This group is dedicated to upgrading the fifty state legislatures, thinking them the heart of the governmental system of the United States. I disagree.

States have virtually outlived their usefulness as viable forms of government. This is not to say that they cannot be partially overhauled in ways this Citizens Conference suggests. Questions left unasked by the Conference cover how and why <u>local</u> governments can be overhauled. They correctly note the inability of federal programs to deliver on promises and programs, and the plight of local jurisdictions as they struggle with problems currently

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[1]Burns, 1971, p. 36.

beyond their means of reconciliation. But they incorrectly assume that just because ". . . cities and localities . . . have the problems but almost none of the money or the legal and jurisdictional authority they need to deal with the problems"[1]— these localities should be forced to turn to their states for salvation.[2]

Localities are legal creatures of the states. Not one word is contained in the Constitution of these United States about local governments and their rights. Yet localities are where all the people actually live! Joe Citizen has to go up to the second of three levels of government before he deals with an independently legitimate government. Our legalistic mess reaches sublime irony in the example of New York City: Twice as populous as the entire United States was when the Constitution was approved, New York City is reduced to beggar status when dealing with New York State.

Originally state governments were powerful and effective mediators between local interests and the national interest. Access to the state house was relatively easy. In contrast, today's average state has as many people as the entire nation had

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[1] Ibid., p. 19.

[2] See Kotler, 1969, for philosophical contrast.

in its youth. It takes more than high speed roads and airways to give each citizen meaningful access to his state legislators. State legislatures themselves have aggravated their problems by trivializing their power position vis-à-vis the federal government. Much time is spent getting state laws in line with federal statutes and federal court orders, setting up mandated agencies and programs to administer federally funded programs, and so forth.

When an individual confronts abstract "government" he does not simply face three levels of government. Power is exercised and diffused through one national government, fifty states, over 80,000 local governments (including 3,000 counties, 18,000 municipalities, 17,000 townships, 21,000 school districts, and 21,000 special districts).[1] Edmund Muskie calls this intricate matrix a fourth branch of government, which ". . . has no direct electorate, operates from no set perspective, is under no special control, and moves in no particular direction."[2]

Fortunately for the individual he faces just one vertical set of governments at a time. This is not the case for all governments below the top level.

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[1] Seidman, 1970, p. 139.

[2] Quoted in ibid.

Many problems cross municipal and state lines. The only modern government which can embrace these problems is the federal government. Thus by organizational default the national government's centripetal unity embraces problems which centrifuge beyond local or state competence.

It is true that many types of problems can only be coordinated and controlled at the national level. Examples of this are railroad trackage, interstate highways, network broadcast media, banking systems, and a host of other extensive problems. For that matter, there are many other problems solvable only by a monolithic worldwide government—one with more power and support than the extant U.N. farce. Yet there are also many problems which can best be handled by regional and local governments.

If one were to get into an airplane and fly over America, he would not see any states (except Hawaii); what he would see instead are regional clusters of population. Even strip cities (as, the Boston-to-Washington megalopolis) are more like clusters strung together than evenly distributed population areas. Some movement has occurred toward regional governmental cooperation (as in water

supplies and in urban transportation), but not enough to fill that vacuum of responsibility where jealous local governments fear to tread together. Into this vacuum have blundered state governments and the ubiquitous federal bureaucracy: their modus operandi has been to take blood from the left arm of the taxpayer to give it to his right arm--spilling some in the process. This magic act is the fraud of "revenue sharing."

Reconciliation of differences, and coordination of opportunities, is made more difficult with the ancient state boundaries we now have. When state boundaries were drawn up two hundred years ago vast metropolitan areas were nonexistent. Of the 192 metropolitan areas in this country, twenty-three straddle more than one state. Examples are New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis, Cincinnati, Washington, and other smaller metropolitan centers.[1] State governments are often put into opposition when interest groups oppose each other across state lines.

As population size increases, subunit characteristics become more divergent. Certain types

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[1] L. Day and A. Day, 1965, p. 70.

of problems are pushed upward for coordination and regulation; certain other problems are spun downward to a level where local consideration and application can best effect government's purpose.[1] Stranded in the middle are the state governments: neither totally comprehensive, nor intimate, they cling onto their eighteenth-century prerogatives.

I consider the federal government to be a necessary evil: necessary because of the uncertain current status of world power; and because of the potential for monopoly interests to take over de facto most of our society without a government of national scope countervailing them. The price tag put on all of this centralized "security" profoundly influences all of our society. Power demands intelligence to function; modern intelligence gathering is mostly a one-way function, which puts individual citizens at a serious bargaining disadvantage.

According to Harold Wilensky:

> Other things being equal, the larger the size, the greater is the public impact, the more intense is the problem of internal control, and the more resources are available for the intelligence function. The more specialization, the more interdependent are the specialized parts, the greater the cost of failure of any one part, and, therefore, the more resources devoted by each to keep track of the others, and the more staff at the center to coordinate the whole.[2]

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[1] Chamberlain, 1972, p. 139; see too Hodson, 1972, pp. 160-176.

[2] Wilensky, 1967, pp. 38-39.

Following this logos, we should not be surprised at the occurrence of a Watergate type scandal: Start with a conservative pinch of paranoia; add a cup of "cult of the personality"; sprinkle lightly with tape technology; bake in closed ovens of heated intrigue--and out pops a Watergate.

Large government systems yield corruption sooner or later. Their major problem is with feedback mechanisms which are supposed to force accountability. Much can be done to ameliorate this tendency--as, special prosecutors, a more awake Congress, honest elections, etc. However, all state governments, and federal government control, share that quality of great distance from individual voters. Whereas in the past an individual could make a personalized impact on his congressman, today a congressman says, "My mail is running two to one in favor of . . .". When individuals become statistics they involuntarily suffer the malaise of massness. Massness is madness.

State governments are no better equipped than the federal government to meet this alienation problem. Only local governments are sufficiently intimate to <u>potentially</u> show a human face to their electorates. Large governments today accentuate their aloofness via computer plans which span two or more

administrations. Concerned citizens used to feel that government's capacity to change things was small and potentially subject to revisions at the next election.[1] We might in these days "throw the bums out"; but it is much harder to throw out their pork barrels, with their built-in vested interests.

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Of course local governments have their share of planning activities, as they should. But between size extremes of governmental planning-power differences are qualitative, such that local plans hatched in local planning offices loom less large than do secret schemes of Pentagon pundits. A key to this difference is avenues of accountability. All viable open systems have two-way communication. Only locally can every individual effectively and personally speak out. Theoretically the individual is free to speak out even to his national government. But who really listens? Can we distinguish one voice shouting at a football stadium? Questions of economic class too are crucial to the spirit of democracy: When a corporation has open access to the top, but that corporation's customers do not, is the spirit of democracy served? It is as if we all have freedom to speak--but the rich and powerful command all the loudspeakers.

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[1]See Donald N. Michael, "Democratic Participation and Technological Planning," in Westin, ed., 1971, pp. 294-295.

In the last chapter it was indirectly shown how a city council could become isolated from popular sentiment. When representatives are isolated they become rulers, not representatives. Thus, the question is how to return sovereignty to the sovereign people. I believe that computer technology could provide that pathway. Today's computers as currently applied to social problems are restricted to data gathering and providing options for planners. Despite this new tool's widespread use, there are limits built into any centralized application of computers to real-world planning problems. For example: a chess board is a tiny microcosm compared with macroscopic social reality; nevertheless, there are a stupendous 10^{120} possibilities in the chess board alone.[1]

Computer technology is best wed to democracy through establishment of a two-way communication between government and the electorate. We cannot have an open society when various ears of government are closed for two to six years at a time. The founding fathers in their mistrust of "the mob" established an essentially closed political system--one which opens up every few years for voting, then

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[1]See Herbert A. Simon, "Research for Choice," in Kostelanetz, ed., 1971, pp. 39-40.

closes again. In past centuries life's pace was leisurely; technology was virtually constant. Today more goes on during one four-year presidency than occurred in several decades of the eighteenth century.

It could be well argued that increased molecular activity below necessitates more stability at the pinnacle of power. There is some structural validity to this perspective. However, there are two modifying factors: first, the educational level of the electorate has sharply risen, enabling more people to comprehend government's activities; second, there can be micro-variability within macro-stability. This is where two-way feedback fits in.

Madison demonstrated how representative government need not be restricted by the face-to-face requirements of direct democracy. Now it can be shown that computers, when hooked up to telephone lines, can restore much of the feedback intrinsic to direct democracy.

All legislative bodies subdivide their activities into committees. Committees are able to make parameter choices for their whole legislative bodies to decide on. Too, committees psychologically satisfy human need for face-to-face interaction, facilitating interchange of ideas.[1] In the revised

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[1]Cf. James, 1951.

Congress, in the renewed city council, committees would still function as needed--but the essential change would be in the legislative role of the entire body. Councils and the Congress would themselves relate to a voting electorate as committees. Their primary function would be presentation of two or more viewpoints for the instant electorate to vote on. Even if everybody on a council were in agreement, somebody would be assigned a "devil's advocate" role for the public presentation.

With cable television many new channels will be opened. Cynics who doubt whether people would be interested in joining the legislative process overlook such factors as the high viewer interest in the Ervin hearings on Watergate. Even day-to-day activities can generate viewer appeal. For example: McAlester, Oklahoma, broadcasts over cable television its bi-weekly council meetings. That city's mayor comments: ". . . people who weren't concerned before are now involved. They stop you on the street, or telephone, to tell you how they feel about issues. This makes us more responsive to the community's feelings."[1]

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[1]Quoted in Reader's Digest, March, 1974, p. 11.

Even more important than access to viewing government's activities is the further question of what it means "to watch" vs. "to watch to participate." Cast in a totally passive role, the viewer reverts to an infantalized status, seeking primitive excitements and fantasy (which commercial television is all too good at providing). Cast in an active political role, the viewer will be as excited as the fifth century Athenians were when they debated daily issues. The need to participate is evident in our example, where people sought out their councilmen and mayor to tell them their feelings, even though they had no direct access to the handles of power.

Face-to-face, small-group communication is the psychological norm, and of course is impossible for nearly all modern governments. But via computerized votes at least half, the personal half, of the face-to-face dialectic is preserved. Robert Wolff, a professor at Columbia University, examined instant direct democracy and predicted this scenario:

> The initial response to a system of instant direct democracy would be chaotic, to be sure. But very quickly, men would learn--what is now manifestly not true--that their votes made a difference in the world, an immediate, visible difference. There is nothing which brings on a sense of responsibility to fast as that awareness.[1]

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[1]Wolff, 1970, p. 36; cf. Sherrill, 1968; and see Vladimir K. Zworykin, "Communications and Government," in Kostelanetz, ed., 1971, pp. 159-162.

More timid reformers believe a ward system for local government is all it takes to get justice for all viewpoints. I too would advocate this system, as opposed to citywide elections, wherever possible. But wards alone are not enough to return government to the people. Ward-based councilmen could become exclusive in their loyalties (even though their decisions affected the entire city), and a minority viewpoint could unjustly suffer a minority vote. Other councilmen would feel freed to vote their ethnic or class prejudices when ward representation was established.

A ward system would indeed establish proportional representation for major geographically localized viewpoints. But the purpose of government should be more than this. If the electorate is not intelligently involved in the political process the end of Justice could be overlooked in the passion of petty politics. A better move would be establishment of an enlarged council, with each member representing not more than 8,000 citizens. At this low population number individuals would get to know their councilman personally, and of course more people would get a chance to actually hold office.[1]

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[1] A Swedish survey found that the values of participation and effectivencss are best served in densely populated communities below 8,000 population. See Dahl and Tufte, 1973, pp. 62-65.

Local government can, if given back enough of the taxing power that the states and the federal government have taken away, take over many of the activities affecting local people. Regional governments can coordinate interests of local governments. States may or may not survive: the question is both constitutional and experiential. The federal monolith should survive as long as worldwide harmony is a dream on a summer evening.

On a level of population smaller still than cities and towns we find the intentional communes. As political units they are of a different order from traditional representative democracy. On the communal level politics and community are one; each community has a personality, and its members are all important to the whole. America's communal movement is for our analysis currently not a viable alternative for all the masses: there are too many people alive now (locked into complex economies) for <u>everyone</u> to go communal. Nevertheless, communes provide a border against which standard body politics can be measured.

Traditional small towns have failed to provide that border effect necessary for true community identity. They have not survived the invasion of super highways and television culture. Herbert Read observed:

> It is a notorious fact that the morality of society as a whole is in inverse ratio to its size; for the greater the aggregation of individuals, the more the individual factors are blotted out, and with them morality, which rests entirely on the moral sense of the individual and the freedom necessary for this.[1]

An excellent documentation of the surrender to mass society of traditional small towns which have not positively differentiated themselves is found in the Vidich and Bensman study, Small Town in Mass Society.

Vidich and Bensman observed how adjustments of local decisions to federal and state subsidies has led to a psychological dependence on ". . . outside control to the point where town and village governments find it hard to act even where they have the power. Legal jurisdictions have been supplanted by psychological jurisdictions . . . ."[2] In short, traditional small towns today provide neither the sanctuary of total community, nor the pride of political independence.

In contrast, the ideal commune is pointed toward becoming an alternative form of microsocial organization in the world. A viable dialectic between solitude and being-with-others emerges from community interaction and private sanctuary.

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[1]Read, 1968, p. 88.

[2]Vidich and Bensman, 1960, p. 101, also pp. 80-107; see too Stein, 1960.

Other unique elements characterize this extension of the extended family. As is true with all gestalts, no written description can capture the essence of any commune. A process cannot be crystallized; a commune is such a process, not just a place.[1] Even though most communes have fallen far short of their ideals—the very fact that they have had intentional ideals sets them apart from the anomic thingness of standard people-clusters.

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[1]See Roberts, 1971; Nordhoff, 1966; Kanter, 1970; and Cooper, 1971; cf. Goodman, Paul, and Goodman, Percival, 1960.

CHAPTER XVII:
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

In my back yard: the bugs watch the birds who watch the squirrels who watch the cats who watch the dogs who watch the people who watch the bugs . . .

And so it goes throughout all of Nature. Intraspecific as well as extraspecific behavior is charged with a special intensity. My back yard is just a microcosm, an infinitesimal chunk, of the biosphere. Chunk though it be, it contains all of the dynamics Darwin and Malthus eloquently described. Nature it seems is exceedingly prolific, even in one's back yard. Billions of spores are ejected by hundreds of plants. Millions of tiny bugs munch hastily on these plants. Minute monsters battle for supremacy over postage stamp-sized patches of dirt. To them we are so remote we might as well be God.

Keynoting all this fury of activity is the waste of redundant individuals. Indeed, Nature hardly knows of individuality in my back yard. A natural "individual" is any coherent, negentropic package of energy directed toward its survival and reproduction of its kind. Action is programmed

through instinct so as to be subconscious of itself. Purpose is programmed and therefore unknown for itself. But while individuals are wasted their bodies are recycled into another section of the food chain. If Nature wastes individuals, she is very careful about not wasting their negentropic protein residue. And what is the "purpose" of all this? Simply-- to keep on keeping on.

Man is truly a stranger to lower life forms--well, at least in his more humane moments. Few other animals kill others of their species for sadistic pleasure. What if the female praying mantis turns on her lover and eats him as they finish mating? Such apparent cruelty is Nature's way toward negentropic efficiency: after mating the male mantis has no further purpose, no meaning, except as food. Facing the mantis Homo sapiens is as another creature from another universe. Because man's capacities for creative expression are so much vaster than those of lower species--there dialectically emerges (evolves) new qualities of meaning to complement and supersede the keeping-on-keeping-on justification for the lower orders' activity.

In short, man is conscious of his historical self. What the lower orders lack in individual quality,

they abundantly make up for in quantity and energy. What man lacks in quantity (there are far more bacteria in one's body than people in the world)--he makes up for through his magnified individual existence. Creative growth is the ideal for self-conscious man. Mass man's reality is otherwise. Mass man is hardly superior to the lowest orders in his collective actions. How else could we explain World Wars I and II? How else could we explain all the other senseless atrocities and banalities committed by mass man on himself.

Consciousness of self and society as emergent existent is the gateway to freedom and morality. Consciousness of one's environment is an aspect of that self-consciousness. Grain treated with a fast poison kills off just one or two rats in a target colony; it takes a slow poison to work. Why? Rats are weak in analyzing cause and effect if the chain of logic is too stretched. Man's logic is far better, ideally. But is he today conscious enough of the systemic consequences of his choices? Frank Herbert recently wrote a stimulating article for Harper's Magazine wherein he examined technological man's problem of communicating with his own species as an aggregate organism, showing how linear

perception fails us in this relativistic world. He concluded: " . . . we are not raising our awareness to the level demanded by the times, we are not making the connections between poisons and processes--to the despair of our species."[1]

Whereas Nature in her lower life forms is locked into destruction of the redundant individual for the sake of species preservation, man can supersede this vicious logos by way of his ecological consciousness of self in its milieu. Just as there are vicious circles, so too can there be miraculous circles. When man through his foresight acts via birth control in the present to avoid future redundant people, those people will not be here in the future to compete and suffer. Man can "have his cake and eat it too": Only man of all species <u>can</u> optimize his group impact on the environment, while maximizing individual options. Expression of man's creative qualities is that emergent which links him to the god essence. If "god" is that which creates and determines his own destiny, then authentic man can uniquely share in this glory. But not mass man.

Massness is the lowest common denominator toward which individual people sink when they find themselves trapped in a morass of bureaucratic

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[1]Herbert, 1973.

manipulation, in a cultural desert, in an anomic society devoid of human scale and humane values. Eutopia is an ideal which can be actualized not from the air of a poet's imagination, but from the solidity of everyday life. Eutopia cannot be measured in simple Gross National Product terms. Eutopia dialectically emerges from a social system which respects the individual as much as it values its own coherence. Eutopia is a qualitatively progressive and quantitatively stabilized community which respects the earth as its mother-spaceship.

It is not utopian to plan and prepare <u>now</u> for our American eutopia. Actually, we may have no other choice. Positive feedbacks from man's accelerating application of technology and his accelerating lust for Nature's treasures may have already put him at the brink of species suicide. If such were to come about, every place on the earth would be "utopia"--no place.

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